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This dissertation tracks representations of orators in a constellation of British texts 
throughout the long eighteenth century, ranging from plays, novels, and poems to 
religious, scientific, and pedagogical texts. These colorful and persuasive orators are 
linked to the disruptive power of mass persuasion, the slipperiness of the spoken word, 
and the apparent failure of rhetoric as a discipline. From the order of the Restoration to its 
re-establishment after the Glorious Revolution to the emergence of a Georgian polite 
culture characterized by its moderation, privileged stakeholders announced both a current 
and future stability that orators continually threaten. My chapters focus on four 
discourses in which real and fictional orators play a central role: experimental 
philosophy, attacks on Methodism, Alexander Pope‘s poetry, and Scottish Enlightenment 
rhetorical treatises.  I locate an imperative to limit the potential power of the orator, 
which echoes a general cultural move to ―neuter‖ rhetoric of its affective capabilities and 
to regulate the troubling instabilities of language. Neutered Rhetoric interrogates the 
  
traditional critical narrative of British rhetoric in the period by considering the resurgence 
of rhetorical theory in the 1750s as both a reaction to and a revision of the vexed cultural 
status of the orator as presented in literary texts. In charting literary representations of 
orators and their relationship to the shift in rhetoric from an oral to a written discipline, I 
present a new avenue for exploring the changing shape and influence of rhetorical theory 
during the period. I argue that representations of orators – whether real or fictional – can 
be read as theories about the nature of rhetoric, its inherent value and the problems of its 
effects. Whenever orators speak, they both represent and provoke cultural responses to 
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An Age of Orators 
In a 1759 essay in the Critical Review, Oliver Goldsmith pontificates, ―We all 
would be orators: our very tradesmen are orators: we live in an age of orators. Were it not 
worthwhile to ask what oratory is?‖
1
 When he posits the eighteenth century as an ―age of 
orators,‖ Goldsmith writes ironically. His rhetorical question comes in the middle of a 
fairly damning review of John Ward‘s System of Oratory (1759). Bored by the 
―disgusting dryness of names and definitions,‖
2
 Goldsmith claims that Ward merely 
repeats the exhaustive (and exhausting) precepts of classical rhetoric without considering 
their propriety in contemporary settings. For Goldsmith, orators are not, as Cicero would 
define them, specialized masters of eloquence who are the products of a dynamic 
program of rhetorical training. Rather, orators are everywhere – in shops, taverns, and 
coffeehouses -  and they do not need a classical training program to be persuasive. 
Like Goldsmith, we can ask ―what oratory is‖ by looking more carefully at those 
who practice it. It would not be an overstatement to call the literature of the long 
eighteenth century a chronicle and representation of an ―age of orators.‖ However, as 
Goldsmith implies, orators are more often problems than solutions; they provoke the 
worst more than they bring out the best. Orators are frequently sources of a dissonant 
noise that needs to be silenced. From the Restoration to the French Revolution, we can 
find orators up to no good. In John Milton‘s Paradise Lost (1667), for instance, before 
                                                 
1
 Oliver Goldsmith, Collected Works, ed. Arthur Friedman, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 1:168. 
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Satan delivers the speech that will convince Eve to betray God‘s order, the narrative 
voice is explicit in putting him firmly in the rhetorical tradition: 
As when of old some orator renowned, 
In Athens or free Rome, where eloquence 
Flourished, since mute! to some great cause addressed, 




With the skill of Athenian orators, this persuasive speaker destabilizes a paradise that is 
characterized by both its physical beauty and its stringent moral code. After Satan‘s 
speech, Eve will praise his words as ―plain,‖
4
 viewing deception as cool, detached reason. 
Earlier in Paradise Lost, we meet an orator whose persuasive ability rivals Satan‘s. When 
the grandiloquent Belial appears in Pandaemonium, his words are preceded by this 
description: 
. . . his tongue 
Dropped manna, and could make the worse appear 
The better reason, to perplex and dash 
Maturest counsels: for his thoughts were low-- 
To vice industrious, but to nobler deeds 




Belial will proceed to persuade his audience to accept the ―slothful‖ virtues he 
exemplifies, arguing that his devilish companions should merely relax and get used to 
hell rather than wage war against heaven. In 1747, Samuel Richardson has Clarissa 
Harlowe invoke Milton‘s description of Belial to describe the silver-tongued John 
Belford.
6
 Of course, Belford will not become the Satan to Clarissa‘s virginal Eve; that 
would be Robert Lovelace. After casting Belford as a Belial figure, Clarissa notes that 
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 John Milton, ―Paradise Lost (1674),‖ In The Riverside Milton, ed. Roy Flannagan (Boston: Houghton 
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Lovelace possesses an even greater ―deceiving sweetness which appears in his smiles, in 
his accent, in his whole aspect and address.‖
7
 Like Belial, Lovelace ―pleases the ear,‖ 
which Clarissa decides is evidence of his dignity, leading her to have ―hope of seeing him 
a reformed man.‖
8
 As the reader will realize, Clarissa should have trusted the  impression 
that led her to recall Milton. The Belial allusion foreshadows Lovelace‘s actions – he will 
―dash‖ Clarissa‘s ―maturest counsels‖ with eloquently presented lies.  
Deceitful but eloquent, Belial, Lovelace, and Satan are examples of what Richard 
Lanham has called homo rhetoricus, one who has ―a natural agility in changing 
orientations‖ and for whom ―what is accepted as reality‖ is interchangeable with ―what is 
useful.‖
9
 This ―rhetorical man‖ is ―committed to no single construction of the world; 
much rather to prevailing in the game at hand.‖
10
 In Paradise Lost,  Belial and Satan are 
perfect foils to the inhabitants of Eden, who practice a prelapsarian ―unmeditated 
eloquence.‖
11
 Richardson presents a similar opposition as Clarissa desires to ―let my 
actions, not my misrepresentations . . . speak for me,‖
12
 while Lovelace thrives on 
misrepresentations, linguistic and otherwise. Richardson links Lovelace‘s persuasion not 
merely to oratory, but to rhetoric of the most pernicious kind. 
Uncontained and unbound by a guiding ethics, orators thrive in a disordered state 
that they help to create. Richardson and Milton depict the orator acting with liberty and 
ingenuity: freedom of speech at its worst. Unless they are controlled or silenced, the 
effects of these fictional persuasive voices lead to tragedy. In her 1668 play, The Bridals, 
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Margaret Cavendish puts forward the possibility that orators can be controlled and 
dismissed before they achieve their harmful goals. Set apart from a group of feuding 
bridals, the secondary character of Mimick aspires to be a professional orator. Mimick is 
―rather a knave than a fool,‖
13
 but he longs to develop and model persuasive skills so 
great that he will create cuckolds through speeches that will ―make the two Poles meet in 
the very forehead of the Torrid Zone of a Man‘s head.‖
14
 Though Mimick‘s rhetorical 
gifts are questionable, his ambitions are even more suspect. He longs to be like Orators 
who ―gain more renown by those that do not hear them, but only see them.‖
15
 Mimick‘s 
professional ambition is guided by his recognition of the grim state of rhetoric as a 
discipline; in short, to be a successful orator, one does not have to be particularly gifted at 
oratory. Though Mimick‘s desires are potentially destructive, his effects are nothing of 
the sort. His objectionable orations are quickly dismissed by the intelligent and witty 
bridals who hear them. The audience who laughs Mimick off the stage joins in this act of 
critical judgment. The Bridals presents a fictional space in which the deleterious effects 
of rhetoric can be isolated and ignored. Reason and good sense clearly and adamantly 
triumph over empty words and divisive sentiments, both in the romantic plot that drives 
the play and when confronted by the potential threat the devious orator poses. Within the 
fiction of the play, Mimick is contained by the intelligent audiences who reject him. 
However, Cavendish‘s dramatization (which, as I will argue, is connected to her political 
and scientific imperatives) also suppresses the symbolic persuasive voice that Mimick 
represents. For Cavendish, Mimick‘s failure becomes the triumph of aristocratic privilege 
                                                 
13
 Margaret Cavendish, ―The Bridals,‖ in The Convent of Pleasure and Other Plays, ed. Anne Shaver 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999), 191. Since the Johns Hopkins edition does not have not line numbers, 
these citations are by page number. 
14
 Ibid., 193. 
15




and order through which selfish motives are revealed by rather than hidden within the 
orator‘s speech. 
The posh socialites of The Bridals have no desire to integrate the orator into their 
circle. Yet Tobias Smollett‘s 1771 novel The Expedition of Humphry Clinker offers the 
possibility of conciliation and reform that Richardson‘s Clarissa imagines but does not 
achieve. Humphry Clinker, a penniless fellow with an immaculate moral compass and a 
gift for preaching, is taken in as a footman by the traveling party of Matthew Bramble.  
Frustrated when Clinker bursts into an extempore sermon against swearing before a poor 
crowd at the Court of St. James, the splenetic Bramble opines, ―if you should have 
eloquence enough to persuade the vulgar, to resign those tropes and figures of rhetoric, 
there will be little or nothing left to distinguish their conversation from that of their 
betters.‖
16
 Later, when Bramble finds Humphry preaching ―at a kind of a methodist 
meeting,‖ he interrupts and upbraids him further.
17
 Bramble‘s suspicion of Humphry‘s 
methods reflects a general anxiety toward the increasing power of real-life Methodists 
such as George Whitefield. Like Whitefield, Humphry is particularly skilled at drawing 
in female audience members. Yet as the novel ends, Humphry is folded into the polite 
and rational society that the traveling party represents. When Humphry is revealed to be 
Bramble‘s illegitimate son, Smollett presents his redemption in his integration to the 
more moderate standards of religious practice as represented by Bramble and his 
company.
18
 Milton and Richardson present the catastrophic effects of persuasive speech. 
Yet Cavendish and Smollett offer fantasies of assimilation and containment, of the 
                                                 
16
 Tobias Smollett, Humphry Clinker, ed. Thomas L. Preston (Athens: Georgia UP, 1990), 98. 
17
 Ibid., 134. 
18




triumph of British rationality and community – even with all its quirks and flaws – as a 
way to contain the specter of the orator.  
From Satan to Lovelace, from Mimick to Humphry Clinker, the literature of the 
eighteenth century abounds with orators. On one hand, the orator sets his devious sights 
on using speech to unsettle and challenge the judgment. On the other, auditors use their 
judgment to control these potentially dangerous effects. By examining what the orators 
can do, should do, and also what should be done about them, these writers present 
meditations about rhetoric, its inherent value and the problem of its effects. These orators 
not only channel and are informed by rhetorical theory, they are themselves theories of 
rhetoric. 
What Happened to Rhetoric in the Long Eighteenth Century? 
The fate of the orator is part of a larger narrative about the practice and theory of rhetoric 
in the eighteenth century. As writers from Milton to Smollett address the power of the 
orator, rhetoricians of the period debate the direction that rhetorical theory should take. In 
a period in which the discipline was marked by internal dissension and external criticism, 
no major works on rhetoric were produced in England between 1660 and 1750.
19
 During 
this period, the primary texts that dealt with rhetoric, such as the anonymous Some Rules 
for Speaking and Action (1716) or John ―Orator‖ Henley‘s Oratory Transactions (1728-
                                                 
19
 For a list of some of the works produced during this period, see Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-
Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971). From 1660 to 1690, the French 
composed the most rhetorical treatises. From 1690 to 1740 in England, the primary movement focused on 
delivery and pronunciation and was termed (by its contemporaries) ―The Elocutionary Movement.‖ About 
this period, Howell writes, ―the practices which the elocutionists encouraged inevitably led to declamation 
without sincere conviction and earnest feeling, as students recited discourses devised and organized by 
someone else. And when these practices came to stand in the public mind for the whole of rhetorical 
doctrine, rhetoric came to mean empty and insincere speaking . . . for artificial elegance of style‖ (145-46). 
For a recent revisionist take on the Elocutionists, see Dana Harrington, ―Remembering the Body: 
Eighteenth-Century Elocution and the Oral Tradition,‖ Rhetorica 28, no. 1 (2010): 67–95. On rhetoric in 





29), focused on delivery alone and more or less ignored the other great canons of 
classical rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, and memory.
20
 About the period, Walter 
Ong claims, ―The demise of rhetoric marked probably the greatest break with the past 
which Western culture had ever experienced.‖
21
 Yet despite the ―demise,‖  orators were 
ubiquitous. The conflicted status of rhetoric is the intellectual backdrop against which the 
orator speaks. Orators must not only make a case for the subjects of their persuasive 
speeches, but also the art of persuasion itself. And often, as we will see,  in their 
audiences‘ eyes they fail. 
 The eighteenth century marks a sharp shift in the moral configuration of orators. 
The classical rhetoricians imagined the orator as a heroic, civilizing figure. In Cicero, the 
orator unites wisdom and eloquence, and becomes a civilizing force in the marshalling of 
language to pursue and animate civic virtue. Quintilian writes that ―justice and truth . . . 
have a peculiar relation to the art of oratory.‖
22
 The orator is ―such a man as may be 
called truly wise, not blameless in morals only . . . a character such as, perhaps, no man 
ever was.‖ 
23
  For these influential Romans, rhetorical education offers a system of 
training not only in speaking, but also in virtue, ethics, and  epistemology. As Jeanne 
Fahnestock notes, rhetoric ―represents the discipline that virtually constituted higher 
learning in antiquity, and it remained a major portion of the university curriculum from 
the Middle Ages through the eighteenth century.‖
24
 In the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century, a number of treatises were published that celebrated both the power of orators 
                                                 
20
 On Some Rules for Speaking and Action, see Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric, 
190–98;on Orator Henley, see Graham Midgley, Life of Orator Henley (Oxford UP, 1973). 
21
 Walter J. Ong, ―Review of Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric by Wilbur Samuel Howell,‖ 
The William and Mary Quarterly 29, no. 4 (October 1972): 641. 
22
 Quintilian, Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory: Or, Education of an Orator, trans. John Selby Watson 
(London: George Bell and Sons, 1907), 4. 
23
 Ibid., 6–7. 
24




and the classical methodology that could produce them. Linking classical technique with 
protestant theology, Thomas Wilson used his 1553 Arte of Rhetorique to reconceive 
Ciceronian eloquence as a gift from God, who ―stirred up his faythfull and elect, to 
perswade with reason, all men to societye.‖
25
 The connection between protestant morality 
and persuasive skill authorized the orator to do great things in God‘s name. Because of 
the assurance of divine providence, Henry Peacham could describe the orator without 
irony or qualification as ―the emperor of men‘s minds and affections and next to the 
omnipotent God in the power of persuasion by grace and divine assistance.‖
26
 
 Yet after the  English civil wars, rhetoric became the subject of disdain and 
suspicion. After all, orators got them into that mess in the first place. ―Specious Tropes 
and Figures,‖ scoffs Thomas Sprat in The History of the Royal Society (1667), 
condemning the seemingly benign stylistic devices for ―the evil . . . now so inveterate, 
that it is hard to know whom to blame, or where to begin to reform.”
27
 John Locke calls 
rhetoric ―the perfect cheat,‖ allowable in civic address but having no place within serious 
philosophical discourse.
28
  To personify the dangers of rhetoric, writers often turn to the 
vexed figure of the orator to represent the problem of its misuse and the excesses of the 
discipline. For instance, Thomas Hobbes complains that the orator was a ―favorite of 
sovereign assemblies,‖ who had ―great power to hurt, but little to save.‖ 
29
 When 
Jonathan Swift‘s Gulliver rebukes lawyers as those who are trained in the ―art of proving 
by words multiplied for the purpose that White is Black, and Black is White, according as 
                                                 
25
 Thomas Wilson, ―The Arte of Rhetorique,‖ in The Rhetorical Tradition, 703. 
26
 Henry Peacham, ―The Garden of Eloquence,‖ in Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric, ed. Wayne Rebhorn 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000), 226. 
27
 Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society, ed. Jackson I. Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones (St. Louis: 
Washington UP, 1958), 113. 
28
 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1979). 508. 
29






 he not only describes the deplorable contemporaneous state of forensic 
oratory, but he also echoes one of the earliest criticisms of ancient rhetoric – that it makes 
the worse appear the better. At the other end of the period, Immanuel Kant dismisses the 
orator as one who ―gives something which he does not promise,‖ but ―fails to supply 
what he did promise.‖
31
While Kant‘s description emphasizes the flawed ―promise‖ and 
questionable motives of an ―art‖ dedicated to persuasion, other writers depicted deceptive 
speakers who manipulate judgment as a sculptor does clay. Rhetoric in the eighteenth 
century was viewed by some as a trivial, even useless discipline pursued by stodgy 
antiquarians and laughable elocutionists. Yet as Sprat and Hobbes assert, an art dedicated 
to persuasion recalled the animated speakers who stimulated dissent and whose fiery 
speeches invited the civil war.  
 To say that all public speakers were denounced would be an overstatement, but 
calling someone an orator often amounted to an insult. Though the usage of the term 
varies, an orator was a speaker whose pomposity was reflected by a reliance on rhetorical 
conceits. Many who openly practiced rhetoric were often mocked or criticized, as in 
Henry Fielding‘s and Alexander Pope‘s satirical caricatures of the popular lecturer and 
elocutionist John ―Orator‖ Henley. In The Dunciad (1729), Pope puts Henley in the 
gallery of exultant dunces, where he appears ―Tuning his voice, and balancing his hands / 
How fluent nonsense trickles from his tongue! / How sweet the periods, neither said nor 
sung!‖
32
 In Fielding‘s The Author’s Farce (1730), the barely concealed caricature ―Dr. 
                                                 
30
 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 231. 
31
 Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Judgement, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Prometheus Press, 2000), 207. 
32
 Alexander Pope, ―The Dunciad.‖ The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope, ed. James 




Orator‖ pursues the hand of the Goddess of Nonsense.
33
  Plays such as Charles Macklin‘s 
The Man of the World (1781) and Samuel Foote‘s The Orators (1777) also presented 
elocutionists as buffoons and scam artists.
34
 Alternately, as in Milton‘s Paradise Lost, 
orators also often produce unease about their potential to propel the wrong passions and 
disrupt ordered scenes. In Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard‘s Cato’s Letters (1722), 
the orator ―rouses all that is human in you, and makes your own heart conspire against 
you! In this magical and outrageous tempest, you are at the entire mercy of him who 
raised it.‖
35
 The too-malleable human passions are at the ―entire mercy‖ of an orator who 
uses calculated language to make something appear what it is not. In earlier essays, 
―Cato‖ also celebrates the potential of orators throughout history, but here he views them 
as provoking a destructive linguistic ―tempest.‖ These competing representations – that 
is, as either trivial or terrible – together reveal the attitudes toward language and 
persuasion that underwrite the surge toward progress and politeness that were defining an 
increasingly modernized society. 
 Having fallen from prominence after the Restoration and the scientific 
revolution, rhetoric would reemerge in the 1750s with a new credibility following the 
publication of several major rhetorical treatises and important lecture series. In the work 
of Scottish Enlightenment figures such as Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, and George 
Campbell, rhetoric began to matter again. However, their focus had largely shifted from 
oral to written discourse and from production to reception. This emergence of what is 
                                                 
33
 Henry Fielding, The Author’s Farce. ed. Charles B. Woods (Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1966). 
34
 Charles Macklin, ―A Man of the World,‖ in Four Comedies by Charles Macklin, ed. J. O Bartley 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1968), 199-268; Samuel Foote, The Orators. A Comedy. As It Is Acted at 
the Theatres-Royal in Drury-Lane and Convent-Garden. (London, 1777). Macklin‘s ―Man of the World‖ is 
a parody of Thomas Sheridan, while Foote ridicules Macklin, who also lectured on elocution. 
35
 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters, ed. Ronald Hamowy, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty 




often called a ―new‖ rhetoric largely replaced orthodox approaches to classical 
methodology that had prevailed in the university. As I will discuss in more detail in 
chapter four, these texts generally overlook the orator and even exhibit a suspicion 
toward the spoken word. 
Though rhetoric proved malleable enough to be reshaped, these shifts in practice 
and theory signaled the polite distinctions of the changing culture. Despite this dynamic 
backdrop, no thorough critical study explores the correlation between rhetoric‘s contested 
status and the literature of the period. Even if the lead-up to the new rhetoric is a period 
that seems unproductive for rhetorical theory, the presence of orators provoked 
representations that take on the role of theory Raymond Williams defines as ―an 
interaction between things done, things observed, and (systematic) explanation of these.‖ 
36
 Representations of orators are far from systematic, but they are explanations of the 
operations of speech and  its ability to influence. By considering the relationship between 
the fate of rhetoric and representations of persuasive speakers, I explore the resilience of 
the spoken word in a period when its stability and efficacy were being challenged.  
Critical Survey 
Throughout this project, I use the term rhetoric to describe a discipline and a 
practice. For Aristotle, rhetoric is the pursuit of an art of oral persuasion;
37
 for Quintilian, 
it is ―the art of speaking well.‖
38
 Both influential classical theorists emphasize rhetoric as 
a primarily oral discipline, one that takes place in public settings. Yet I also use the term 
―rhetoric‖ as a stand-in for a disciplinary history. By attacking or endorsing rhetoric, long 
                                                 
36
 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985), 317. 
37
 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1991). 
38




eighteenth-century thinkers consider both practice and tradition. When Sprat denounces 
―the colours of Rhetorick,‖
39
 he at once attacks the practice of figurative language and a 
discipline dedicated to teaching and applying them. Also, while ―rhetoric‖ and ―oratory‖ 
are often used problematically in the period to refer to the same thing, I use ―oratory‖ to 
refer to the specifically oral practices that my study explores. Yet as a discipline, rhetoric 
was in large part dedicated to training orators for speaking in deliberative, judicial, and 
ceremonial settings, though this emphasis shifted after the mid-1750s, a moment I will 
discuss as profound for its implications about both the spoken and written word as well as 
the integral figure of the public speaker. While the figure of the orator was often used as a 
literary representative for rhetoric as a whole, rhetoric had become and was further 
becoming about more than oratory. So for my study, ―rhetoric‖ represents both a thing 
that takes place – the art of persuasion – and a thing that has taken place – as an 
institution and a tradition. Since part of my inquiry concerns writers who, through their 
texts, attempt to resist and yet still embody the same tensions that underlie the integrity of 
oral performance, I am interested in rhetoric as a persuasive performance, whether that 
act is written or oral. 
This project draws upon and contributes to both eighteenth-century literary 
studies and works that more specifically focus on eighteenth-century rhetorical theory. 
Studies of rhetoric in the long eighteenth century generally focus on theory, and overlook 
practice. As H. Lewis Ulman‘s remarks on the scope of his reading of eighteenth century 
rhetoric theory, such readings are ―case studies‖ of ―philosophies of language and 
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 As the title of his Things, Thoughts, Words, and Actions: The 
Problem of Language in Late Eighteenth-Century British Rhetorical Theory suggests, 
Ulman views rhetorical theory as providing solutions to problems of language. Lockean 
semantics set in motion a skepticism toward the possibility of language to attain an 
adequate level of purity or clarity, as signification will always connote multiple 
meanings. Particularly in philosophy, the problem of representation is bound up in the 
nature of interpretation. In Locke, philosophical discourse must avoid rhetorical conceits, 
even as it cannot avoid ambiguity altogether. For Ulman, theorists informed by Locke 
take into account the murkiness of language through an emphasis on perspicuity and clear 
communication. In chapter four, I address these imperatives and their effects on orators. 
 Because later rhetoricians respond to ―problems‖ of language, there is a tendency 
to read their intervention as part of a grander narrative of a victory for enlightenment 
epistemology. Any student of long eighteenth-century rhetoric must take into account 
Wilbur Samuel Howell‘s exhaustive and magnanimous 1971 study Eighteenth-Century 
British Logic and Rhetoric. Howell offers a thorough reading of the theory of the thinkers 
he deems the ―new‖ rhetoricians, and argues the necessity of its implementation in light 
of emerging philosophical and scientific innovation. In a summative sentence, Howell 
claims the state of the discipline ―was not so much in need of repair as replacement. And 
so they formulated a new rhetoric to replace the old.‖ 
41
 For Howell, this transition was 
necessary and successful, a triumph of progressive thinking in making rhetoric matter 
again. Because of the fifteenth-century reforms of Peter Ramus and the suspicion of 
natural philosophers, Howell describes the ―old rhetoric‖ as ―no longer [having] anything 
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of real importance to say or do.‖ 
42
 Instead of addressing the philosophical innovations of 
Locke and Descartes, rhetoricians had to ―content [themselves] with enumerating in 
pedantic detail the names, derivations, and literary applications of the tropes and the 
figures . . . and with issuing the commands of a drill master about the use of voice and 
gesture in delivering a speech.‖
43
 Howell offers a valuable survey of the changing shape 
of rhetoric in the long eighteenth century, yet it is colored by his valorization of the new 
rhetoricians and his denigration of classical theories of invention and arrangement. His 
motivation is clear when attacks his contemporaries in the 1960s and 1970s who were 
still relying on classical commonplaces as generative prompts: 
[R]hetoric in a culture permeated by the standards of scientific and scholarly 
proof must become scientific and scholarly itself, and must argue from the facts of 
the case, not from suppositions that may represent mere popular misconceptions 
and prejudices. I am not saying that the eighteenth-century British authors of the 
new rhetoric won a permanent victory on this point. But they resolutely tried for 
victory, and it is a calamity for twentieth-century rhetoric that they did not 
completely prevail. The theory that valuable arguments emerge from 
commonplaces unfortunately continues still to have currency, even in circles 




Howell shares the Enlightenment ideology that scientific innovation made the classical 
theories of invention untenable. Like the thinkers he celebrates, he sees Enlightenment 
innovation as necessitating rhetoricians to read classical texts more critically and reject 
premises that no longer applied. Positing the ―calamity‖ as a failure for his 
contemporaries to learn the lessons of the eighteenth century, Howell reveals his shared 
belief with the new rhetoricians that a classical approach centered on probability and 
practical wisdom was no longer productive in light of new scientific understanding. To 
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Howell, new rhetoricians are the ones who originally posited this argument and made the 
appropriate changes, while the old rhetoricians are relegated to a regressive mode of 
thinking. To accept this narrative of progress, realized in a ―permanent victory,‖  is to 
value the new over the old. 
 What Howell overlooks are the cultural circumstances to which both critics and 
practitioners of rhetoric respond. As Kenneth Burke notes, rhetoric happens in ―the 
flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard.‖ 
45
 The forces that aim to organize 
language are not abstract ideas, but are specific relations to the function of oral 
performance in a given context. After all, during this time, England welcomed a thriving 
print culture that emphasized the superior formality of written language as well as a 
paradigmatic empirical philosophy that questioned the efficacy of rhetorical performance. 
In Jurgen Habermas‘ analysis, this is the period in which a public sphere both evolves 
and collapses.
 46
 Consequently, as Paula McDowell notes, British thinkers developed ―a 
distinctly new degree of self-conscious reflection on oral communication and its actual 
and potentially threatening intersection with an unrestrained press.‖
47
 This fixation on 
orality did not merely happen in the abstract realm of philosophy. Experimental 
philosophers seemingly banished rhetoric from protocols of the laboratory. Religious 
writers denounced preachers who aimed their sermons at passionate rather than rational 
response. Writers who were mastering the tools of the emerging print culture challenged 
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the value of oral media. Even rhetorical theorists questioned the integrity of the 
contemporary oral culture. When Goldsmith calls his milieu an ―age of orators,‖ he calls 
attention to the ubiquity of persuasive voices. This project recognizes their persistent 
presence and the confrontations that arise. 
 Building on Ulman, I consider the way the problem of language is inextricably 
linked to the presence of orators such as those whom Milton, Richardson, Cavendish, and 
Smollett address through their literary representations. Because orators are so ubiquitous 
and present such a threat, writers respond by developing competing theories of 
persuasion and language in an attempt to counter and control the effects of rhetoric. 
Theory results even when its creators do not set out to make it.  By considering scientific, 
religious, and poetic discourse, and finally eighteenth-century rhetorical theory itself,  I 
argue that representations of orators reveal that the contested attitudes toward speech and 
language were endemic throughout the period. In each case, theory comes into conflict 
with practice, as practice first resists and ultimately challenges theory. Though they offer 
no clear or familiar theoretical language, these representations are an interposition into 
the potential and actual problems of persuasive speech. Teasing theory out of 
representations of orators allows for a better understanding of the nature of performance, 
affect, individual volition, and mediation in the long eighteenth century. 
Though no study particularly focuses on the eighteenth-century orator,
48
 critical 
accounts reveal a culture wrestling with the necessity, integrity, and efficacy of rhetorical 
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performance. Because many rhetorical practices were viewed to be inappropriate to a 
polite culture, its traditional theory was often deemed dangerous in the passionate 
response it had traditionally aimed to provoke. As Adam Potkay argues throughout The 
Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume, the classical program of ―eloquence‖ was 
unsuited to this ―age that does not want its passion inflamed.‖
 49
 This concern is part of 
what Paula McDowell calls a ―self-conscious reflection on oral communication‖ that 
grows out of  an ―extended meditation upon the problems and possibilities of print.‖
50
 As 
McDowell notes, all the belching and droning and braying in works such as Swift‘s Tale 
of a Tub (1704) and Pope‘s Dunciad are representative of the oral improprieties that must 
be tamed.
51
 Arguing from slightly different perspectives, Potkay and McDowell posit the 
evolution of a polite oratory and the ethics of print culture as a response to the dynamic 
and forceful primacy of orality. Scholars such as Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan 
have elaborated the means by which orality and literacy are powerful technologies that 
affect cognition, that are what Elizabeth Eisenstein calls ―agents of change.‖
52
 In 
McLuhan, such change results in a ―world‖ characterized as ―alien to the resonating 
diversity of spoken words.‖
53
 While Potkay locates a polite style of alleviation rather than 
arousal, Paul Goring makes a compelling, possibly even competing case that the 
sustained popularity of oratorical performances reveals ―that the bodies of orators were 
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important to the growth of politeness because they occupied supremely public positions 
in eighteenth-century life.‖
 54
 Studies of Restoration and eighteenth-century drama also 
note the development of a ―rhetoric of the passions‖ that Joseph Roach describes  as 
―hav[ing] the power of utterly deflecting the psyche and physique from their natural 
course,‖
55
 a phrase that could be applied to an orator as well. Roach‘s description of 
affect recalls the scene in Tom Jones (1749) when Partridge responds to David Garrick in 
the role of Hamlet, saying ―when I saw the little man so frightened himself, it was that 
which took hold of me.‖
56
 The ability for persuasive speakers to take ―hold‖ over the 
baffled and entranced audiences full of Partridges is an anxiety that I will continue to 
unpack. In the dramatic emphasis on disguise and performance, Lisa Freeman adds that 
performing the passions ―diminished the significance of interiority and privileged the role 
of exteriority in the presentation and reception of an actor‘s performance.‖
57
 The 
theatrical emphasis on show over substance is celebrated, while the same values in 
rhetoric are critiqued. As actors such as Macklin and Thomas Sheridan also contributed 
to elocutionary discourse, they attempt both an emotional rhetoric and to extrapolate a 
rhetoric of the emotions.  
The broad range of critical opinions shows the period to be at once an age of 
reason and an age of passion. Rather than see such evidence as oppositional, I argue that 
these tendentious attitudes are entangled in the deliberations of an intellectual elite whose 
moderating ambitions toward various levels of popular culture fail to be realized in public 
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protocol. Potkay and Goring analyze the rise of polite culture, what it rejects and what it 
integrates, and the way it can be articulated as a desirable sociable ethos. Admittedly, the 
term ―polite‖ has many different suggestive meanings, both for modern critics and those 
who used the term in the eighteenth century. Tellingly, when Samuel Johnson wrote 
Hester Thrale that he was feeling ―quite polite,‖ a confused Ms. Thrale responded, ―That 
the Dr. was quite polite to Day – we never knew what he meant exactly.‖
58
 Johnson most 
likely uses ―polite‖ to describe a positive state, just as many writers would apply the term 
to describe a polished decency. Politeness has deep connections to wealth, taste, and 
manners. Paul Langford explains, ―The essence of politeness was often said to be that je 
ne sais quoi which distinguished the innate gentleman‘s understanding of what made for 
civilized conduct, but this did not inhibit others from seeking more artificial means of 
acquiring it.‖
59
 For those ―seekers,‖ politeness is a style and a social posture more than a 
deeply ingrained virtue. Critics of politeness might use the term to indicate its artificiality 
and its social presentation. In Henry Mackensie‘s Man of the World (1773), a character 
describes the French as ―the politest enemies in the world,‖ just before they throw him in 
a ―dungeon dark, damp, and lonesome.‖
60
 Even the vile and free of virtue may adopt the 
manners of politeness. The double-meaning, as something attained that is presented as 
innate, is embedded in discussions of sociability and appropriate practices. Depending on 
who uses the term, ―polite‖ can be an insult or a compliment, a way of emphasizing the 
artificial or idealizing the refined. Ironically, even the progenitors of politeness were also 
some of its most vocal critics; we will see this particularly in the case of Alexander Pope. 
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As Langford notes, politeness also refers to the ―infiltration of metropolitan mores into 
ever corner of the land and every social class.‖
61
 As a program, politeness can be located 
in the attempts of an intellectual elite to describe and disseminate itself. Potkay describes 
the polite style as one that ―seeks to placate or stabilize rather than, as with eloquence, to 
make things happen.‖
62
 In those aims, rhetoric becomes pivotal in the way it both 
contains those values and allows writers to articulate them. 
The work of Potkay and Goring conveys a point that this project takes as fact: 
orators continued to speak even though many wished they would just shut up. Despite 
their inappropriate desire to ignite passions, orators continued to do just that, threatening 
the stability of discourses that their participants saw as possible: politeness evolved 
either, as Potkay suggests, in spite of eloquence or, as Goring argues, by way of it. The 
continued presence of popular rhetorical figures such as Orator Henley, Thomas 
Sheridan, Charles Macklin, and Methodist preachers unsettled various intellectual and 
artistic cultures that longed to replace the orator with a more appropriate mediator, 
leading to representations of orators who should be ignored for their spurious or 
dangerous content. These representations can be read as theories about the nature of 
rhetoric, and thus participate in the significant discourse of ―reflection‖ that Paula 
McDowell analyzes. For instance, writers such as Swift and Pope often reflect on the 
emerging tools of the print culture and the way it displaces the primacy of orality. Also, 
because of lamentations by critics such as Goldsmith and David Hume, there were efforts 
to stimulate oral practices that ranged from improving pronunciation to producing 
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 These thinkers were concerned with the effects of changes in media not only 
on the production and consumption of literary texts, but also on cognition. Again, 
reflections on orality, even  if seemingly in the abstract, were prompted by material and 
cultural circumstances. 
Scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also find discord between 
rhetorical and linguistic theory and oratorical practice.
 64
 This conflict is played out in 
representations of  speaking bodies of orators. When writers depict persuasive speakers, 
they contain them in a derisive, often caustic language. Through these representations, 
they evaluate the questionable necessity yet obvious persistence of the discipline, as well 
as the refusal  of orators to submit to polite order. In some sense, my overarching 
question is a paradigmatic one: what happens when practice resists theory? Ideally, 
rhetorical theory should be the abstract vehicle for protocols that shape linguistic and 
cultural practices. Yet when attempts to enact procedural order fail, do the residual 
practices force theory to reshape itself?  
While my study is chronological, I will avoid the teleological impulse that many 
studies of rhetoric in the period adopt. I address these tensions more specifically in my 
fourth chapter, but the ―rise and fall‖ narrative is a familiar one that I challenge through 
the kind of cultural analysis many of these studies overlook. For example, in their 
anthology The Rhetorical Tradition, Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg write, ―Within a 
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hundred years of Sprat‘s strictures, rhetoric‘s estate was considerably improved.‖ 
65
 This 
statement recalls Howell, who links the movement of ―old‖ to ―new‖ with the most 
uncritical narratives of the Enlightenment: that through philosophical progress and a 
reason aided by science, a valorized group of thinkers inaugurated a progressive 
modernity. Mapping the fall and rise of rhetoric onto a traditional enlightenment 
narrative, Howell presents Hugh Blair and George Campbell as solving a problem that 
Sprat and Locke created by tempering the old-fashioned classical improprieties of Cicero 
and Quintilian. This is, I find, a reductive reading of rhetorical theory rather than a 
consideration of the means by which practice and theory intersect. Rather, following the 
project that Clifford Siskin and William Warner lay out in This is Enlightenment, I see 
the emergence and disappearance of rhetorical theories as events in the history of 
mediation. Warner and Siskin define mediation as ―everything that intervenes, enables, 
supplements, or is simply in between.‖
66
 In other words, ―media of some kind are always 
at work.‖
67
 Theories of communication and persuasion do not merely work to assist 
mediation but,  in Warner and Siskin‘s construction, they are media. 
“Neutering” Rhetoric 
 
To examine the role that theory plays in relationship to language in general and 
oratory specifically, I use the term ―neuter,‖ which obviously alludes to its most familiar 
lexical connotation associated with emasculation and castration. More specifically, the 
second definition in the Oxford English Dictionary encompasses my use of the term: ―to 
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render harmless or ineffectual, to neutralize.‖
68
  As my title indicates, and on the most 
basic level, I look to attempts to render orators harmless or ineffectual. These are the acts 
of containment and neutralization  that I describe above, and will focus on throughout 
this project. However, I more specifically locate the neuter within ideas about language 
itself, the way it operates and how it should operate , which is a framework that draws 
upon a number of critical, rhetorical, philosophical, and literary legacies. 
In his essay ―The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric,‖ Richard Weaver uses 
―neuter‖ as an adjective to describe a linguistic program that can be extrapolated from 
Plato‘s dialogue.
69
 In the opening section of Phaedrus, Socrates describes three kinds of 
lovers: the idealistic love of the ―noble lover,‖ the dehumanizing love of the ―base lover,‖ 
and the disinterested love of the ―non‖ or ―neuter‖ lover. Since the dialogue is by nature 
rhetorical, and takes into account issues of organization and ethics, Weaver casts the 
lovers in terms of different kinds of speech. In comparison with these categories of 
―lovers,‖ Weaver describes a corresponding rhetorical imperative: ―it can move us toward 
what is good; it can move us toward what is evil; or it can . . . fail to move us at all‖ (6). 
The last class describes what Socrates calls the ―non-lover‖ – what Weaver associates 
with a ―neuter‖ language. In Plato‘s dialogue, the young and eager Phaedrus begins the 
dialogue by excitedly telling Socrates of the speech he has heard by Lysias, an encomium 
to this indifferent non-lover.
70
 Lysias‘ speech praises the failure to move as a virtue, a 
conscious philosophy for the non-lover who instead follows a policy of enlightened self-
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interest realized in an intellectual, psychological, and emotional objectivity. The non-
lover avoids having his passion moved by the apparent sublimity of love, which Lysias 
claims is a deterrent for reaching a form of prudential reason. Socrates finds this love 
incompatible with transcendent notions of divine love and its representation through 
speech. Rather, Socrates symbolically delineates an ideal speech that persuades the soul 
to transcendent truth and virtue in an act of divine ―remembering,‖ resulting in the 
momentary union of soul and body 
As Weaver notes, Socrates‘ gentle reproach of young Phaedrus‘ enthusiasm for 
the ―non-lover‖ offers a rhetorical model. Weaver connects the ―non-lover‖ with a 
―neuter language‖ of prudent, scientific detachment which ―is preferred by all men who 
wish to do well in the world and avoid tempestuous courses‖ (9). The suggestion of a 
neutered language implies the idealized quality of being ―semantically purified,‖ or  ―a 
speech approaching pure notation in the respect that it communicates abstract intelligence 
without impulsion‖ (7). In the neuter, the non-lover  fantasizes a perfect communicative 
transaction that Weaver calls an ―unqualified medium of transmission of meanings from 
mind to mind, and by virtue of its minds can remain in an unprejudiced relationship to the 
world and also to other minds‖ (7). The ideal neuter communication is not an affective 
one, but a flawless transmission. The arhetorical impulse of the non-lover abounds 
throughout the eighteenth century, whether in the language projects of experimental 
philosophers or in the polemics of Anglican ideologues who instituted a less stylized 
preaching protocol. It is implicit in Thomas Sprat‘s desire for a ―close, naked, natural 




―Ways found out to fix it for ever.”
71
 Again, language is a problem that must be solved, 
and orators who use language inappropriately create problems that require them to be 
neutered. 
Expounding the virtuous duties of rhetoric, Weaver persuasively argues that Plato 
rejects the neuter and moves dialectically toward the noble speech that makes some effort 
to reconcile transcendental experience with its correlating incommunicability: ―Rhetoric 
appears . . . as a means by which the impulse of the soul to be ever moving is redeemed‖ 
(25). Socrates rejects the suggestion that the ―non-lover‖ is the only viable alternative to a 
―base rhetoric‖ that seeks compulsion over knowledge. For Weaver, the ―neuter‖ 
becomes an appropriate term: by removing or ―neutering‖ impulse from communication, 
one reaches the cultivated level of disinterest that the ―non-lover‖ achieves. Since this is, 
in Platonic terms, psychologically impossible, Socrates spends the bulk of the dialogue 
outlining a redirection, rather than an elimination, of the impulse toward a Platonic divine 
madness that culminates in the discovery of truth and higher order.  
As conceptualized by Weaver, the ―neuter‖ offers an advantageous rational 
paradigm in its link to ideals of objectivity and linguistic purity. Within the discourse of 
rhetorical theory, the value of the ―neuter‖ appears as a way of curbing the excesses of 
language through disciplinary refinement – as in Ulman, of solving linguistic problems. 
The typical account of the history of rhetoric accommodates this narrative of 
sophistication. If the origins of rhetoric are found in the undisciplined and self-
promotional practices of the Sophists roaming the streets of fifth-century Athens, then 
rhetoricians pose an explicit threat to the culture that spawns them when they are not 
contained by institutions. Isocrates condemned the Sophists and their training as ―stuff 
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and nonsense, and not the true discipline of the soul‖
72
 One who successfully employs a 
rhetoric that does not submit to the ethical rules of philosophy will, in the diagnosis of 
Gorgias in Encomium of Helen,  ―bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion‖
73
 
Historically, such abuse and impropriety anticipated the systematic project of 
refinement that Aristotle undertakes in On Rhetoric. As Paul Ricouer argues, Aristotle 
―domesticates‖ the tropaic and potentially dangerous ―undisciplined speech.‖
74
 He forces 
rhetoric to submit to a logical and ethical system of use, institutionalizing it through 
systematic definitions put to use in a vibrant educational program.
75
  Ultimately, Aristotle 
sets the stage for a continuing discussion of ethics, praxis, and efficacy. By linking 
rhetoric so deeply with civic virtue and practical wisdom, as Ricouer writes, Aristotle 
establishes an ―embracing rhetoric.‖
76
 As anyone who has ever taught a first-year 
composition course knows, the systematization that Aristotle attempts is easily 
transferable to the classroom. Perhaps because of that systematic agenda,  other critics 
have argued that Aristotle‘s methodology is reductive. For instance, Carol Poster has 
argued that Aristotle crafted a ―Rhetoric against rhetoric.‖ Even under the discipline of 
philosophy, Aristotle views rhetoric as an ―unfortunate necessity‖ because, in an ideal 
society, ―a proper political science would lay down such laws that rhetoric would become 
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 Though Aristotle‘s Rhetoric is not overly prescriptive, later writers 
would narrow Aristotle‘s focus to rules that make it easier to articulate and consume. 
Rhetorical theory can facilitate the power of language, as in Aristotle, yet it can 
also be used to control language through limiting protocols or stringent ethical guidelines. 
By institutionalizing rhetoric, Aristotle paves the way to make the study and practice of 
rhetoric more reputable and appropriate. In his definition of rhetoric as the counterpart of 
dialectic, he moves rhetoric out of argumentation alone and expands its province to 
assisting inquiry through argumentative strategies. This has led Walter Ong to claim that 
the ―deeply agonistic roots‖ of rhetoric were compromised over the ―inevitable 
migrat[ion] from the oral to the chirographic world.‖
78
 For Ong, the shift from an oral to 
a written discipline is one of the many effects of  the way that ―writing restructures 
consciousness.‖
79
 If the oral moment offers the potential for the stimulation of inactive 
passions toward violent propulsion, the written word possesses what Jacques Derrida 
calls ―the cadaverous rigidity of writing.‖
80
 Derrida‘s phrasing recalls the docile counter-
potential that the Restoration climate hoped to produce. The orator plays the foil to such 
endeavors with what Hobbes calls ―great power to hurt ... little to save.‖
81
 The spoken 
word, precisely because of its slipperiness, offers the prospect of misinterpretation or, 
worse, misuse. In its susceptibility to dialogic interaction, it lacks the ―rigidity‖ that the 
written word can be supposed to have. Over the course of this project, I look to the ways 
that eighteenth-century theories of persuasive speech prompted these neutering 
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imperatives. The elusive nature of the oral, in particular, is what provokes so much 
anxiety in the settings I analyze.  
The idealized neutrality that Weaver describes also shows up as a cultural 
imperative, as a method of surviving a potentially dangerous and debasing society 
through sophisticated reactions and a policy of non-participation. In 1711, Joseph 
Addison takes on the persona of Mr. Spectator to make the following assertion: 
There are some Opinions in which a Man should stand Neuter, without engaging 
his Assent to one side or the other. Such a hovering Faith as this, which refuses to 
settle upon any Determination, is absolutely necessary to a Mind that is careful to 
avoid Errors and Prepossessions. When the Arguments press equally on both sides 





Mr. Spectator‘s advice is consistent with the persona he develops throughout his essays. 
He encourages ―hover[ing]‖ over the scene of argument, rather than directly 
participating, just as he announces in a more famous passage that he will serve as ―a 
Spectator of Mankind, [rather] than as one of the Species.‖ 
83
 As Anthony Pollock argues, 
Addison and Richard Steele offer the superficial standard of ―an urbane ethics of 
sociability‖ that encourages a ―spectatorial mode of publicness.‖
84
 Mr. Spectator both 
participates in and encourages what Pollock calls the ―aesthetic redemption‖ of ―social 
violence.‖ Pollock writes that Mr. Spectator and Isaac Bickerstaff ―embody the 
spectatorial ideal‖ because it essentially turns them into uncontaminated onlookers of an 
―irremediably antagonistic society.‖
 85
 The model response to the unalterable violence of 
society is not to look away, but to watch passively and react appropriately. This 
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detachment engenders authority. After explaining his intention to ―stand neuter,‖ Mr. 
Spectator turns to the subject of witchcraft and concludes, ―my Mind is divided between 
the two opposite Opinions; or rather (to speak my Thoughts freely) I believe in general 
that there is, and has been such a thing as Witch-craft; but at the same time can give no 
Credit to any particular Instance of it.‖
86
 Because he can rely on neither empirical 
evidence (he has never seen a witch) nor superstitious word of mouth (which he 
distrusts), Mr. Spectator is perfectly content to rely on the ―safest method‖ and ―give 
[himself] up to neither.‖ As an audience member to an argument, which can be described 
as a scene of violence, he both enjoys and advocates the sedate posture of impartiality. In 
this configuration, Addison presents a paradigm that serves for the rhetorical moment. In 
―standing neuter,‖ an audience member can effectively ―neuter‖ the coercive intentions of 
the rhetor and what Weaver calls the ―tempestuous‖ tendencies inherent in 
argumentation. 
 These two possibilities of the ―neuter‖ suggest ways to cauterize the potentially 
deleterious effects of rhetoric. As Weaver notes, a philosophy of language and affect (like 
that presented by Lysias in Phaedrus) can neuter the orator by advocating a confining 
theory of rhetoric. This purity amounts to a system of rhetoric training that discourages 
overly stylistic prompts, for they might corrupt the (as Weaver notes, non-existent) sober 
fidelity between language and its user. Weaver challenges such an ideal and argues that 
qualifications and prejudices are written into language by its speaker even in the most 
objective attempt.  Pollock‘s reading of The Spectator offers another neutering 
proposition from the trained and polite audience who are able to aestheticize the 
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persuasive moment. If these circumstances are enforced, the orator has a significantly 
reduced power.  
The ―neuter‖ grows out of a desire to make language submit to rules, or to do 
things that it is unwilling to do. However, the inherent flaws or problems implicit within 
language might also be celebrated through a less stringent approach. That recognition is 
at the heart of Mikhail Bakhtin‘s analysis of the word as a site of conflict, in which an 
authoritative voice competes with an ―internal persuasive discourse‖ that is ―half-ours 
and half-someone else‘s.‖
87
 As Bakhtin notes, the inherently centrifugal forces of 
language resist attempts at stratification. The spoken and written word is ―dialogical‖ 
insofar as ―it is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value 
judgments and accents.‖
88
  Further, the ―intentions permeating these languages become 
things, limited in their meaning and expression . . . making it difficult for the word to be 
utilized in a directly intentional way, without any qualifications.‖
89
 Bakhtin celebrates 
rather than corrects the open-ended and ambiguous nature of dialogism. As Gary Saul 
Morson and Caryl Emerson note, ―The dialogic truth manifests unfinalizability by 
existing on the ‗threshold‘ of several interacting consciousnesses, a ‗plurality‘ of 
‗unmerged voices.‘‖
90
 By contrast, Bakhtin discusses social forces that aim for a unitary 
or ―monologic‖ language that can achieve authority through stable meanings that rise 
above argument. Bakhtin rejects this authoritative language because it is impossibly 
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abstract and does not reflect the way meaning is formed through social exchange.
91
 Yet 
he notes that attempts to impose such linguistic unification are driven by ―sociopolitical 
and cultural centralization.‖ 
92
 
The effort to secure the relationship between political stability and linguistic 
purity can be seen as engaging in this effort toward centralization.  As Bakhtin explains, 
―Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property 
of the speaker‘s intentions; it is populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of 
others.‖
93
 Those who seek to neuter language often reject the possibility that persuasive 
speech can be the vehicle for positive change, replacing it with the impossible ideal of 
empirical accuracy and unprejudiced information. Following the Restoration, that anxiety 
specifically resulted from the threat rhetoric posed to the perceived empirical, spiritual, 
and political stability that many wished to give their new age. Even as writers demote the 
trivial art of the orator as outdated, they fear a speech that arouses passions best left 
dormant. The anxiety that provokes and desires the neutering proposition results in 
diverse representations – whether terrifying, trivial, or somewhere in-between – that 
nonetheless embody the same concern. These terrifying and ridiculous orators are among 
the most memorable in the period: Milton‘s Satan, Richardson‘s Lovelace, Sheridan‘s 
Miss Malaprop, and even Fielding‘s pontificating Partridge. 
Disruptive orators are at once a remnant of an outdated culture and a potential 
threat to an apparently stable discourse. Often these threats are represented through 
depictions of rhetorical practices and practitioners corrupting the sober, corrective 
projects in which its participants engage. Therefore, orators must be neutered, sanctioned 
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by the initiation of centripetal protocols that attempt to reduce agonistic intention into a 
calming voice: a neutral language that aims to contain rather than diffuse. Building off 
the methodology Weaver and Bakhtin provide, I examine literary examples of speakers 
who must be ―neutered‖ from dominant discourses that faced internal dissension.  The 
troubling figure of the orator is an unwelcome resistance to a discourse that might 
otherwise contain him. As the masculine pronoun in that last sentence indicates, the 
primary actors in my study are mostly, though not exclusively, male. Although I also 
address the persuasive performances of female speakers and ensuing responses, both real 
and fictional, my focus on the decline of oratory reverberates with an emerging masculine 
ethos defined by its sober rationality, one that would be on display in forums such as The 
Spectator and the sentimental novel. Representations of orators are also representations 
of masculinity. Ineffective oratory can be linked to an ineffective, effeminized manhood 
as seen in vociferous dandies such as Cavendish‘s Mimick or Thomas Shadwell‘s Sir 
Formal, a key player in my first chapter. While the sentimental novel is beyond the scope 
of this project, Tobias Smollett‘s narrative of reform for Humphry Clinker involves not 
his moral development, which is conceived as nearly preternatural, but his rhetorical 
character and the way he aims to affect audiences. Also, one of the most fevered anxieties 
that I explore, particularly in my respective chapters on the Methodists and Alexander 
Pope, are the effects of charismatic male orators on susceptible female audiences. 
Smollett is quick to note that the audience members of Humphry Clinker‘s sermon are 
mostly female, and Humphry ends up marrying one of them. But the acts of neutering in 




origin and legacy in patriarchal cultures such as Sophistic Athens, Ciceronian Rome, and 
Humanist England.  
Chapter Outline 
My chapters isolate specific discursive settings in which the orator presents a 
problem that must be settled through acts of containment and dismissal. My first chapter, 
―The Orator in the Laboratory,‖ shows the orator as a threat to the rising cultural capital 
of the Royal Society and their vaunted experimental philosophy in the wake of the 
Restoration. As experimentalists such as Thomas Sprat and Robert Boyle seek to banish 
―specious tropes and figures‖ from the laboratory, critics argue that the representative 
ideal of the orator is absolutely central to the production of supposedly objective findings. 
The incisive critical satires of Thomas Shadwell, Samuel Butler, and Margaret Cavendish 
invoke the orator to challenge the networks of correspondence, the modest witnesses, and 
the literary technologies that were pivotal to the authority of the Royal Society. This 
engagement is deeply connected to the post-Civil War political and linguistic anxieties 
that the Royal Society was deeply committed to eradicating. 
 These anxieties that haunted the laboratory could soon be heard coming from the 
church pulpit. As my second chapter, ―Cannot You Trust God for a Sermon,‖ reveals, 
Restoration anxieties toward orators also deeply affected religious discourse in the 
following century. When John Wesley and the Methodists emerged in the 1730s, they 
posed a significant affront to the established clergy. The Methodists‘ passionate homiletic 
practices confront the authority of an idealized Establishment union between the rational 
and the spiritual. In this chapter, I explore attacks on Methodists in plays, poems, and 




auditors‘ intense reactions to them. Because of the success of Methodist orators, their 
critics were forced to respond with homiletic theories to account for new social and 
religious circumstances. The fate of religious oratory is deeply linked to the emergence of 
and response to the extemporizing Methodist preachers who confronted and changed 
embedded religious identities. 
The devious power of rustic speakers that so troubled establishment clergy finds a 
beguiling representation in the poetry of Alexander Pope. In my third chapter, ―He Spoke 
No More Than Just The Thing He Ought,‖ I argue that Pope confronts and channels the 
rhetorical anxieties that I outline in my previous chapters. In his translation of The Iliad 
(1719), Pope not only tempers Homer‘s affective speakers but also offers extensive 
endnotes and commentaries about the ethics and efficacy of persuasive speech. In his 
mock-epic, The Rape of the Lock, Pope presents rhetoric‘s inefficacy to produce social 
change and moral instruction. Through these acts of translation and adaptation, Pope 
reformulates classical orators to temper their agonistic and violent impulses. This is part 
of a general project that he describes in his introduction to The Iliad as aiming to 
“cultivate and beautify . . . a wild paradise‖
94
 His later poems – An Essay on Man (1734), 
the Moral Essays (1731-35), and The Dunciad – show the effects of deceptive orators and 
artists, whose sole purpose is to misrepresent epistemological order for selfish purposes. 
Pope‘s fears about judgment are linked to his concern about the unmanageable reception 
of his own poetry. These representations constitute a vexed but thorough theory of 
rhetorical practice that illuminates the most compelling tensions of his poetry. 
                                                 
94
 Alexander Pope, ―Preface to the Iliad,” ed. Maynard Mack, vol. 7. The Twickenham Edition of the 




Rhetoric experienced a renewed interest after the 1750s through the work of 
Scottish Enlightenment rhetoricians. However, my last chapter, ―We Forget The Orator,‖ 
shows that even these thinkers questioned the integrity of the orator in reshaping rhetoric 
for a new audience. While rhetoricians from Cicero to Thomas Wilson present the orator 
as a virtuous speaker who combines wisdom and eloquence, the rhetorical texts that 
emerge in the mid-eighteenth century are predicated on the concern that the orators‘ 
excesses are responsible for the declining currency of rhetorical theory. In their revision 
of the rhetorical tradition, so-called new rhetoricians such as Hugh Blair, Adam Smith, 
and Joseph Priestley develop theories of communication and persuasion that limit the 
effects of the troublesome orators that populate the scientific, religious, and poetic 
landscapes earlier in the century. Theories of persuasion had to be ―neutered‖ in order to 
contain orators and to prevent their persistence through the discourse of rhetorical 
education. In these influential works, the orator is so troubling that he must be qualified, 
corrected, and in some cases written out of rhetorical theory. 
The story I tell is ultimately one about the emergence and disappearance of 
technologies of mediation, about social and religious change, and the stories an 
intellectual culture told itself in order to justify the phases of its so-called 
―enlightenment.‖ My protagonist is the orator, a figure who persists in speaking despite 
attempts to silence him. Whenever orators speak, they represent cultural responses to 







Chapter 1: The Orator in the Laboratory: The Rhetoric Of And 
Against The Royal Society 
 
B.: But how came the people to be so corrupted? And what kind of people were they that 
did so seduce them? 
A.:The seducers were of divers sorts . . . 
     - Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth (1679)
95
 
Imploying Senses Aright 
Robert Hooke‘s remarkable Micrographia (1665) might be the defining 
accomplishment of early Royal Society propaganda. Samuel Pepys called it, ―the most 
ingenious book I‘ve ever read,‖ claiming he stayed up until two in the morning reading 
it.
96
 With its captivating engravings, it offered a fascinated public access to the new 
technology of the microscope, an apparatus through which ―the roughness and 
smoothness of the Body is made smooth.‖
97
 Hooke‘s fantastical drawings of insects 
defamiliarized the mundane, making them mythical, and promoted the new science that 
made such achievements possible. Though readers most likely looked to Micrographia 
for spectacle more than science, Hooke is explicit about his goals. The microscope was 
not merely going to produce marvelous representations, but it was also going to be 
restorative in the grandest possible sense. In his preface, he writes that ―artificial 
Instruments” can provide ―in some manner, a reparation made for the mischiefs, and 
imperfection, mankind has brought upon itself.‖
98
 As Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer 
have explained, the power of instruments ―resided in their capacity to enhance perception 
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and to constitute new perceptual objects‖ and to ―impos[e] both a correction and 
discipline on the sense.‖
99
 Hooke will clarify this reparation as applying equally to the 
physical and the moral. 
In particular, new technologies were going to allow experimental philosophers to 
move beyond argument and into certainty, taking experimental philosophy out of the 
realm of the ―Brain and the Fancy‖ and into the serious spaces of ―the plainness and 
soundness of Observations.‖ As Hooke explains in the preface, 
And I beg my Reader, to let me take the boldness to assure him, that in this 
present condition of knowledge, a man so qualified, as I have indeavoured to be, 
only with resolution, and integrity, and plain intentions of imploying his Senses 
aright, may venture to compare the reality and the usefulness of his services, 
towards the true Philosophy, with those of other men, that are of much stronger, 





Those who do not embrace the ―true Philosophy‖ risk producing knowledge(s) gained 
outside of a method that ―imploys . . . Senses aright.” Rather than coming to conclusions 
dialectically, Hooke implies an objectivity, found through experimentation, that exists 
outside of debate. Thomas Sprat would add, ―the Microscope alone is enough to silence 
all opposers.‖
101
 Micrographia is not the beginning of a discussion, but the presentation 
of one of the many new technologies by which indisputable facts can be gathered. 
Further, Hooke privileges his plain intentions over rhetorical ―speculations‖: one of the 
central features of the ―true‖ philosophy. 
Though his prose is not particularly dogmatic, Hooke participates in the exclusion 
of rhetoric that was part of a broad seventeenth-century move to instrumentalize language 
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and reduce it of its affective (and misleading) capabilities. Robert Markley astutely 
recognizes this move as the Restoration urgency ―to control the dialogical and subversive 
tendencies of language.‖
102
 Regarding attempts at language reform, Markley notes, 
After a divisive civil war characterized by a breakdown of censorship and a 
cacophony of voices struggling to articulate the rights of various factions, the 
ideological appeal of universal language schemes lies in the images of unity and 
structure they deploy . . . The totalizing rhetoric of language reformers and 
projectors in seventeenth-century England betrays the nervousness of an 
intellectual elite committed to achieving political, theological, and socioeconomic 




Illuminating the political stakes for language reformers, Markley shows the causal 
relationship between civic disorder and the allied heads of persuasive speech, linguistic 
ambiguity, and uncensored public discourse. To perpetuate such practices was to avoid 
learning the lesson history had taught a society proclaiming its restoration and the 
successful eradication of such divisive forces. In Behemoth, when Hobbes describes the 
―seducers . . . of divers sorts,‖ he reminds the now-stable culture of the tempestuous past 
and the orators who stimulated it. This caustic message will become a consistent theme in 
discussions about the fate of language in both the new science and the new political order 
of the Restoration. 
These attempts are consistent with what Weaver calls the desire for ―unvarying 
accuracy and regularity in . . . symbolic references‖ that characterizes moves toward 
putative neutral speech practices.
 104
  Weaver‘s analysis applies to twentieth-century 
efforts at linguistic reform, but by the mid-seventeenth century, theories of philosophical 
and scientific language exhibit a similar suspicion toward heightened styles that indicate 
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rhetorical intention. As Weaver notes, a ―style‖ makes one a ―marked man.‖
105
 Before 
and after the Restoration, the kind of ―marking‖ Weaver describes was reserved for the 
rhetorical tradition that became associated with empty argumentative principles as in, for 
example, Thomas Sprat‘s negative recasting of rhetoric‘s cultural production to a 
destructive ―volubility of Tongue, which makes so great a noise in the World.‖
106
 In The 
History of the Royal Society, Sprat‘s paradigmatic exclusion of ―specious tropes and 
figures‖
107
 from experimental practice is provocative, aimed not only at the seemingly 
benign ornaments, but also at what he sees as a bloated and dangerous tradition that 
instilled them as part of a robust stylistic program. In arguing that the Royal Society had 
successfully eradicated such excesses, Sprat marks his own discourse by both what it 
performs, a sanctioned style that can more succinctly relay neutral information, and what 
it lacks, ―specious tropes and figures.‖ In this sense, Sprat‘s imperative fits with 
Weaver‘s category of ―an unqualified medium of transmission of meanings from mind to 
mind, and by virtue of it minds can remain in an unprejudiced relationship to the world 
and also to other minds.‖
108
 By reminding us of the ―other minds,‖ Weaver argues that 
linguistic operations are often shaped through collective, even institutional means. 
Prejudice may exist in ―the noise of the world,‖
109
 as Sprat writes,  but it is excluded from 
the proceedings – actual and virtual – of the Royal Society. For Sprat, rhetoric only 
corrupts, emphasizing presentation and ―noise‖ over the substances that must be 
explored, experimented upon, and ultimately verified. Ideally, rhetoric should channel the 
amorphous varieties of intellectual activity through vibrant rhetorical forms; yet by 
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reducing the discipline to a dissonant ―noise,‖ Sprat highlights the disruptive aspects of 
persuasive speech, and not in the terms of an enabling civic discourse, but of practiced 
deception inappropriate for experimental spaces. 
Considering Markley‘s analysis of the historical conditions, as well as Weaver‘s 
discussion of the dynamics of a ―neuter‖ rhetoric, in this chapter I turn to the culture of 
experimental philosophers and their critics as an especially vibrant arena for examining 
tensions about language in general and rhetoric in particular. At the heart of scientific 
practice are issues of linguistic instability that cannot be resolved despite assertions that, 
as in Sprat‘s provocative eulogy, they have been isolated and removed. Experimental 
texts and treatises channel, in varying degrees, an anxiety toward rhetoric and its 
obscuring and agonistic effects into the often defensive pursuit of a ―neuter‖ language 
free of affective potential. As a result, experimental philosophers tend to view the orator 
as the principal agitator of unsavory public passions and a corruptor of empirical truths 
through an improper style. Yet while experimental philosophers seemingly try to push 
rhetoric out of the laboratory, their critics push it back in. Both sides view rhetoric as a 
bombastic discipline pursued by specious, often ridiculous practitioners. Therefore, when 
these critics depict the orator as a participant in experimental conclusions, they strike at 
the heart of an indispensable institutional integrity. While experimental philosophers 
view rhetoric as the root of cultural disruption, its loosely allied critics target it as an 
overlooked flaw in the production of knowledge.  
This chapter considers first the cultural and intellectual agendas that caused 
experimental philosophers such as Sprat, Robert Boyle, Joseph Glanvill, and Robert 




stability. Then I move to the critics who use literary forms to critique the pronounced 
exclusion of rhetoric as a pivotal hypocrisy that can be utilized to expose the lack of 
objectivity and neutrality in experimental practice. The orator becomes symbolic for both 
flawed written and spoken practices, despite attempts to perfect them. Rhetoric, both its 
abuse and its undeniable presence, plays a central role in three literary critiques of 
experimental philosophy produced between 1661 and 1676: Samuel Butler‘s The 
Elephant in the Moon (1667), Thomas Shadwell‘s The Virtuoso (1676), and Margaret 
Cavendish‘s The Blazing-World (1666). These literary examples are pivotal because they 
operate in the same responsive domain as the various publications that experimental 
philosophers produce, a public titillated by both the prospect and the spectacle of 
scientific activity. In a joint dedication to exposing hypocrisies and specious practices 
through the visualization of scientific practice, as well as evaluating a cultural 
phenomenon that proved an appropriate topic for fiction and satire, these literary 
responses offer a skeptical view of the glowing pronouncements that the Royal Society 
tended to lavish upon itself.  In Butler, the essential experimental regulations toward 
spoken assent are corrupted by self-interested virtuosos desiring celebrity above 
knowledge, who pursue credibility through fantastical discoveries. While Butler‘s 
criticism addresses the corruption of experimental activity through speaking, Shadwell 
even more vividly captures the means by which the apparently objective vehicles of 
assent really act as a bloated rhetoric. Through the figure of the orator Sir Formal Trifle 
in The Virtuoso, Shadwell specifically satirizes a system of scientific mediation and 
publicizing by caricaturing it in the form of a florid rhetorician. Formal conceals 




experimental reports into something more spectacular for public consumption. Finally, I 
turn to Margaret Cavendish‘s utopian vision in The Blazing World. The sovereign 
structure which Cavendish constructs and implicitly endorses avows that techniques of 
persuasive speech should not be removed, but must be regulated, corrected, and 
ultimately rehabilitated for inclusion in experimental settings. 
In these examples, the orator becomes representative of a linguistic problem that 
must be resolved yet cannot be, though the idealistic setting of Cavendish‘s ―Blazing 
World‖ offers the possibility of practical governance. If a discipline and tradition of 
rhetoric is specifically banished from scientific practice, Butler, Shadwell, and Cavendish 
find its remnants in bloated practices that are a ―house rhetoric,‖ a language dedicated to 
convincing its audience of a guiding integrity. Exposing that language both at the heart of 
experimental practice and its publications, then, challenges the integrity of experimental 
philosophers where they are most vulnerable. 
“error” and Its Consequences: Rhetoric and Experimental Philosophy 
One thing is clear from a survey of the inaugural texts of experimental 
philosophy: orators were not allowed in the laboratory. Orators disrupted the quiet and 
productive space that the laboratory and its philosophers sought to preserve. In Francis 
Bacon‘s The New Atlantis (1627), a text that came to be read as the spiritual foundation 
for the Royal Society, the ―House of Salomon‖ allows the study of rhetoric only to nullify 
its effects. Natural discoveries presented as ―adorned or swelling‖ will be subject to ―pain 
of ignominy and fines.‖
110
 Rather, the presentation should be ―only pure as it is, and 
without all affectation of strangeness.‖
111
 In the ―Houses of the Deceits of the Senses,‖ 
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rhetoric is only to be studied so that natural philosophers can recognize counterfeit 
―adorned‖ ideas and nullify their effects on the senses.
112
 In The New Atlantis, Bacon 
keenly visualizes the more dense material his Novum Organum (1620) addresses in terms 
of ―error‖ as he finds it invading analytical thinking. Perhaps most overtly in Novum 
Organum, his four ―idols‖ target areas against which those who pursue natural 
philosophy must fortify themselves. While the most troublesome are the idols of the 
market-place, the indeterminate linguistic gesture that announces itself as objective truth, 
the idols of the cave also pose a threat in the substantiation of what becomes acceptable 
knowledge.
113
 For Bacon, the ―cave‖ is an enclave where received ideas take on currency 
merely because of an association with an institution that authorizes itself; an endless 
repetition of errors goes uncorrected because of the exclusivity and self-endorsement that 
the ―cave‖ represents. Opposing Plato‘s cave, in which the myopic dwellers cannot 
distinguish shadows from a reality they have never seen, Bacon casts his own cave 
dweller as a victim of self-delusion rather than an unknowable reality. Though Bacon‘s 
cave also ―refracts and discolours the light of nature,‖ it is based on errors of personal 
knowledge and experience (―owing either to his proper and peculiar nature‖) or ―to his 
education and conversation with others.‖
114
 For Bacon, the errors of cave are most 
evident when one believes his or her own personal authority as the most valid lens 
through which to view the external world.  
Particularly in the tendentious wake of the civil wars, moral and political 
philosophy also challenged the orator. In moral and political philosophy texts, ―error‖ 
was not only an empirical category, but also a broad term through which to isolate causes 
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of theological and political disorder. Thomas Hobbes diagnoses and categorizes forms of 
error as a principal cause of civic unrest. For Hobbes, error has its basis in a misplaced 
causation that reduces the world to aphorismic wisdom. Throughout Leviathan (1651), 
Hobbes addresses error as it affects language, geometry, theology, politics, and the 
interpretation of natural phenomena. In a particularly relevant passage, he attributes 
―false miracles‖ to ―the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but 
especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and of the nature, 
and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused.‖
115
 Hobbes‘ 
solution was a series of political instruments that could stabilize an individual abject 
condition that only becomes amplified when combined in society – both the authoritative 
state and the ruler which could control and limit the effects of dangerous factions, and the 
citizen who ceded that authority. For Hobbes, error also has a rhetorical quality in the 
way invalid assumptions are taken to be either true or logically coherent through a culture 
of assent that allows them to disseminate.  
The social nature of truth claims must be remedied or, at least, confined into a 
setting in which their disruptive effects cannot be realized. In Leviathan, Hobbes 
articulates the dangers posed by the presence of self-interested orators, lest: 
any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, 
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable 
inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne Power is 
in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill 
Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and 
becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse and 
Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and 
the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no 
Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his 
enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though 
they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse 
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Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than 




Keeping with his overarching state of nature, Hobbes sets up an arhetorical culture 
founded on binaries: monarchs and assemblies; friends and enemies; hurting and saving; 
accusing and excusing; political subject and the orator. Without limits, the orator thrives 
on a state of disruption that he animates through controversial arguments that rhetoric as 
a received discipline apparently encourages. In statements like this, Hobbes finds the best 
way to end political controversy is by removing a tradition that encouraged agonistic 
controversy. As Bryan Garsten argues, Hobbes seeks a new function for rhetoric to 
―eliminate the realm of controversy in which the old rhetoric has found its place.‖
117
 In 
Hobbes‘ commonwealth, Garsten notes, ―an orator looking for an audience . . . would 
find the subjects‘ ears already fastened to the lips of the sovereign and many of their 
opinions dictated by the sovereign.‖
118
 Leviathan is a particularly vivid example of the 
envisioned means to which language must be regulated in order to achieve political 
stability. Later in the text, regarding ―all Rhetorical figures,‖ Hobbes remarks, ―in 
reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.‖
119
  
Hobbes‘ distrust of political orators and Bacon‘s expulsion of rhetoric from the 
laboratory are part of the backdrop for the formation and evolution of the Royal Society.  
Hobbes was no friend to experimental philosophers, yet his anti-rhetorical sentiment links 
him with a constellation of experimenters, theologians, language projectors, and even his 
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occasional combatant, Robert Boyle.
120
 Similarly, Sprat extends the ―volubility of 
tongue‖ beyond the laboratory, and sees it as the troubling root of problems in the 
―world‖ as well. As Hobbes denounced rhetoric as a practice ―not to be admitted,‖ 
experimental philosophers sought an appropriate language free of its traditional 
techniques. This language would emphasize fidelity to the object being described, as 




In the perhaps inflated terms of Sprat‘s History, linguistic reform was expressed 
not as an obstacle to be overcome, but as a bygone conclusion. A culture of critics rose to 
challenge the credibility that Sprat celebrated as quickly fulfilled destiny. For these 
critics, it was too soon for Royal Society member Abraham Cowley to announce in his 
preface to Sprat‘s History, ―Io! Sound too the Trumpets here! / Already your victorious 
Lights appear.‖
122
 Cowley continues by praising the achievement of Sprat‘s text that 
many would call premature, ―None e're but Hercules and you could be / At five years 
Age worthy a History.‖ Sprat sees the progressive thinking of Bacon vindicated in the 
royal charter and rapid growth that the Royal Society enjoyed, yet he defends the 
inclusion of his work as a ―History‖ in the prefatory ―Advertisement to the Reader‖: 
―though this Book does Treat of many Subjects that are not Historical, yet I have 
presum'd to name the whole a History, because that was the main end of my Design.‖
 123
  
For Sprat, six years after its foundation, the society warranted a history as well as poetic 
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celebrations using grand allusions such as those in Cowley‘s Preface. Statements like 
these can be read as decrees that accomplishment and inauguration had occurred at 
roughly the same moment. 
Henry Stubbe, a surgeon whose controversial opinions spanned from spiritual 
orthodoxy to political heterodoxy, is particularly vehement in severing the link between 
institutional celebration and technological progress.
124
 In his 1670 ―Censure‖ on the 
latitudinarian Sprat, Stubbe scoffs, ―It was not intended of the Virtuosi: Except ye 
become like one of these, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.‖
125
 In 
particular, Stubbe challenges a group who made public exclamations that linked their 
exclusiveness and innovation with divine prerogative. While Stubbe found such evidence 
in Sprat, he could have looked elsewhere. Cowley invokes the Old Testament narrative of 
Gideon from Judges 7 to describe the process of separating the wheat from the chaff: 
“Methinks, like Gideon's little band, / God with design has pick'd out you, / To do these 
noble wonders by a few; . . .‖
126
 In the Biblical episode, God tells Gideon that the forces 
he leads to overtake Midian are ―too many‖ and calls them to drink water from a lake. 
Those who drink with their hands are to remain, while those who leave are dismissed. 
Cowley‘s scriptural precedent connects divine providence, and with it predestination, 
with a justification for exclusion. Those who do not accept the experimental way of life 
are spiritually akin to those rejected from Gideon‘s army.  
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If ―specious tropes and figures‖ had no place in experimental discourse, why was 
this same abandoned language being used to praise its sanctitude? This pretense drove its 
critics. Samuel Butler pithily points out the contradiction in his Miscellaneous 
Observations:
127
 ―The historian of Gresham College endeavours to cry down oratory and 
declamation while he uses nothing else.‖
128
 Butler criticizes an anti-rhetorical text not 
only for using rhetorical tactics, but also for participating in the very tradition from which 
it claims to have seceded. Rather, in eulogizing the Royal Society, Sprat develops a new 
rhetoric just as self-interested as a more transparent rhetorical program. Butler‘s other 
barbs take on not only the texts but also the language that operates behind closed doors. 
Criticisms like Butler‘s converge around the emerging issues of plainness and protocol, 
which intend to remove rhetoric from the laboratory but instead reinstill it in a new, 
devious form. Yet most incisively, Butler identifies experimentalists failure to carry out 
in practice what they so thoroughly articulate in theory. 
 Other critiques and satires emphasize that Sprat‘s ―mathematical plainness‖
129
 is 
a rhetorical choice that cloaks its persuasion behind the strictures of a stylistic method. 
As historian Geoffrey Cantor notes, scientific discourse is a ―discourse of power‖ 
because ―far from being rhetoric-free, modern scientific prose has become the most 
potent instrument of persuasion in our culture.‖
130
 In other words, an anti-rhetorical 
agenda is still a rhetorical choice. Even the most neutral attempt at language is, to adopt a 
term that historians of science use to discuss scientific apparatuses, ―theory-laden‖ in 
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that, as Ian Hacking notes, ―we have all sorts of expectations, prejudices, opinions, 
working hypotheses and habits when we say anything.‖
131
 
As Butler elucidates, Sprat attacks rhetoric in order to celebrate the achievement 
both of the Royal Society and the text he has written to celebrate it. Rhetoric is 
―specious‖ because it creates objectionable noise that disrupts the tranquil setting of both 
the laboratory and the various publications that explained the internal findings. In 
eulogizing the past and prophesying the future of the institution, Sprat consigns the 
Baconian idols to the ―noise of the world,‖ outside the sterilized setting of experiment. 
Perhaps in his dedication to eulogizing the society of which he was a member, Sprat‘s 
denouncement is more pronounced, less complex, and more overbearing than the active 
experimenters he aimed to commemorate. Yet the question of rhetoric as the means to 
improper forms of assent and authorization, both virtual and immediate, consumed those 
who wished to realize Bacon‘s ―House of Salomon.‖  
Regulating Assent: Neutering Witnesses 
In Leviathan and the Air Pump, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer describe the 
institutional conditions necessary for spoken assent to thrive as a network of 
authentication and correspondence that could support the neutral acts of ―seeing and 
observing‖: 
This freedom to speak had to be protected by a special sort of discipline. Radical 
individualism – the state in which each individual set himself up as the ultimate 
judge of knowledge – would destroy the conventional basis of proper knowledge, 
while the disciplined collective social structure of the experimental form of life 
would create and sustain that factual basis . . . Legitimate knowledge was 
warranted as objective insofar as it was produced by the collective, and agreed to 
voluntarily by those who comprise the collective. The objectification of 
knowledge proceeded through displays of the communal  basis of its generation 
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In a later article, Shapin further explores the space of the laboratory and the status of its 
occupants and concludes, ―What underwrote assent to knowledge claims was the word of 
a gentleman, the conventions regulating access to a gentleman‘s house, and the social 
relations within it.‖
133
 In Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Shapin and Schaffer add that the 
experimental model of assent is basically a ―technology of trust‖
134
 that ―functioned as an 
objectifying resource.‖
135
 Approval or disapproval in the laboratory had to be elaborated 
in terms that could take such judgments for granted, or as self-evident. Sanctioning the 
experiment merely by noting the group who conducted it was what led to the clamors of 
criticism that I describe above. Though the society stressed their status as experimenters, 
they were still broadly gentlemen, and had to ensure that the integrity of their 
experiments was based on the factual status of the object, rather than the social status of 
the observing subjects. Assent had to be an invisible process, one in which social 
standing and what Sprat calls ―self-love‖ are ignored in place of a neutral response to 
experiment. Experimenters pursue their work in the quiet confines of the laboratory, 
which had to be represented and accounted for in the publications that reported that work. 
 In addition to pursuing material technology, experimental philosophers also were 
dedicated to producing what Shapin and Schaffer call a ―literary technology"
136
 that 
could textually reproduce the events of the laboratory. Addressing the reader of his New 
Experiments Physico-Mechanical (1669), Robert Boyle sees experimental publications as 
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―standing records,‖ reports that could ideally replicate experimental productions, and thus 
―need not reiterate themselves an experiment to have as distinct an idea of it.‖
137
 Shapin 
and Schaffer explain how the methodology established an authenticating community: 
If one wrote experimental reports in the correct way, the reader could take on trust 
that these things happened. Further it would be as if that reader had been present 
at the proceedings. He would be recruited as a witness and be put in a position 
where he could validate experimental phenomena as matters of fact. Therefore, 





Boyle explores the difficulty of achieving this trust in his 1661 ―Proemial Essay,‖ where 
he prizes transparency and clarity above all else. He does not reserve the same rancor for 
Sprat‘s ―specious tropes and figures,‖ but still argues for their exclusion from 
experimental discourse. Using rhetoric in an experimental report is the equivalent of 
―paint[ing] the eyeglasses of a telescope.‖
139
 Boyle translates the scientific virtue of 
transparency that the telescope offers into a literary ideal. Unlike Sprat several years 
later, Boyle does not herald this transparent writing style as the prized experimental 
conclusion of Royal Society inquiry, but contemplates carefully the direction published 
reports must take. As Markley notes, for Boyle stylistic concerns are reinforced by 
theological, social, and epistemological matters. Markley argues that throughout Certain 
Physiological Essays, the collection in which the ―Proemial‖ is included, Boyle ―can 
place his faith neither in a real character nor in a reformed language because he perceives 
representation – the metaphoricity of language – as ultimately mysterious.‖
140
  
The ―Proemial Essay‖ reveals both the desire and accompanying skepticism that 
any stylistic method can approach objectivity, while recognizing that experimental results 
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must take on a written form for public validation. Yet Boyle still advances a program that 
approaches linguistic reform: ―for though a Philosopher need not be sollicitous that his 
style should delight its Reader with his Floridnesse, yet I think he may very well be 
allow'd to take a Care that it disgust not his Reader by its Flatness.‖
141
 Though Sprat will 
later appropriate this balance as the opposition between rhetorical and scientific language, 
Boyle recognizes that a strictly programmatic approach to scientific writing might 
―disgust.‖ Boyle‘s interest in crafting the public ethos of the Royal Society is markedly 
more humble than Sprat‘s and Joseph Glanvill‘s. When Glanvill claims that Royal 
Society experimental results ―may be received as undoubted Records of certain events, 
and as securely depended on, as the Propositions of Euclid,‖
142
 critics such as Stubbe and 
Hobbes saw such epistemological certainty as testifying to a naïve and self-interested 
institutional faith that had yet to be earned. Stubbe also lashed out at Sprat‘s History as 
―impious and pernicious.‖
143
 Boyle is less committed to promoting the institution than he 
is in testing and perfecting the vehicles that can ensure its integrity. While Boyle‘s 
interests are myriad, in the wake of the Restoration his writings reveal a desire to bridge 
gaps between public curiosity and institutional rigidity, and in finding an appropriate 
protocol in which experimental results could be communicated. 
 Though Royal Society members celebrated and aspired to a purer language 
outside of the confines of the rhetorical tradition to promote matters of facts, historians of 
science emphasize the institutional structures and protocols that reveal such knowledge as 
a social construction, and bring to light social practices that organize experimental 
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practice and contribute to knowledge production. Shapin and Schaffer locate the ―modest 
witness‖ at the center of experimental practices that determined how an experiment could 
be confirmed as fact. In written report, for instance, the modest witness could be realized 
in the literary technology of the plain style. The social aspect required an experimental 
community extended through a ―network of correspondence‖ (69) institutionalized 
through the vehicle of integrity that the Royal Society provided.  The authorizing body of 
the Royal Society could mark the authenticity of the systematic process through which 
assent is gathered and ultimately publicized. As I will show, to sever this connection was 
to delegitimize an entire experimental culture by removing its grounds for objectivity and 
authorization.  
 Boyle continues, ―though it were foolish to colour or enamel upon the glasses of 
Telescopes, yet to gild or otherwise embellish the Tubes of them, may render them more 
acceptable to the Users, without at all lessening the Clearness of the Object to be look‘d 
at through them.‖
144
 The separation of ―tube‖ and ―glass‖ further emphasizes Boyle‘s 
faith in the observational validity of the telescope. While the corruption of the ―glass‖ 
reflects an unacceptable variable in the observation, the ―tube‖ does not intervene 
between observer and observed, and therefore might be adjusted for aesthetic purpose. 
The tube can be shaped or changed simply because its external surface is inessential to 
providing a reliable report. The magnifying technology of the glass, however, offers a 
symbolic ideal for the language that should be used in experimental report. In his 
Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours (1664), Boyle comments,  
as we see, that in the Moon we can with Excellent Telescopes discern many Hills 
and Vallies, and as it were Pits and other Parts, whereof some are more, and some 
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less Vividly illustrated, and others have a fainter, others a deeper Shade, though 
the naked Eye can discern no such matter in that Planet. And with an Excellent 
Microscope, where the Naked Eye did see but a Green powder, the Assisted Eye 
as we noted above, could discern particular Granules, some of them of a Blew, 
and some of them of a Yellow colour, which Corpuscles we had beforehand 




Just as the telescope offers the increased vision in the semblance of an ―Assisted Eye,‖ 
revealing the phenomenon of greenness to be merely an ―exquisitely mix‘d‖ series of 
compounds, the language programs of the Royal Society clarify the vagaries of  
experience and sensual impression, which are often corrupted by rhetorical conceits. 
What Boyle describes are difficult, if not impossible, balancing acts. However, 
Boyle and Hooke‘s textscontend that a technology such as the telescope makes this level 
of empirical precision possible. In terms of writing, even Boyle expresses skepticism that 
such fidelity is possible through the internal ambiguities that language contains. Yet such 
equilibrium was necessary in order for the Royal Society to perpetuate the institutional 
rigidity that their texts profess. Experimental publications had to be readable while still 
providing absolute fidelity to the experiments they chronicled. Royal Society members 
had to be an institutional elite that still recognized a public responsibility. In the first 
issue of Philosophical Transactions in 1665, when the introduction promises productions 
that will be ―clearly and truly communicated,‖
146
 it is part of an on-going articulation of 
Sprat‘s ―mathematical plainness.‖
147
 As the qualifying adjective ―mathematical‖ 
suggests, plainness can be refined to a point where it services, rather than misinforms and 
alters, scientific observations. To be ―clear‖ and ―true‖ is  not a simple matter; thus 
equating them with the ―plainness‖ and ―soundness‖ of microscopic inquiry shows 
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exactly how high thinkers like Boyle aim, and what was at stake for his contemporaries in 
the pursuit, presentation, and ultimate publication of experimental knowledge. 
Boyle does not offer the common literary virtue of the plain style; rather, he 
emphasizes the technology to underscore the importance of the difficult perspicuity that 
best reflects the objective ideal of scientific inquiry. In comparing the use of ―needless 
rhetorical ornament‖ to ―paint[ing] the eyeglasses of the telescope,‖ Boyle argues that a 
scientific approach to language should at least have the same implicit goal as telescopic 
and microscopic observation, in which the transparency and neutrality of the apparatus 
secures spatial separation between subject and object, writer and text. Boyle combines 
stylistic method with Robert Hooke‘s pronouncement that the apparatus of the 
microscope allows ―a supplying of (the senses‘) infirmities with Instruments‖ and ―the 
plainness and soundness of Observations.‖
148
 Like the transparency the technical 
apparatus provides, scientific style should clarify rather than obscure, inform rather than 
explain. As Hooke‘s ―glass‖ corrects infirmities, so could a language that had as its 
guiding principle the operative neutrality of this new mode of knowledge.  
 In forwarding the veracity of an experiment, public presentation must bring about 
the assent of an audience, where the public approval virtually legitimates the private. 
Since the laboratory had to be reimagined for public consumption, contemporary critics 
rose to attack the various representations. Hobbes, for instance, consistently criticizes the 
Royal Society, particularly after Boyle‘s experiments with the air pump, for the way that 
knowledge was gathered and the society of exclusive gentleman of questionable 
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credentials who gathered it.
149
  Hobbes emphasizes the need for evidence and observation 
in the collection of knowledge and pronouncing of truth. In his rigid terminology, the 
results of many experiments qualify as an ―experience,‖ yet even this ―concludeth 
nothing universally.‖
150
 Hobbes notes the finitude and fallibility inherent in the senses 
that fetters observations even when aided by the systematized process or fantastic 
technology. Even in consensus, such knowledge is flawed because of the rhetorical 
process by which it was gained. What was primarily at stake for critics of experimental 
philosophy was knowledge – not only who was producing it, but who was approving and 
ultimately disseminating it. Among their many targets is exposing the mediation which 
experimental polemicists claimed to have perfected.  
 Yet in many ways, the laboratory, and its institutional form, the Royal Society, 
served figuratively as the calming apparatus that would separate the ―noise‖ and vigorous 
passions of the world from the sober tranquility of experimental spaces. In particular, 
Sprat opposes this regimen of tranquility with the dissolute voices that lead to social and 
spiritual unrest. Different kinds of ―noise‖ appear throughout the History, both positively 
and negatively. The noise that Sprat celebrates is ―the noise of Mechanick Instruments . . 
.  heard in Whitehall itself.‖
151
 While the tinny clamor of instruments acts as a kind of 
music, Sprat reserves anxiety for the noise of diverse voices, and sees the need for an 
insulated setting: 
There are indeed some operations of the mind, which may be best perform'd by 
the simple strength of mens own particular thoughts; such are invention, and 
judgement, and disposition: For in them a security from noise, leaves the Soul at 
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more liberty, to bring forth, order, and fashion the heap of matter, which had been 




If what Sprat describes is an isolation chamber, in which the soul can be at liberty, he 
suggests an external world in which a disturbed peace is the result of ―the volubility of 
tongue‖ that persuasive language apparently aims toward. Discussing the limitations of 
the apparatus, Karen Barad discusses this severing move in scientific settings in its 
relationship to (or ―intra-action‖ with) a pervasive subjectivity and finitude.
153
 In such 
enclosures, where objectivity can occur because of the conditions of the setting, the 
scientific ideal of the apparatus/instrument is ―hermetically sealed off from any and all 
‗outside influences,‘‖ which reduces ―the role of the experimenter to a mere recorder of 
the objective marks displayed by the instrumentation.‖
154
 Sprat‘s vision for the 
laboratory, buttressed by the protocols that ensure ―security from noise‖ can ―leave the 
soul at more liberty,‖ offers a societal model that may inform and perhaps be replicated to 
remedy external conflicts. Joseph Glanvill sees the guiding ethos of the Royal Society 
extending beyond the setting of experiment, seeing the new philosophy as ―tend[ing] to 
the ending of disputes,‖
155
 as their generated knowledge might also remedy political and 
theological controversy. In Micrographia, Hooke projects the regenerative powers of 
science as redemptive in the grandest possible sense: ―As at first mankind fell by tasting 
of the forbidden Tree of Knowledge, so we, their Posterity, may be in part restor‘d by the 
same way, not only by beholding and contemplating but by tasting those fruits of Natural 
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knowledge that were never yet forbidden.‖
156
 Such statements reveal the ambitions of the 
Royal Society to sanitize human behavior both inside and outside the laboratory, offering 
the paradigm of a spiritual and material space that provided for an emergent neutrality 
that obsessed seventeenth-century thinkers. While perhaps inflated for polemical 
intention, the institutional faith shown here reflects the adoption of Boyle‘s growing 
belief that theology and experimental philosophy ―interpenetrate, inform, and elucidate 
each other.‖
157
 The extension of the community that undergirds Royal Society 
publications testifies to the institutional belief that what happened behind closed doors 
could be communicated to a wider population in hopes of cultural and spiritual 
edification.  
 In these idealistic spaces, the subject of many an experimental philosophy treatise, 
the experiment and experimenter could be validated by a group of disinterested peers. To 
rectify the obvious finitude and occasional disruption of human conduct in experimental 
settings, Hooke repeats the need for ―method or engine, which shall be as a guide to 
regulate its action,‖ lest the intellect ―act amiss.‖
158
 For Hooke, experiments must be 
viewed as separate from social occasion, and must be enhanced by elaborate protocols 
that became the ―engine‖ to secure objective knowledge. In response to the social 
concern of authenticating knowledge this presents, Sprat argues the need for ―many 
sincere witnesses standing by, whom self-love will not persuade to report falsly.‖
159
 Sprat 
shows a confidence that sincere witnesses will be easily found in the gentlemanly culture 
he occupies, and that their privileged and institutionally sanctioned status will ensure 
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their objectivity. Since the conditions for experiment had to be protected from the 
corruption of self-interested participants, it necessitated a language that functioned on 
principles of transparency and certainty. However, as I will show, deflating the sincerity 
of these ―witnesses,‖ revealing them as impassioned rather than impassionate, could be 
used as a move to demean the society as a whole. 
 For critics of Hooke and his cohort, exposing persuasion at the heart of 
supposedly neutral practices, then, reveals experimental culture as a gentlemanly club 
more concerned with protecting its own integrity than producing anything of value. It is 
like going through sanitized, protected, and polemicized space and finding an orator. Just 
as Butler finds rhetoric in the anti-rhetorical pronouncements of Sprat, these critics join 
him in finding rhetoric at the heart of the Royal Society, despite its pronounced absence. 
As Butler hints, the character of the orator is publicly denied a presence, but subsists in 
the exclusive and self-congratulatory culture of gentlemen that authorizes itself. As the 
gentleman Bruce will remark in Shadwell‘s The Virtuoso in a comment that caricatures 
the figures of audience and experimenter, they are ―the chorus to [a] puppet show‖ 
(I.i.283). 
“Several faiths of seeing”: Samuel Butler’s Satires on Science 
Thomas Babington Macaulay notes that Samuel Butler was the ―only man of real 
genius who, between the Restoration and the Revolution, showed a bitter enmity to the 
new philosophy.‖
160
 The specifics of that enmity, however, have been lost to history. In 
his own time, Butler‘s popularity began and ended with Hudibras (1663-78). Royalists, 
in particular, celebrated his acidic couplets depicting a vain Presbyterian justice whose 
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zeal outweighs his common sense. Hudibras was so popular that, fittingly, the poem 
consumed the author: he was known by all as ―Hudibras‖ Butler.
161
 This fate could only 
be expected of an author who published a single significant work. Yet when Butler‘s 
writings were published anonymously after his death in 1680, and then in 1759 in a two-
volume edition published and edited by Robert Thyer, the collected works of ―Hudibras‖ 
Butler included pithy invectives framed as ―Miscellaneous Observations,‖ ―Satyrs‖ 
consistent with the genre of similarly-titled works, over two hundred character sketches, 
and the longest poem other than Hudibras, The Elephant in the Moon. Scattered among 
these works, and focalized in The Elephant in the Moon, is a consistent disdain for 
experimental philosophy for the way its cultural enterprise corrupts its methodology.  
In his sympathetic entry on Butler in The Lives of the Poets (1779-81), Samuel 
Johnson expresses his own curiosity about Butler‘s animosity: 
Some verses . . . show him to have been among those who ridiculed the institution 
of the Royal Society, of which the enemies were, for some time, very numerous 
and very acrimonious; for what reason it is hard to conceive, since the 
philosophers professed not to advance doctrines, but to produce facts: and the 
most zealous enemy of innovation must admit the gradual progress of experience, 




Johnson adds, ―In the mist of obscurity passed the life of Butler.‖ In that ―mist,‖ Butler 
continually targeted the Royal Society with sharp satires that positioned him as an 
―enemy of innovation‖ because of what he saw as the troubling means by which 
―innovation‖ was conducted and publicized. Perhaps the animosity came as a result of his 
relationship with Sprat, with whom he served in the court of the Duke of Buckingham.
163
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Whatever the case, the public behavior and proclamations of the Royal Society troubled 
Butler enough that he inveighed, at least privately, against them.  
Marjorie Hope Nicholson notes that The Elephant in the Moon more than likely 
―circulated in manuscript among the Wits at tavern and coffeehouse.‖
164
 Since, as 
Nicholson explains, Butler wrote a poem to Thomas Shadwell, Shadwell had likely read 
The Elephant in the Moon.
165
 At one point, when Shadwell‘s virtuoso, Sir Nicholas, 
announces his plans for a geography of the moon, he explains, ―I can see all the 
Mountainous parts, and Vallies, and Seas, and Lakes in it; nay, the larger sort of Animals, 
as Elephants and Camels; but publick Buildings and Ships very easily‖ (V.ii.81-87). He 
adds, ―At Land they fight with Elephants and Castles,‖ echoing the conceit of Butler‘s 
poem that depicts a lunar war involving Elephants. 
The Elephant in the Moon was Butler‘s first foray into targeting the society, but 
not his last. Since the poem was never published, dating it proves difficult. Yet because 
the poem invokes both the Philosophical Transactions – begun in 1665 – and Royal 
Society antagonist Henry Stubbe, we can assume that the poem was written after the 
1671 publication of Stubbe‘s censures. In 1674, Butler amended Hudibras to include a 
new ―part‖ dedicated to Hudibras‘ argument with Sidrophel, a ―Rosicrucian‖ who 
farcically elaborates talking points of experimentalists, and whom scholars see as a 
satirical caricature of prominent Royal Society member Paul Neile.
166
 Sidrophel is ―as 
full of tricks / As Rota men of politics‖ (191), and is easily deflated even by the 
ridiculous knight-errant Hudibras. Butler also drafted, but did not finish, a Satire upon the 
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Royal Society, and frequently targets so-called men of science in his Characters and his 
Miscellaneous Observations. In these works, Butler rises against a group wishing to 
depict themselves as devoid of ―self-love,‖ casting the virtuosi as men of passion, not 
reason, who have merely figured out a way to legitimate their quest for obscure 
knowledge. This is consistent with Butler‘s other writings which expose the archetypal 
Restoration gentleman as driven by a need for public vindication. In his Satire upon the 
Imperfection and Abuse of Human Learning, Butler writes, ―Man has a natural desire to 
know, / But th‘one half is for int‘rest, th‘other show . . .‖
167
 That Rochesterian sentiment 
reappears throughout his writings. In this particularly grim view of ―human learning,‖ the 
knowledge-seeker is guided by a combination of selfish curiosity and vain showmanship. 
Of experimental settings, Ken Robinson notes, ―Butler thought of error, self-interest, and 
imposture as close companions.‖
168
 Though microscopes and telescopes, as well as the 
rigid protocols of the scientific inquiry, are the apparati that separate finite observers 
from their observations, they cannot resolve the dilemma that those humans can do 
whatever they want with those observations to bolster their own status. These tools are 
merely an avenue toward the same implicit flaw Butler saw in all Restoration 
―characters,‖ a desire for fame, wealth, and social and sexual fulfillment through 
whatever means were available to them. The man of science, even in his pronouncements 
of objectivity and his vision for a shared natural order outside of individual achievement, 
was not be excluded from this appraisal. 
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One of Butler‘s most biting criticisms to this effect comes in his Characters, 
which he wrote between 1667 and 1669, and presumably circulated in manuscript.
169
 
These Theophrastan sketches, which flourished during the seventeenth century,
170
 present 
a variety of farcical types specific to Restoration culture, for instance ―Clap‘d Man,‖ ―A 
Tennis-Player,‖ and ―An Hypocritical Nonconformist.‖ When he turned to ―A Virtuoso,‖ 
Butler cleverly conflates the two common connotations that were familiar to 
experimental culture. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, from 1650 to 1700, a 
virtuoso can either be ―one who has a general interest in arts and sciences‖ or ―a student 
or collector of antiquities, natural curiosities or rarities,‖ to which is added ―one who 
carries on such pursuits in a dilettante or trifling matter.‖
171
 On the former, John Evelyn 
refers to ―one of the greatest vertuosas in France for his Collection of Pictures, Achates, 
Medaills, & Flowers.‖
172
 Walter Houghton notes the connection of ―virtuoso‖ to 
scientific endeavor by showing that the term was employed to reflect either a positive or 
negative valence: ―there were virtuosi and virtuosi - the amateurs or dilettantes, and the 
‗sincere‘ inquirers into nature, with or without the Baconian purpose of ultimate use.‖
173
  
Using the term to reflect ―sincere‖ inquiry, Joseph Glanvill refers flatteringly to 
forefathers such as Copernicus and Kepler as ―the vertuosi of the awakened world.‖
174
  
Butler‘s character sketch takes on the experimental ―dilettante‖ and synthesizes it 
with the antiquarian connotation of ―virtuoso‖ to belittle the kind of useless knowledge 
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that the experimental philosopher collects. Just as the antiquarian pursues obscure items 
rather than any productive undertaking, Butler caricatures the ―virtuoso‖ as one 
perversely delighted by the mundane:  
He is a Haberdasher of small arts and sciences, and deals in as many several 
operations as a baby artificer does in engines. He will serve well enough for an 
index to tell what is handled in the world, but no further. He is wonderfully 
delighted with rarities, and they continue still so to him though he has shown 
them a thousand times, for every new admirer that gapes upon them sets him a-
gaping too. Next these [sic] he loves strange natural histories; and as those that 
read romances, though they know them to be fictions, are as much affected as if 
they were true, so is he, and will make hard shift to tempt himself to believe them 
first to be possible, and then he's sure to believe them to be true, forgetting that 
belief upon belief is false heraldry. He keeps a catalogue of the names of all 
famous men in any profession, whom he often takes occasion to mention as his 
very good friends and old acquaintances. Nothing is more pedantic than to seem 
too much concerned about wit or knowledge, to talk much of it, and appear too 
critical in it. All he can possibly arrive to is but like the monkeys dancing on the 





In this passage, the artistic does not only invade nature, but supplants it. Natural histories 
are the equivalent of ―romances,‖ because they arouse – perhaps even sexually – the 
attention of the reader. In establishing the virtuoso as a pedantic lover of useless 
knowledge driven by a need to impress on others his inflated sense of self-worth, desiring 
to be included amongst the ―famous men in any profession,‖ Butler emphasizes the 
corruption of inquiry by those who have a need for a calculated status as a celebrity.  
Butler‘s virtuoso is titillated by ―strange natural histories‖ and forgets that ―belief upon 
belief is false heraldry.‖ Though such reports are more than likely written and authorized 
by Sprat‘s ―mathematicall plainness,‖ they still arouse the virtuoso‘s passions toward 
empty spectacle and insignificant curiosity. Concluding the sketch, Butler notes, ―His 
learning is like those Letters on a Coach, where many being writ together no one appears 
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plain,‖ as the virtuoso amounts to little more than ―a great man among the ignorant, a 




In the character sketch of the virtuoso, Butler emphasizes the actual content of 
experimental reports, as well as the twisted fantasies of those who read them. Virtuosos 
are creatures of passion, even if they announce themselves as ruled by rational faculties 
that sublimate their desires to the neutral quest of progress and inquiry. In this sketch, 
strange passions are aroused both inside and outside of the laboratory, and are only 
legitimized through a mix of royal prerogative and sanctimonious reporting. The virtuoso 
deceives his audiences through presentations that are practically theatrical by nature, and 
trumpets even the most worthless achievements as grand scientific accomplishment. By 
emphasizing the desire for experimentalists to create (perhaps above all else) a sense of 
celebrity, he challenges its solemnity and apparently disinterested aims. Butler connects 
the premium of knowledge with external factors that its most ―noble‖ pursuers refuse to 
acknowledge are operative in their practices.  
The Characters provide a specific line of attack against experimental culture, and 
not just the technologies and innovations themselves, that helps clarify his purpose in The 
Elephant in the Moon. Where the virtuoso mainly aspires to celebrity and is titillated by 
both that prospect and the literature and language that surround it, the moon-watchers 
Butler depicts are bound by an institutional faith that corrupts their practices. Not merely 
an individual problem, as the character sketch suggests, the larger threat lies in societies 
of virtuosi who confirm each other and are deemed genuine by an audience who takes 
their obscurity as truth merely because of how it is uttered. In The Elephant in the Moon, 
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the desire for institutional accomplishment and telescopic inquiry is bound with a need 
for public validation and vindication from their critics, which leads the virtuosi to obtain 
and confirm spectacular findings that can be publicized. 
In the poem, a society of virtuosi set out one evening to observe the moon, hoping 
that the new knowledge they might find will legitimate them in the eyes of a (in the 
fiction of the poem) skeptical public. At first, the moon-watchers claim to see 
―Privolvans‖ and ―Subvolvans‖ warring on the lunar surface, as described in Johannes 
Kepler‘s fictional creation Somnium (1634) and John Wilkins‘ The Discovery of a World 
in the Moone (1638). However, their most remarkable discovery occurs when they see an 
―elephant from one of those / Two mighty armies is broke loose.‖
177
 When the virtuosi 
discuss their finding, they recognize that such spectacular knowledge will validate them 
―for the general satisfaction‖ (243). Even though the finding goes against everything they 
understand about astronomy, they are convinced the telescope does not lie: 
 And every man, amazed anew 
 How it could possibly be true 
 That any beast should run a race 
 So monstrous in so short a space, 
 Resolved, howe‘er, to make it good – 
 At least, as possible as he could – 
 And rather his own eyes condemn 
 Than question what he‘d seen with them. (254-260) 
 
Just as Kepler‘s dream-vision presents a war between lunar races, Butler‘s poem casts the 
specialists at war with a general audience before whom they must be approved. Lunar 
observation, especially that which produces fantastic results, will (in theory, at least) 
delight their fancy. Throughout the poem, Butler emphasizes this desire for 
authentication as a ―learn‘d society‖ – while they are deeply respected within the 
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confines of their own communal borders, their conversation condemns the distrustful 
public. After some discussion, they formulate a plan to present the information. As they 
write, their observations are found to be erroneous by a group of ―footboys‖ who realize 
that a mouse has become trapped in the telescope. At first, the society members refuse to 
believe the footboys‘ reports, and instead argue that their trained sights would not deceive 
them to such a grand degree. As a point of contrast, the footboys function on a ―monkeys‘ 
ingenuity,‖ unbound by any intellectual or social affiliation, which leads them to 
challenge the finding. Finally, the virtuosi unscrew the glass of the telescope to find the 
invading mouse. Only when they submit to the common sense and reasonable skepticism 
of their unschooled technical assistants do they realize how deeply and preposterously 
they have erred. 
 Butler includes terms that connect these virtuosi to current practitioners of the 
Royal Society. After discovering the ―elephant,‖ they decide ―to print it in the next 
Transaction” (244). The ―sly surveyors‖ of Ireland refers to William Petty, who mapped 
Ireland nearly a decade earlier. The virtuosi also lament their critics, among them 
―Stubbs,‖ or Henry Stubbe, and ―all the academic clubs.‖ Butler would further attack the 
Royal Society in his ―Satire upon the Royal Society,‖ where he mocks their ―constant 
occupations / To measure wind, and weigh the air.‖
178
 These allusions emphasize Butler‘s 
target specifically of the contemporary setting of institutionalized science – they are, after 
all, a ―learn‘d society‖ – and not merely a group of amateur triflers. In what becomes a 
parable, the institutional faith of the virtuosi overpowers the kind of rational skepticism 
that would otherwise lead them to an accurate conclusion. 
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 Butler‘s structure allows him to expose more completely the sharp contrast 
between objective protocols and finite subjectivity that figures into every observation. In 
the opening lines, ―a learn‘d society‖ (1) gathers to ―search the moon by her own light.‖ 
Butler opens by presenting the objective reserve with which experimental philosophers 
wish to characterize themselves, emphasizing the language of neutral inquiry with terms 
such as ―inventory‖ (5), ―accurate‖ (7), and ―properest observations‖ (13) that all mark an 
integrity uncorrupted by a desire for personal fame. Though they join to search by ―her 
own light,‖ rather than their own, they gradually begin to turn away from what they can 
learn from the moon to what they can gain from spectacular lunar discoveries. Indeed, the 
first two stanzas suggest the communal quickening and sharpening of inquiry that Sprat 
anticipates when he writes that the nature of assembly allows circumstances where  ―the 
Wits of most men are sharper, their Apprehensions readier, their Thoughts fuller, than in 
their Closets.‖
179
 In this cooperation, inquiry is freed from what Hooke calls ―all the 
difficulties of prejudice, with which mens minds are usually beset.‖
180
 In Sprat‘s 
idealization, built on Baconian principles, the group sublimates the unfruitful directions 
that unfounded individual hypotheses might bring about.  Yet Butler reveals the manner 
in which persuasive individuals deceive the group through speculations that lead only to 
further, more convoluted speculations. The group gathers around the ―lofty tube, the scale 
/ With which they heaven itself assail, / Was mounted full against the moon‖ (21-23). 
Until this point, the observers are cast as free from prejudice, yet the adverb ―against‖ is 
the first hint that something other than dispassionate examination will occur, suggesting 
an opposition between observer and observed.  
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Following this, the poem becomes a narrative of the corruptive emergence of 
―self-love‖ in such gatherings; the society members are each ―impatient who should have 
the honour / to plant an ensign first upon her‖ (25-26). In the stanza that follows, when 
Butler introduces the ―virtuoso then in chief,‖ the satirical voice takes over the poem 
following the decreasingly solemn beginning. This tactic allows Butler to frame the event 
around the accomplishment and cultural status of the Royal Society, which reveals how 
such surveys are informed by the inflated self-worth of the members of the institution. In 
each subsequent stanza, the ―learn‘d society‖ are revealed to be merely a group of triflers. 
In their speeches, Butler‘s moon-watchers offer polemics that contain the language we 
have seen the members of the Royal Society use to describe themselves and the necessity 
of their advancements. Since the characters are meant to represent prominent 
experimental philosophers, their activity satirizes the self-serving discourses that happen 
inside and outside the laboratory. 
 As the virtuosi discuss their findings, they become more confident in their 
conclusions. Eager to present their finding to the public, their conversations shows that 
exhibitionism trumps scientific curiosity. George Wasserman sees Butler‘s primary target 
as general concern, not specific to the scientific moment or the Royal society, toward the 
―use of reason to cultivate falsehood and subvert truth in the interest of self-esteem.‖
181
 
Equally significant is the way that self-esteem is tied to institutional authority more than 
individual confidence. The observers display a degree of egalitarianism amongst their 
own circle; in dialogue, they join together in the project of institutional validation and use 
the sort of dialectical protocols reminiscent of the Royal Society as the vehicle to do so. 
Yet reason is sublimated to a conversation in which each society member celebrates the 
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achievement of the last. Their assent builds to a point where, the narrator notes, there are 
―several faiths of seeing‖ (462). In other words, they can believe in their supposedly 
unified initial perception simply because they are the ones doing the perceiving. Their 
faith in their supposedly faultless faculty of their ―seeing‖ leads them to conform nature 
to their own ―learn‘d‖ ideas of how it should be. 
 In addition to their own puffed-up confidence, Butler opposes a skeptical public 
and the institution convinced of its own merit. Before being exposed by their footboys, 
one of the virtuosi excitedly notes that their latest discovery will allow them ―henceforth 
to be believed, / And have no more our best designs, / Because they‘re ours, believed ill 
signs‖ (200-203). This virtuoso
182
 acts as a scribe of sorts, and is celebrated among the 
group ―for his excellence / in heightening words and shadowing sense‖ (166-167). At his 
behest, they decide to pen an ―exact narrative‖ before subjecting their observations to 
scrutiny. Instead, because ―it is uncertain when / Such wonders will occur again‖ (233), 
they rush to publicize what they have just seen because it will challenge public prejudice 
and skepticism. As Ken Robinson notes, ―the poem‘s quack-scientists fail to check on the 
conformity between their speculations and the phenomena that they purport to explain‖ 
and thus believe Kepler‘s claims about moon-men, which are ―claims treated as 
signifying dogmatic hubris and wrong scientific method.‖
183
 
 Butler reveals the tricky balancing act between science as a phenomenon that 
must be explored privately yet still presented publicly, which oscillates most often toward 
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sacrificing the integrity of the experiment for the suitability of its presentation. In 
addition to their plans to persuade the outside world of their own merit, these virtuosi also 
persuade each other that their initial impressions, even after they are disproven by a 
footboy, might somehow be accurate. They do this by further expressing their animosity 
toward the public. An expert on ―vermin‖ steps forward, ruefully determining: 
It is no wonder we‘re cried down 
And made the talk of all the town 
That rants and swears for all our great 
Attempts we have done nothing yet. (393-96) 
 
The retaliation, of course, to claims that ―we have done nothing yet‖ is to fabricate 
something that the public can understand and that will capture their imagination. Their 
debate comes to the conclusion that above all else, the public must be persuaded with 
results regardless of their validity. The form of the presentation outweighs its content. It 
doesn‘t have to be true, it just has to persuasive. As the vermin expert proclaims, ―For 
partners have been always known / To cheat their public interest prone‖ (443-444).  
 For the virtuosi, their presentation ultimately acts as a defensive retort for that 
skeptical public who ―rant and swea[r]‖ (395). But even if the sighting is not in any way 
an accurate one, the legitimation gained by such spectacular knowledge will allow them 
the opportunity to pursue valid conclusions. However, these conclusions should not 
necessarily be shared with the public. The purpose of scientific audiences, like those in 
court or in the houses of great men who might be benefactors, is to endow and affirm, not 
to question.  As conceived by Butler, the ―network of correspondence‖ is mere lip-
service, a way of publicly crediting non-specialist audiences in hope that the good faith 




the ―learn‘d society‖ sneers at everyone outside of it. The words of the vermin expert 
close the dialogue: 
For truth is too reserved and nice 
T‘appear in mixed societies, 
Delights in solitary abodes, 
And never shows herself in crowds . . . 
The world, that never sets esteem 
On what things are, but what they seem, 
And if they be not strange and new, 
They‘re ne‘er the better for being true. (405-408; 415-418) 
 
The public fancy for experiments is marked by a desire for ―strange and new‖ spectacles, 
so the virtuosi might as well appease them with elaborately concocted ―things.‖ The real 
truth will not appease public fancy; it is ―too reserved and nice,‖ and is only suitable for 
the confines of the ―learn‘d society‖ where it will be properly nurtured and understood. 
Of course, the dramatic irony evident in the ―vermin‖ expert‘s response is obvious 
because he and his fellow society members have just accepted the most absurd of 
observations. As Butler shows, the desire for spectacular visions animates both the 
virtuosi and their audience, if only in the case of this ―learn‘d society‖ for more shallow 
reasons. Upon finding the reality of gnats and a mouse instead of men and elephants, the 
virtuosi are ―amazed, confounded, and afflicted / To be so openly convicted‖ (504-505). 
Butler finds the source in the need for public validation, and turns the tale into a satirical 
parable that locates error in this indulgence. His closing imperative is a reproach of a 
culture grown self-congratulatory, targeting 
 . . . those who greedily pursue 
 Things wonderful instead of true, 
 That in their speculations choose 
 To make discoveries strange news, 





Scientific investigation animates, rather than suppresses, odd passions and the desire for 
wonder rather than for truth. Returning to the lover of strange histories in the Characters, 
experimental publications err by becoming a ―gazette,‖ emphasizing spectacle rather than 
the mundane goings-on both inside and outside of the laboratory. Like Sprat‘s History, 
which ―cr[ies] down oratory and declamation while us[ing] nothing else,‖ the moon-
watchers of Butler‘s poem exemplify the wide gulf between theory and practice. 
“I see Sir Formal’s oratory cannot prevail”: Assent and Rhetoric in The Virtuoso 
Butler emphasizes that, even in attempts to exclude it, rhetoric is evident in the process of 
reshaping scientific findings into public literature, as well as the clear persuasive tactics 
that occur in the scientific inquiry itself. In The Virtuoso, Thomas Shadwell offers a 
similar line of attack but more explicitly visualizes this process in the composite of Sir 
Formal. For Shadwell, the laboratory is not the apparatus in which ―self-love‖ is sifted 
out as though through a crucible, but actually encourages its participants to engage in 
practices of self-interested persuasion because of the domineering presence of the 
virtuoso. Shadwell‘s Nicholas Gimcrack only allows the kinds of authorization and 
authentication that affirm his ridiculous efforts, even though such support comes 
exclusively from those who have the most to gain from it.  
The plot of The Virtuoso mainly concerns the attempts of two lovers, Bruce and 
Longvil, to win the hands of Clarinda and Miranda, nieces of the virtuoso, Gimcrack. 
Gimcrack and his wife, the cuckolding Lady Gimcrack, wish to have the dowry of their 
nieces for their own, and have already rejected many marriage proposals. Bruce and 
Longvil realize that amorous attempts on the nieces, who are already attracted to them, 




jealousy is helped by the vigilancy and malice of that impertinent strumpet his wife, 
keeps ‗em from all manner of address. Letters they have receiv‘d from us, and we can 
have no answer.‖
184
 However, Longvil has found a way to have a meeting with Gimcrack 
by ingratiating himself to Gimcrack‘s sycophantic house orator, Sir Formal. Sir Formal 
will ignorantly act as mediator between the two potential suitors and the closed-minded 
Gimcrack by presenting Bruce and Longvil as ―the greatest philosophers and the greatest 
admirers of the Virtuoso and his works that can be‖ (I.i.120-22). 
At first denied a chance to woo the nieces, the suitors immediately recognize that 
the easiest way is through the laboratory, which Gimcrack keeps in his home. 
Immediately, the laboratory merges uneasily with a domestic setting, which figures into 
the marriage plot of the comedy as well. As Stephen Shapin notes, such settings were 
common in the sense that ―by far the most significant venues were the private residences 
of gentlemen or, at any rate, sites where places of scientific work were coextensive with 
places of residence, whether owned or rented.‖
185
 Shadwell satirically shows that while 
these ―places‖ are architecturally ―coextensive,‖ they work to corrupt the activity that 
happens in each. As Miranda claims, her will is controlled by the ―government of a 
virtuoso‖ who ―never cares for understanding mankind‖ (I.ii.5).   Gimcrack fails in his 
dual role as domestic head – both as husband and controlling uncle – and dedicates his 
time only to ridiculous experiments such as the bottling of air and teaching a frog to 
swim. The narrative of the play shows Gimcrack losing control of his household as the 
absurdity of his experiments becomes more apparent. For Bruce and Longvil, endorsing 
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Gimcrack‘s scientific enterprise will allow them audience and access, a space in which 
they are closer to the two nieces. The plan works precisely because Gimcrack surrounds 
himself with the sycophantic Sir Formal and the coxcomb Sir Samuel, who has ―forty 
several disguises to make love in‖ (I.i.140). Both are authorized presences in the 
laboratory, and Sir Formal in particular not only observes the production of Gimcrack‘s 
prized ―knowledge,‖ but also participates in it. 
Shadwell‘s critique of experimental philosophy comes through his exposure of the 
Royal Society‘s paradigmatic sanctified setting of the laboratory. As I will show, 
Shadwell has his characters even repeat the solemn language of experimentalists as a way 
of proving how ridiculous it sounds when one actually speaks it out loud. As John 
Shanahan argues, ―Against a rising tide of polemic and apologies casting laboratories as 
sacred spaces different from their worldly surroundings, Shadwell casts them as perfectly 
continuous with fallen spaces of (common) man.‖
186
 Tita Chico emphasizes Shadwell‘s 
implication that ―the popularization of experimental philosophy emphasizes such 
buffoonish and self-interested behavior,‖
187
 and thus highlights the culture that belies the 
ideals of its solemn rhetoric. Michael McKeon adds that theatrical satirists such as 
Shadwell use dramatic representation to show how ―the entire technology of 
experimental instrumentation became a mirror of theatrical technology and its arts of 
illusion.‖
188
 Such assessments reveal Shadwell‘s approach in savaging experimental 
culture and the language dedicated to its perpetuation. Yet in considering The Virtuoso as 
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 we should reflect on another explicit aspect of 
Shadwell‘s satire: the audience who watches and ultimately verifies the experiment. Far 
from the tranquil space that Boyle and Sprat polemicize, in which ―self-love‖ can be 
separated from the observer through the implementation of protocol, Shadwell visualizes 
the shallow motives that enter into the authentication of knowledge production, 
ultimately corrupting it. Throughout the play, Gimcrack surrounds himself with a self-
absorbed culture of yes-men who do not care what the experiment is, but only what they 
can gain from their approval of it. 
Critics have been attentive to the various plots for which Gimcrack‘s laboratory 
plays conduit, whether the romantic entanglements of Bruce and Longvil, the endeavors 
of Gimcrack‘s scoundrel ―uncle‖ Snarl, or a bizarre cross-dressing plot involving Sir 
Samuel and Lady Gimcrack‘s lover, Hazard. In this section, I focus on Shadwell‘s 
portrayal of a corrupt culture of assent that operates around the moments of experimental 
pursuit. Critics have debated whether Shadwell attacks specifically the Royal Society or 
merely those experimental triflers who pursue elaborately unnecessary and unsanctioned 
experiments outside of it (like Sir Nicholas).
 190
  Shadwell‘s views toward experimental 
philosophy are neither completely derogatory nor are they built to preserve a culture of 
proper experimental decorum. Like Butler, he suggests that the pretensions of 
experimental practice invade the integrity of experimental works. Yet Shadwell saves his 
largest target for the network of correspondence that serves to corrupt experiments of any 
integrity, and chooses the orator Sir Formal as the expression of this hypocrisy. 
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Gimcrack‘s ridiculous experiments are not meant for public consumption, yet 
they enter that realm through the pronouncements of Sir Formal. When we first meet 
Gimcrack, venturing with Bruce and Longvil behind the formerly closed doors of his 
laboratory, he is ―learning to swim upon a table‖ (II.ii), imitating a frog in a nearby bowl, 
his limbs attached to the frog‘s by a string. As the obsequious audience offers their 
praises, each desiring favor from the Virtuoso, Gimcrack announces his experiments with 
the utmost gravitas: ―I seldom bring any thing to use; tis not my way. Knowledge is my 
ultimate end‖ (II.ii.85-86). Sir Formal immediately endorses him, which leads to an 
exchange between Gimcrack and his audience that will serve as a prototype for the rest of 
the authenticating claims that happen throughout the play. This dialogue embodies 
Shadwell‘s perception of the networks of correspondence that follow the experimental 
moment: 
Bruce: You have reason, Sir; Knowledge is like Virtue, its own reward. 
Formal: To study for use is base and mercenary, below the serene and quiet 
temper of a sedate Philosopher. 
Gimcrack: You have hit it right, Sir. I never studi'd any thing for use but Physick, 
which I administer to poor people: you shall see my method. 
Longvil: Sir, I beseech you, what new curiosities have you found out in Physick? 
Gimcrack: Why I have found out the use of Respiration, or Breathing, which is a 
motion of the Thorax and the Lungs, whereby the Air is impell'd by the Nose, 
Mouth, and Windpipe into the Lungs, and thence expell'd farther to elaborate the 
Bloud, by refrigerating it, and separating its fuliginous steams. 
Bruce [aside]: What a Secret the Rogue has found out! (II.ii.87-101) 
 
Bruce‘s final aside reveals his obvious skepticism at Gimcrack‘s method after his earlier 
public consent. Bruce assents, connecting the silly spectacle of Gimcrack‘s swimming 
with ―virtue‖ because he realizes the quickest way to Clarinda is by proving himself as a 
―philosopher.‖ Yet Bruce‘s authentication comes easily – by confirming Gimcrack‘s 




opening scene, they show the aptitude to be good critics and impartial observers. They 
are described as ―Gentlemen of wit and sense‖ in the ―Dramatis Personae.‖ Yet once they 
enter the laboratory, they sacrifice the cultural and intellectual acumen earlier displayed 
so they can manipulate Gimcrack into validating them. Gimcrack‘s laboratory is not a 
crucible that refines its participants into the neutral way of experimental life, divorcing 
them of the ―self-love‖ that Sprat rejects. As Bruce‘s aside reveals, spoken assent masks 
skepticism because of social factors unrelated to the experiment at hand. In this scene, the 
experimental ideal of collective witness only joins together self-interested social aspirants 
who offer empty praise.  
Gimcrack partly authorizes Bruce and Longvil for their gentlemanly social status, 
and partly because they acquiesce to his presentation. When they are around Gimcrack, 
their approvals are often qualified by asides that reveal their contempt for him, and prove 
that they perform for two audiences. Their private words reveal what a fraud they think 
he is, as their vocal sanctioning of his experiments is as exaggerated as their asides are 
biting. For instance, when Bruce declares that a failed blood transfusion between a 
spaniel and a bulldog is an ―experiment you‘ll deserve a statue for‖ (I.iii.133), he could 
be talking about anything. Gimcrack resists anyone who might be a critic, in particular 
the virulent Snarl, who corrects and mocks him at every point, and only welcomes a 
group who responds with flattery and approval to his every word. Shadwell specifically 
positions Bruce, Longvil, and Sir Formal as audience members only to show their 
obvious fallibility even in their authenticating announcements. They have no desire for 
observing truth and presenting an objective judgment, but only appeasing and gaining the 




knowledge Gimcrack desires – useless even in the accuracy of its empirically-noted 
minutia – they merely offer flatteries disguised as judgments, which gain them even 
further access to first the laboratory and later the amorous nieces. 
To Shadwell, the absurdity of an experiment such as the bottling of air is, literally, 
no matter. It takes on a kind of public currency through the authentication of its observer, 
in each case a faux-modest witness whose apparent disinterestedness is a performance 
calculated to be a successful tool for persuasion. Yet Sir Nicholas does not care about, 
nor does he even recognize, the partiality or foolish nature of his audience. After Bruce 
makes a fawning remark about an experiment in his laboratory, Gimcrack calls him ―a 
most admirable observer‖ (IV.iii.212). Gimcrack wants only to surround himself with 
those who validate him, or offer the useless evaluations that he does. The virtuoso can 
continue to remain in the theatrical space of the laboratory so long as he has the consent 
of his audience. When faced with a hostile audience, as we will see, Gimcrack shows his 
inability to defend his science. Shadwell‘s depiction refutes the ideal of the modest 
witness in every scientific setting, whether in dealing with its validation or its public 
reception.  
Sir Formal‘s responses are more initially ridiculous even than Gimcrack, yet they 
offer a compelling example of modes of assent that shape scientific knowledge in the 
form of rhetorical pronouncement. Formal acts as both a house orator and an external 
publicist. He performs the latter duty in the play‘s opening scene, when upon meeting 
Bruce and Longvil he describes Gimcrack as the ―finest speculative gentleman in the 
whole world‖ (I.i.267-68). By ingratiating themselves to Sir Formal, Bruce and Longvil 




proud of the Honour of being the grateful and happy Instrument of the Necessitude and 
familiar Communication, which is to intervene between such excellent Virtuoso‘s‖ 
(II.ii.52-55). Through this corrupted ―instrument,‖ Bruce and Longvil accomplish their 
genial confirmation with flattery. The scientist and his rhetorician, the tool of his public 
mediation, are both easy for the taking. They both subscribe to a self-interested rhetoric 
easy to reproduce, dedicated to transforming dull scientific findings into rhetoric that 
confirms its worth. As the play rises to a climax, he even acts as intermediary between 
Gimcrack and the public, arguing that his rhetorical skill will pacify an incendiary crowd. 
Formal is not only a mediator, but an institutionally sanctioned one, and his flowery 
rhetoric is the accepted instrument through which Shadwell presents knowledge being 
conveyed and authenticated.  
Easily flattered, Formal responds to any gesture with a volley of tropes that mask 
his lack of substance. When faced with the rejection of Clarinda, whose hand he seeks to 
win with poetic oratory, he exhorts her to ―ignore not that those venturous blossom 
whose overhasty obedience to the early spring does anticipate the proper season do often 
suffer from the injuries of severer weather unless protected by the happy patronage of 
some benign shelter‖ (I.ii.185-190). Not convinced that Formal will provide the ―benign 
shelter‖ she apparently needs, Clarinda leaves, and Formal responds, fittingly, ―Her 
departure favors somewhat of abruptness‖ (I.ii.192).  
Though limited to lavish ornamentation, Rhetoric is the only instrument Formal 
knows. Formal even admits as much, describing himself as one who ―speak[s] alike on all 
subjects‖ (III.iv.92). Yet Formal also allows Gimcrack a kind of significance that the 




ultimate end,‖ Formal restates the purposely useless experimental findings in such a way 
to endow them with an extrinsic value. Formal‘s ―gift‖ lies in taking Gimcrack‘s bland 
language and rearticulating it through rhetorical concoctions. For instance, after Sir 
Nicholas makes a brief observation about a tumbler spider, that ―The Fabric or Structure 
of this Insect, with its Texture is most admirable,‖ Sir Formal responds, 
Nor is its Sagacity, or Address, less to be wonder'd  
at, as I have had the honour to observe under my noble  
Friend; as soon as it has spi'd its Prey, as suppose upon a Table,  
it will crawl under-neath till it arrive to the Antipodes  
of the Fly, which it discovers by sometimes peeping up; and  
if the capricious Fly happens not to remove it self by crural  
motion, or the vibration of its wings, it makes a fatal leap  
upon the heedless Prey, of which, when it has satisfied  




Formal thoughtlessly embraces bland, scientific facts and weaves them into a grand 
rhetorical narrative. He embellishes the story with adjectives (―capricious,‖ ―fatal,‖ 
―heedless‖) that make it at once more fantastical and less accurate. He also emphasizes 
the ―honour‖ of his noble ―friend,‖ Gimcrack, who makes such an occasion possible. 
Though Gimcrack‘s description avoids the metaphorical, Formal‘s ignores the factual. 
Though not always to this extreme, such sacrifices are necessary for the publicizers who 
convert private observation into material for public discourse. As an audience to 
Gimcrack, Formal‘s ignorant approval and subsequent rhetorical revision invalidates him 
an as observer. Yet both in the laboratory and outside of it, Formal acts as a rhetorical 
mediator for the conclusions that Gimcrack reaches. Formal‘s rewording privileges 
presentation over substance; he is, as Bruce claims, ―very much abounding in words and 




Formal acts as a farcical synecdoche for all the instruments of publicizing 
experimental facts that the Royal Society employed – whether its vocal proponents or the 
anonymous reports. Within the confines of the laboratory, he is successful insofar as he, 
like the suitors, floridly celebrates Gimcrack‘s findings. Formal might be seen as 
evidence that Gimcrack is not meant to represent the sanctioned and proper culture of the 
Royal Society. After all, Lady Gimcrack notes that ―[Gresham] Colledge indeed refus'd 
him‖ (II.ii.304). This remark has led one critic to assume that the scientific figures are 
―aberrations of their respective professions‖ because the ―Royal Society provides a 
standard of reason and decorum against which the follies and excesses of fools may be 
measured.‖
191
  Though Gimcrack operates outside the institution, his laboratory is clearly 
meant to resemble Royal Society practices. For instance, when Formal notes that 
knowledge of the moon ―wou'd be of infinite advantage to us, in the improvement of our 
Politicks‖ (II.ii.40-42), Shadwell critiques the tendency for experimental philosophers to 
view themselves as Sprat and Glanvill did, holding the answers to all of England‘s 
problems by perfecting a civil setting that leads to the production of worthwhile 
knowledge. Also, as Marjorie Hope Nicolson notes, Gimcrack‘s foolish resolution of 
selling trips to the moon copies an almost identical passage in Glanvill‘s The Vanity of 
Dogmatizing (1661).
192
 Further, the experiments Gimcrack describes originated in the 
pages of Philosophical Transactions.
193
 
When Formal finally must face the public, Shadwell shifts our attention from 
internal practice to external networks that publicize scientific findings. Later in the play, 
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local weavers are led (falsely) to believe that Gimcrack has invented an engine loom that 
will put them out of business. When a mob forms and threatens to burn down his house, 
Gimcrack cowers away and mutters, ―I never invented anything of use in my life‖ 
(V.iii.115). Sir Formal offers to settle the dispute using his most powerful weapon, 
―Eloquence‖ (V.iii.126). The result is predictably comical; despite his pronouncement of 
both his own rhetorical mastery and the power of ―eloquence‖ to bring order to chaos, Sir 
Formal utters a few pompous paragraphs before the weavers ―beat him, kick him, and 
fling oranges at him‖ (V.iii.61 s.d.). 
 In the earlier scene, in which he eulogizes a spider, Formal both intervenes and 
reinterprets scientific results, replacing any scientific result (deeds) with his florid 
rhetoric (words). The most vocal member of Gimcrack‘s specious authentication 
community, Formal‘s bombastic praise serves as authentication enough to bypass any 
rigid test.  In the later scene, the scientist is protected by the mediation of the language he 
sanctions. Formal‘s report proves more important than the experiment itself, yet 
ultimately it is hollow and unproductive. As experimental philosophers strived to find an 
appropriate language for public mediation, Shadwell depicts them failing because of an 
overwhelming regard for their perception.   
 In this desire for public authentication, it is pivotal to Shadwell‘s satire that when 
Gimcrack cowers for fear from the rioting weavers, neither Gimcrack‘s innovation nor 
Sir Formal‘s rhetorical stylings are effective in putting the mob to rest. Sir Formal‘s 
rhetoric inadequately explains the advantage of the loom and fails to prevent what he 
calls the ―rapid force of the too dangerous hurricane of passion‖ (V.iii.44-45). When Sir 




devastating attack on the presentation of experimental philosophy to the public. With all 
its excesses and transformed, yet corrupted, visions of private activity, the practiced 
rhetoric fails to do anything that it purports to do. It is far from the sober language that 
members of the Royal Society envisage as necessary for the publication of scientific 
facts. Inside the laboratory, the orator merely authenticates; outside, his rhetoric is 
exposed by a skeptical and angry group of workers. The weavers are better auditors of the 
kind of internal and institutionalized lingo that Gimcrack allows. 
Regulating Bear-men: Putting Argument in its Place in The Blazing World 
Shadwell and Butler concern themselves with a rhetoric that pervades 
experimental culture despite the improved social and literary technologies that 
supposedly rendered such impulses unnecessary and undesirable. More specifically, they 
attack and expose flawed practices of sociability that utilize a self-interested rhetoric – 
Butler in terms of a communal agenda, Shadwell through the more explicit form of an 
orator whose vocal assent and eventual rearticulation corrupts the accuracy of 
experimental findings in both private and public spaces. These critiques challenge the 
privileged and apparently perfected sociability of the Royal Society by showing it in 
action: the moon watchers in Butler‘s poems are hardly ―modest witnesses,‖ and no one 
in Shadwell‘s laboratory is free of the ―self-love‖ that Sprat claims can be instrumentally 
severed from experimental participants.  
In her diverse writings about a number of scientific matters, Margaret Cavendish 
also comments on the role social authority plays in assessing empirical accuracy, yet her 
imperative throughout is that it does not have to be this way. Her social writings, 




vantage that allows her a unique viewpoint on the mediation of experimental conclusions. 
They have to be expressed to curious audiences fascinated by new technologies, 
fantastical ideas, and the men who produced them – audiences, in other words, like 
Cavendish. Cavendish does not share the bemused perspective of wits like Butler and 
Shadwell. In her skepticism, she attempts to be informative and ameliorative, aiming to 
correct a reliance on apparati and empirical models that overruled rational inquiry while 
expressing a desire to join more closely in the pursuit of experimentation. As opposed to 
the more caustic attacks of Butler and Shadwell, Cavendish offers the promise of an 
appropriate program of social demeanor that can engage and correct empirical methods 
built on the denial of finite involvement. Throughout her writings, Cavendish addresses 
both the problem and potential of eloquence, particularly in her Sociable Letters (1664) in 
which she both praises eloquence and fears its deleterious effects. Even in dialogue, the 
orator can provoke agonistic unrest that can be damaging in both social and intellectual 
settings. In her utopian vision of The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing 
World, Cavendish visualizes the regulation of internal dialogues through a sovereign 
argumentative structure, similar to that articulated by Hobbes, which will keep 
discussions from turning into endless disputes.
194
  
 Cavendish famously oscillated between critic of, and rapt audience for, Royal 
Society presentations. Samuel Pepys, not an admirer of the Duchess of Newcastle, 
describes Cavendish attending planned experiments at Arundel House ―full of 
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 In his diary entry for May 30, 1667, Pepys notes his 
disdain for Cavendish as she turns the serious business of scientific inquiry into a 
frivolous social occasion. As Samuel Mintz notes in a synthesis of all the reports of this 
visit, she did not live down her reputation as ―the laughing stock of London.‖
196
 
According to Pepys, Cavendish arrived fashionably late with her ―women attending her.‖ 
Pepys was particularly entranced and annoyed by the antics of ―a very black boy that ran 
up and down the room.‖
197
 Though Mintz notes she took ―unashamed pleasure in what 
she saw,‖
198
 such pleasure seemed, to Pepys, antithetical to the serious purposes of the 
occasion of scientific inquiry. In that same diary entry, Pepys laments, ―we do believe the 
town will be full of ballets of it.‖
199
 Cavendish is represented as treating technology as a 
trifle, and its serious business as an event to which one brings an ill-behaved child. 
 While Cavendish was excited by the prospect of natural philosophy and made 
many ventures to scenes of experiment such as Pepys describes, she was also skeptical 
about those who privileged empirical observation over rational contemplation. She 
clearly and vividly articulates her disenchantment with such innovations. For instance, in 
the wake of celebrations of the certainty to which Hooke‘s microscope could aspire, 
Cavendish challenges the apparatus for producing ―copies from copies.‖
200
 In 
Observations on Experimental Philosophy (1666), she argues that the value of Hooke‘s 
                                                 
195
 Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews, vol. 8 (Berkeley: 
California Up, 1974), 243. 
196
 Samuel I. Mintz, ―The Duchess of Newcastle‘s Visit to the Royal Society,‖ The Journal of English and 
Germanic Philology 51, no. 2 (April, 1952): 176. 
197
 Of ―black,‖ Nicolson notes that ―the word indicated only that they were brunette rather than blonde.‖ 
Nicolson, Pepys’ Diary and the New Science, 108. 
198
 Mintz, ―The Duchess of Newcastle‘s Visit to the Royal Society,‖ 176. 
199
 Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, 1974, 8:243. 
200
 Margaret Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. Eileen O‘Neill (Cambridge: 




Micrographia is as much aesthetic as scientific; they are ―superficial wonders.‖
201
 The 
preferable observation comes through ―a perfect natural eye‖ combined with ―rational 
contemplation joined with the observations of regular sense.‖
202
 Rather than seeing the 
apparatus as providing what Hooke called ―reparation made for the mischiefs,‖
203
 
Cavendish argues that such ―aids‖ distort natural perception by combining it with the 
flawed, ornamental qualities of art: 
for Art is not onely gross in comparison to Nature, but, for the most part, 
deformed and defective, and at best produces mixt or hermaphroditical figures, 
that is, a third figure between Nature and Art: which proves, that natural Reason is 
above artificial Sense, as I may call it: wherefore those Arts are the best and surest 
Informers, that alter Nature least, and they the greatest deluders that alter Nature 




Cavendish‘s explicit skepticism toward ―artificial sense‖ arises out of the milieu which 
draws both her fascination and critique. The Observations can be read as an endorsement 
of the general project of experimental philosophy and a challenge to its contemporary 
methodology. The invasion of aesthetic into natural realms should be avoided at all costs, 
lest it produce ―hermaphroditical figures‖ taken to be accurate. Challenging the claim that 
the microscope can reveal an empirically sound matter of fact, Cavendish sees it as mere 
hypothesis – and not a very strong one – to be subjected to further scrutiny. She writes, 
―exterior inspection through an Optick glass, is so deceiving, that it cannot be relied 
upon: Wherefore Regular Reason is the best guide to all Arts.‖
205
  This perspective 
echoes Hobbes‘ criticism that experimental practice does not constitute a philosophy 
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because it foregoes rational inquiry.
 206
 The empirical precision that the optical aid 
provides is perceptually flawed and is ideological rather than empirical, as in Butler‘s 
poem, because of the institutional faith that supports it. 
Though enraptured by the public show at Arundel House, her skepticism about 
the magnificent display of Hooke‘s text is telling.
207
 In her utopian science fiction 
spectacle, The Blazing World, Cavendish has the empress express this skepticism as an 
authoritative judgment on the nature of such devices and the images they produce. The 
empress denounces ―the insufficiency of those Magnifying-glasses,‖
208
 and rejects any 
findings from them as reliable observations. This insufficiency is further delineated in the 
Observations, where she condemns ―those who invented microscope‖ as doing ―more 
injury than benefit.‖ She adds, ―this art has intoxicated so many men‘s brains‖ even 
though it merely produces ―superficial wonders.‖
209
 While such technology might work 
as a kind of courtly entertainment, similar to Cavendish‘s treatment of the occasion at 
Arundel House, it operates primarily as a kind of speculative knowledge that should be 
subjected to the more careful scrutiny of rational inquiry. Despite Pepys‘ complaints, 
Cavendish offers firm distinctions between superficial and productive forms of inquiry. 
She sees the occasion Pepys reports as spectatorial in a theatrical, rather than scientific 
sense. She is, like him, an actor entering a stage, and her judgments, unlike his, are not to 
be taken as authoritative. The Observations belie Virginia Woolf‘s stingingly influential 
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remark that Cavendish and her writings ―ha[ve] the irresponsibility of a child and the 
arrogance of a Duchess. The wildest fancies come to her, and she canters away on their 
backs.‖
210
 Woolf targets the prose of Cavendish as undisciplined, overrun with conceits 
and condescending imagination. Rather, as critics such as Richard Nate, Ryan J. Stark, 
Steven Clucas, and Jane Donawerth have recognized, Cavendish rejected a homogenizing 
stylistic program that she saw as reductive and the ideological components that imply its 
epistemological and social privilege.
211
 Cavendish‘s concern lies at a discursive level: she 
challenges the prevalence of a too-confident institutional language and its affiliation with 
and authentication of unproven technologies. 
As revealed in the episode in The Blazing World, which I will touch on in more 
detail, what bothered Cavendish about the microscope was not so much its presence as 
the confidence it inspired. That confidence could lead to unwavering belief in and 
promotion of knowledge that was at best provisional. Hooke‘s text, then, acquires its 
public value through its rhetorical presentation; his images are ―superficial wonders‖ 
legitimated merely by the authority of the apparatus, its creator, and the audience who 
endows them both. Much like contemporary critics of science, Eve Keller notes, 
Cavendish ―rejected the validity of the subject-object boundary and the self-construction 
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 Rather than being satisfied by the neutral products of the boundaries and 
conditions that the Royal Society emphasizes, Cavendish‘s Observations seeks to include 
human agency as a component to the production of knowledge. Unsatisfied by claims of 
neutrality and certainty, Cavendish critiques both social boundaries and epistemological 
assumptions in her view that, as Keller writes, ―claims of methodological rigor, value-
neutrality, and objectivity‖ should not be seen ―as monolithic conduits for achieving 
certainty, but as social constructions that are endorsed as much because they advance the 
needs of their adherents as because they are deemed to be scientifically effective or 
true.‖
213
 By recognizing human interference as a fallible yet indispensable aspect of 
natural philosophy endeavors, as well as the impulses and aspirations of its practitioners, 
the Royal Society can best address the error of subjecting nature to human limitations, by 




Throughout her writings, Cavendish characterizes the culture of experimental 
philosophy as one plagued by an agonistic tendency. As she characterizes it in the 
Observations, ―disputes are endless, and the more answers you receive, the more 
objections you will find; and the more objections you make, the more answers you will 
receive.‖
215
 In the specific context of the Observations, these disputes arise from debates 
about materialism.
216
 Her own attempt to understand the situation is framed in the 
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Observations as a prefatory ―Argumental Discourse‖ between her ―former thoughts‖ and 
her ―latter thoughts.‖
217
 Yet the titular ―argumental‖ belies what the discourse sets out to 
do: the tone is not argumentative, but didactic. The latter thoughts are satisfied by the 
former through a presentation of rational inquiry rather than empirical results. By setting 
up an inquiry into causes through this kind of discussion, Cavendish opens the possibility 
for resolution to come through communication instead of observation. As the thoughts 
exist within the confines of the ―rational parts of my mind,‖
218
 she presents her own 
process of understanding in terms of a dialogue that can be ordered through social equity 
and agreed-upon grounds of argument.  As the discourse opens, Cavendish admits that 
the ―chief points and principles in natural philosophy‖ have caused a ―war in my mind, 
which in time grew to that height, that they were hardly able to compose the differences 
between themselves.‖
219
 Curiously, she offers these thoughts to the ―arbitration of the 
impartial reader‖ whose judgment might ―reconcile their controversies, and, if possible, 
to reduce them to a settled peace and agreement.‖
220
 Natural philosophy inspires this 
―war‖ because the concepts are so elusive, lost in dense language and conceptions 
through which the only way out seems to be the exclusion of rational debate. Yet the 
outcome between the former and latter thoughts is clearly harmonious. If rational 
dialogue can lead to productive conclusions, Cavendish offers that possibility of 
resolution even in the realm where the immaterial and material cannot be definitively 
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ascertained. A clear understanding of terms for nebulous concepts and immaterial 
substances must first be agreed upon, and with this Cavendish precedes the ―discourse.‖ 
 In the opening to her Observations, Cavendish presents an extended address ―To 
the Reader,‖ in which she complains about the dense and ambiguous language of 
―Philosophical Works of other Authors‖ to explain the impulse that led her to be specific, 
even tedious, in defining her own terms. She writes, ―I was so troubled with their hard 
words and expressions at first, that had they not been explained to me, and had I not 
found out some of them by the context and connexion of the sense, I should have been far 
enough to seek; for their hard words did more obstruct, then instruct me.‖
221
 Cavendish 
anticipates a possible rejoinder – that she is only a woman, and therefore incapable of 
interpreting a specialized language – and notes that despite a lack of proper education, 
―many of our Sex may have as much wit, and be capable of Learning as well as Men.‖
222
 
In this opening advertisement, Cavendish centralizes a theme that her scientific writings 
both model and exemplify. In combining all the multivalent and vague practices of 
institutionalized learning, the language has become obscure to the point that it 
―obstruct[s]‖ instead of ―instructs.‖ The Observations that follow, then, can be read as 
Cavendish‘s proof that a woman can not only play a man‘s game, but also can harness the 
natural wit necessary – and, in her view, overlooked by her contemporaries – in such a 
project. 
 The eclectic and open-ended nature of Cavendish‘s philosophical writings is an 
intentional choice, and can be used as a paradigm for discussing evolving technologies 
and empirical observations.  Stephen Clucas notes that the ―unmethodical design‖ of 
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Cavendish‘s writings often confuses critics who tend to mark them as idiosyncratic and 
inherently formless.
 223
 Instead, Clucas argues, the provisionary nature and lack of dogma 
of Cavendish‘s texts situate them within a larger discourse of scientific writing that 
emphasized the priority of empirical claims over any formal properties.
224
 He adds, ―Thus 
for Cavendish every theory . . . must necessarily be contingent.‖ Yet if Cavendish views 
contingency as necessary for the formation of a rational program, she also recognizes the 
need for proper language to reflect its meaning particularly in experimental writings. 
Since the eyes and ears are so easily deluded, even the apparati that are supposed to 
remedy them cannot be trusted to correct false findings and imprecise linguistic turns. 
The inefficacy of language and the imperfectability of finite human faculties are themes 
that run throughout Cavendish‘s work. Nicole Pohl argues that Cavendish ―wrote 
unconnected, singular scientific treatises, but also aimed at creating an overall scientific 
and philosophical methodology and, ultimately, epistemology.‖
225
 The apparent 
incongruity of her own writing, its attempt to reflect the open-ended nature of an inquiry 
in denouncing dogma, can be seen as an appropriate style for provisional ideas and 
speculations. Otherwise, she fears that she might fall into a category of philosophers with 
a tendency to ―endeavour to prove intricate and confused opinions, by sophistical and 
irrational arguments‖ and to have ―rendered philosophy perplexed and confused.‖
226
  
 In her literary and sociable works, Cavendish explores themes of collective 
integrity and morality, as well as the guidelines for eloquence, that at once inform and 
interpenetrate her philosophical works. In her Sociable Letters, Cavendish addresses an 
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imaginary woman with observations on philosophy, science, and politics. As Diana 
Barnes notes, these letters ―describe different social scenarios and are works of 
imagination or fancy‖ in which ―the social scenario represented by the friends‘ 
conversation comes first, and philosophy is distilled from it in act of authorial judgement 
and decorum.‖
227
  For instance, in Letter 51, she describes the visit of ―Mrs. P.I.‖ who has 
―become an alter‘d woman.‖
228
 Cavendish wryly comments that, though Mrs. P.I. now 
moralistically denounces the fashionable clothing and cosmetics that once characterized 
her, she has merely adopted ―self-conceited babling‖ about scripture as a new posture. 
Cavendish explains that ―she is not onely transform‘d in her dress, but her garb and 
speech, and all her Discourse . . . She speaks of nothing but heaven and purification.‖
229
 
In this letter Cavendish makes the connection between the more obvious commodities of 
contrived fashion and professions of spirituality, each of which operates as a social 
recourse. Yet the connection between this ostentatious spirituality and persuasive 
language comes in the epistolary coda, when Cavendish notes Mrs. P.I.‘s unnatural 
progression to ―preaching sister‖: 
I know not what Oratory the Spirit will inspire her with, otherwise I believe she 
will make no Eloquent Sermons, but I think those of her calling do defie 





The pretense of this letter is to associate a fashioned spiritual manner as a means to social 
acceleration to the ―Godly Fraternity‖ that praises nonsense only because it matches 
familiar and privileged language – thus Mrs. P.I. ―defie[s] eloquence.‖ In order for the 
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kind of progress that Cavendish desires both in social and philosophical circles, this 
language must reflect a genuine purpose, rather than a desire for status. 
 The Letters also address rhetoric more specifically in terms of reception and 
composition, as well as the figure of the orator, and these thoughts connect with an 
overarching view of the necessity that any linguistic program must have a guiding 
integrity at its foundation. Cavendish demarcates a ―natural orator‖ to be desired over the 
―premeditated orations‖ of formal rhetors.
231
 While the formal orator follows prescribed 
structures and uses arbitrary tropes, the natural orators ―can speak on a Sudden and 
Extempore upon any Subject, are Nature‘s Musicians, moving the Passions to Harmony, 
making Concords out of Discords, Playing on the Soul with Delight.‖
232
 Rather than 
express her disdain toward the formal orator, she instead eulogizes the power of words 
articulated through a gifted speaker. Though ―Eloquent speech‖ can ―bind the judgment,‖ 
it can also ―refine the drossy humours‖ and ―polis[h] the rough passions.‖
233
 She adds, 
―since Eloquence hath such Power over Arms . . . those men that are indued with such 
Eloquence, and overflowing Wit, are both to be Fear'd and Lov'd, to be highly Advanced 
or utterly Banished.‖
234
  Rhetorical activity may have many positive outcomes, but its 
power is such that it might result in banishment. Cavendish implies here that language 
must be marshaled and contained, as orators can ―Compose or Dissolve Commonwealths, 
to Dispose of Souls and Bodies of Mankind.‖
235
 The Sociable Letters can be read as a 
standard for acceptable discourse that is similar to the linguistic order that Cavendish‘s 
philosophical writings implore. Words have ―a power beyond nature, custom, and 
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 and therefore should be formalized not through strict rhetorical programs, but 
through clear definitions that arbitrate the misunderstandings that result from the natural 
dialogism of language. In these letters, Cavendish celebrates the capability for social 
discourse to attain what Bakhtin calls an ―internal logic and internal necessity‖ that 
―reveals not only the reality of a given language but also, as it were, its potential, its ideal 
limits and its total meaning conceived as a whole, its truth together with its 
limitations.‖
237
 Bakhtin recognizes that unforced social discourse celebrates linguistic 
ambiguity in terms of what in enables, rather than what seems surface inconsequentiality, 
just as Cavendish sees the possibility of the musical qualities of language to operate even 
within conversational settings normally considered empty.  
 Though dialogue leads to harmony through the basic decencies of human nature, 
the power of rhetoric can be used to more devious effects. As she writes in the letters, the 
force of oratory is such that it has ―Power over Arms‖ and should be ―highly advanced or 
utterly Banished.‖ At the end of Letter 28, Cavendish acknowledges the power of oratory 
but states she will ―leav[e] Words and Wit . . . [and] rely  upon Love and Friendship, and 
rest.‖
238
 In other words, though the power of persuasive speech is an incontestable 
influence on social relationships, an ideal of ―Love and Friendship‖ can be found outside 
the reigning pressures of a domineering and centripetal rhetoric that might dictate social 
order. So while oratory might be celebrated for its virtues as an aesthetic form, its 
potential to disrupt and distort should be placed under control, as these innate factors 
must be taken into account when considering the ethical ramifications of rhetoric as a 
discipline and a possibly destabilizing social force. In her Observations, this kind of 
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verbal manipulation must be consigned so that agonistic debate and selfish intention will 
not overwhelm an objective repose. Throughout, Cavendish recognizes the need to reign 
in language for purposes of stricter observation and clearer reports. 
 In Blazing World, Cavendish envisages a society in which the dialogical 
constraints of her Observations become guiding scientific principles. In the narrative 
which describes ―a World of my own‖ (154), Cavendish depicts an English woman who 
travels ―through‖ the North Pole to world lit by the light of multiple suns and occupied by 
a variety of talking animals. Upon being brought to the emperor, she is declared a 
goddess and made empress. Mimicking Cavendish‘s scientific curiosity, the empress 
immediately sets about organizing the various anthropomorphic inhabitants into 
disciplinary pursuits: 
The Bear-men were to be her Experimental Philosophers, the Bird-men her 
Astronomers, the Fly- Worm- and Fish-men her Natural Philosophers, the Ape-
men her Chymists, the Satyrs her Galenick Physicians, the Fox-men her 
Politicians, the Spider- and Lice-men her Mathematicians, the Jackdaw- Magpie- 
and Parrot-men her Orators and Logicians, the Gyants her Architects, &c. (163) 
 
In putting natural inquiry under her dominion, the empress primarily seeks to end 
disputes and orders each group of ―Vertuoso‘s‖ to investigate their domain (165). 
Predictably, the empress shares Cavendish‘s distrust of microscopes. She is more 
interested in the first-hand observations of the flying bird-men than the bear-men who 
merely see it through their telescopes. 
 The ―Blazing World‖ is a paradoxical combination of both the natural world of 
which Cavendish was captivated amateur ―philosopher,‖ and a landscape in which her 
scientific fancies lead to fantastic fictional creations that do not conform to nature or 




bodies as vehicles to go from one world to the next. The empress not only is given a 
position of hierarchical power from which to rule, but also is allowed to operate from the 
omniscient perspective that allows her accurate empirical insight that her subjects lack. In 
England, the narrator points out, the empress was suspicious of such pseudo-sciences as 
alchemy, so her skeptical epistemology in her utopian fiction similarly challenges such 
assessments. In these moments, the empress becomes Cavendish‘s skeptical surrogate, 
and her declarations, validations, and refutations resemble her earlier criticisms in the 
Observations. Her subjects are wrong, and she gently corrects them, and the empress is 
always right. As Deborah Taylor Bazely notes, 
. . . it is the Empress who controls the direction of conversation, avidly pursuing 
her own form of natural inquiry within the framework of the question-and-answer 
flow of communications. The Empress formulates the questions to which her 
scientists respond . . . the Empress then arbitrates, asks more questions, initiates 
experiments, ventures opinions and judgments upon the information presented to 




The Empress forces the sciences to submit to this dialogue primarily because there is so 
much tendency to dispute. As she notices, the disagreements usually arise out of 
empirical observation. For instance, when the Bear-men are sent to observe the sky, the 
telescopes lead to ―differences and divisions among them‖ (169). The empress silences 
the disagreement and, reflecting Cavendish‘s skepticism toward the ―Optick Glass‖ in her 
Observations, commands that they destroy the telescopes because they ―delude your 
sense.‖ The telescopes do not ―rectifie‖ their sight, but only further misinform them. The 
Bear-men, however, see some civic potential in the apparatus, because the ―Artificial 
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delusions‖ give them ―subjects for arguments‖ (171). The narrator summarizes their 
argument: 
Besides, we shall want Imployments for our Senses, and Subjects for Arguments; 
for, were there nothing but truth, and no falshood, there would be no occasion to 
dispute, and by this means we should want the aim and pleasure of our endeavors 
in confuting and contradicting each other; neither would one man be thought 
wiser then another, but all would either be alike knowing and wise, or all would 
be fools; wherefore we most humbly beseech your Imperial Majesty to spare our 
Glasses, which are our onely delight, and as dear to us as our lives. (171) 
 
The empress accepts the provisions for ―imployments for our senses‖ as the rationale for 
disputes and thus contains and limits their effects. She consents to inaccurate technology 
and even the spirited debates they might produce, but only so long as the ―quarrels should 
remain within their Schools, and cause no factions, or disturbances in State, or 
Government‖ (171). Disputes may be useful within the confines of academic discussion, 
but they cannot plague scientific discussion or spill over into other areas that threaten 
sovereign order and political stability. Because the empress has the luxury of the bird-
men, who offer a privileged form of sight, she has no need for the delusion and 
dissension that the telescope provokes.  
 Microscopy and oratory lead to potentially dangerous clashes. When the visions 
of optical instruments lead to conflicting results, the viewers have to engage what Butler 
calls ―several faiths of seeing.‖ As a contraption that might be used to produce 
―hermaphroditical figures,‖ the kind that might encourage debate confined to an 
academic or courtly setting, the microscope should not be relied to produce authoritative 
knowledge. Similarly, to the Empress, oratory is full of stratagems and syllogisms that 
rely on form rather than fact and, therefore, as in the Observations, ―disputes are endless‖ 




Jackdaw- -men,‖ she allows them to present a series of orations and syllogisms that result 
in an animated disagreement (188). The empress mocks the ―chopt Logick‖ of syllogistic 
argumentation because it ―disorders my reason.‖ Again, she confines such modes of 
disputation to academic discussion so that they do not ―disturb also Divinity and Policy, 
Religion and Laws, and by that means draw an utter ruine upon a state and government‖ 
(191). The orators, on the other hand, at first seem merely unnecessary. Their florid 
language is full of verbal excesses as they ―followed too much the Rules of Art, and 
confounded themselves with too nice formalities and distinction‖ (188). Yet since the 
parrot-men study both logic and rhetoric, the empress sees them as mutually destructive 
by emphasizing art over reason; art ―disorders mens understandings more then it rectifies 
them, and leads them into a Labyrinth whence they‘ll never get out‖ (191). The empress 
rejects these persuasive techniques because she prizes a system of intellectual order 
above all else, and rejects any interest that threatens it. 
 Cavendish‘s scientific writings are guided by an impulse for restored cultural 
order shared by the experimental philosophers her fantasy romance explicitly critiques. 
The empress organizes and stabilizes by sublimating disputes and allowing arguments to 
take place only in confines where they can cause no damage. In the curious ending, the 
empress meets Margaret Cavendish and is enlightened by the author‘s ideas. Cavendish 
exhorts the empress ―to dissolve all their societies; for 'tis better to be without their 
intelligences, then to have an unquiet and disorderly Government‖ (229). Yet Royal 
Society writers, particularly Sprat, turn their critiques externally, seeing culture and an 
intellectual tradition as the greater problem to which the laboratory must provide 




if its members claim to have removed those problems through rigorous methods. She 
presents a world of men that the good sense of a woman can moderate beyond their 
sometimes questionable ambition. Indeed, the empress gives women a more substantial 
role in the ―Blazing World‖ than they had in England because she recognizes their ―quick 
wits, subtile conceptions, and solid judgments‖ (229). Such traits are ideal for regulating 
the agonistic setting of experimental philosophy. Cavendish shows that apparently 
conflicting social attitudes about which she addressed in the Sociable Letters might be 
implanted with good effect into the sterile setting of the laboratory. 
Conclusion 
As language was a source of tension for both experimental philosophy and its 
varied critics, reform faster became an imperative. In An Essay Toward a Real Character, 
and a Philosophical Language (1668), John Wilkins affirms and elaborates the Royal 
Society motto that ―things are better then words, as real knowledge is beyond elegancy of 
speech‖ and echoes Bacon in noting that ―wild errors . . . shelter themselves under the 
disguise of affected phrase.‖
240
 Wilkins adds, 
I shall assert with greater confidence, That the reducing of all things and notions, 
to such kind of Tables, as are here proposed (were it as compleatly done as it 
might be) would prove the shortest and plainest way for the attainment of real 
Knowledge, that hath been yet offered to the World. And I shall add further, that 
these very Tables (as now they are) do seem to me a much better and readier 
course, for the entring and training up of men in the knowledge of things, then 




Here Wilkins yokes institutional faith with a vision for linguistic perfection. Language 
can be reformed; things can replace words; real knowledge can replace that which is 
attained rhetorically or speculatively, and this can be done by refining language and 
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diminishing it of the excesses that plague contemporary discourse. John Locke would 
later complain that philosophical inquiry was beset by ambiguity and mixed meanings. In 
such debates, he argues, ―the precise signification of the names of substances will be 
found not only not to be well established, but also very hard to be so.‖
242
 While his 
solution is nowhere near as radical or all-encompassing as Wilkins‘ fantastically 
elaborate system, Locke joins Bacon in seeing a need to diminish reliance on old 
concepts of rhetoric and linguistics that are ―not capable . . . of conveying the sense and 
intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer.‖
243
 
The inefficacy of language is troubling because of the volatility that miscommunications 
might provoke. As Robert Markley notes, Wilkins produces ―a call to action that is 
ideologically useful precisely because it preserves what is valuable in civilization.‖
244
 
The ―Doubt and uncertainity‖ in the ―hearer‖ poses a threat to the cultural order that 
Wilkins and his likeminded Royal Society colleagues idealize and see as the logical and 
spiritual extension of their project. 
 The quixotic extremes to which language projectors like Wilkins went can be seen 
in Jonathan Swift‘s famous parody of them in Book III of Gulliver’s Travels (1735). In 
the progressive academy of Lagado, the project for ―abolishing all words whatsoever‖ 
takes on both an epistemological and physical dimension.
245
 Those projectors who worry 
that speaking is dangerous to the physical body could be viewed as metaphorical, or as a 
hopeless attempt to contain the Babel-like effects of speech. Yet in combining physical 
and intellectual motives, Swift links oral practice with cultural anxiety. Orality is at once 
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outwardly contagious and internally corrosive. Words are dangerous not only for their 
inherent instability, but also because of the disharmony they provoke. Within the sterile 
conditions that Lagado aspires to perpetuate, the projectors, committed to ―abolishing all 
words,‖ work to eliminate the negative effects of vehement speech that comprise 
destructive speech. In addition to the internal threat posed to ―our lungs,”
246
  the danger 
that the project seeks to extenuate extends to the corruption of the world. Swift reveals 
the vexed relationship between experimental practitioners, who desired certainty and 
transparency to the point of anxiety, and the spoken word. In their quest for linguistic 
determinism, these projectors exemplify what Markley calls the Restoration urgency ―to 
control the dialogical and subversive tendencies of language.‖
247
 In Swift‘s fantastical 
Lagado, the projectors contrive schemes, even an elaborate ―engine‖ that can ―improv[e] 
speculative knowledge, by practical and mechanical operations.‖
248
 Speculations lead to 
disorder, and might be resolved through the mechanical practices that the Lagadans 
employ. In casting the extremity to which experimentalists go to produce order and 
eliminate uncertainty, his satire shows that the grand faith in technology and instrumental 
mediation inspires an impossible vision of cultural order. 
In the next chapter, I examine the specter of disorder caused by the rising 
phenomenon of Methodism. Just as experimental culture sought to regulate the act of 
speaking to remove it of its troubling insufficiencies, Establishment religious figures 
targeted unlicensed preachers whose efficacy was as undoubtable as their violation was 
unsettling. As with the tensions toward rhetoric in experimental philosophy, I also argue 
that the emergence of vehement Methodist preachers converges with a tendentious 
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moment in the history of rhetoric. Attacks on Methodism reveal an anxiety toward oral 
performances and the physical ―enthusiasm‖ provoked in audiences‘ responses that 
unsettled a religious culture that sought to demote such fervor in synthesizing the rational 
and the spiritual, enlightenment reason with religious passion. 




Chapter 2: ―Cannot you trust God for a sermon?‖: The Rhetoric of 
Extemporary Preaching 
 
Thirdly, before their sermons, their prayer was or seemed to be extempore, which they 
pretended to be dictated by the spirit of God within them, and many of the people 
believed or seemed to believe it. For any man might see, that had judgment, that they did 
not take care beforehand what they should say in their prayers. And from hence came a 
dislike of the common-prayer-book, which is a set form, premeditated, that men might 
see to what they were to say amen.
249
 
- Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth 
 
 
"Cannot you trust God for a sermon?” 
 According to a perhaps apocryphal anecdote that was repeated in many 
nineteenth-century Methodist texts, first reported by Thomas Marriott in an 1825 issue of 
Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, John Wesley was forced to preach extempore for the first 
time in 1735 when he forgot his sermon.
250
 In Marriott‘s account, Wesley recalls the 
event to an attendant who was standing by: 
I came without a sermon: and going up the pulpit stairs, I hesitated, and returned 
into the vestry, under much mental confusion and agitation. A woman who stood 
by, noticed my concern and said, ―Pray sir, what is the matter?‖ I replied, ―I have 
not brought a sermon with me.‖ Putting her hand on my shoulder, she said, ―Is 
that all? Cannot you trust God for a sermon?‖ This question had such an effect 
upon me, that I ascended the pulpit, preached extempore with great freedom to 





Regardless of its veracity, the anecdote nonetheless stages a central cultural response to 
Wesley and his movement in the form of an originary moment. The woman‘s provocation 
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can be read as paradigmatic, as a question that Methodists would ask themselves 
throughout the eighteenth century, and that their continued presence would provoke from 
the religious order they ostensibly challenged: ―Cannot you trust God for a sermon?‖ In 
this chapter, I argue that the various answers to that question constitute a striking moment 
in the history of rhetorical theory, when critical discussions of homiletics became 
consumed by the phenomenon of extemporaneous preaching. By answering ―no‖ to this 
question, as the eighteenth-century establishment church clearly did, one would be 
standing firm on a methodology and practice of a ritualistic pulpit styling that the 
Methodists clearly challenged. Emphasizing the word ―sermon,‖ we can interrogate the 
often conflicting aesthetical and spiritual bases that underwrote the various texts 
articulating ecclesiastical preaching protocols. Wesley might very well be able to probe 
his most inward feelings for a passionate oral performance, some would argue, but the 
ensuing performance was not a sermon in the terms of establishment writers who codified 
its internal structure and external presentation. 
Faced with such critiques, Methodists did not want to be called orators; their 
allure was based on their sincerity as they preached the revealed word of God and did it 
in such a way that resisted an ornate rhetorical program. As Methodists such as Wesley 
and Whitefield would consistently argue, the extemporaneous facilitates the spiritual 
fervor and inspiration that lead to genuine conversion. After all, the sincere moment of 
the gospel message should come outside of rhetorical conceits or intricate preparation. 
Seizing on this pretense for inspiration, anti-Methodists cast extemporaneous preachers 




effort to discredit the movement grew along with the Methodists‘ popularity and 
influence.  
 To clarify the tensions that the woman‘s question provokes, as well as the way it 
symbolically prompts a heated discussion of the rhetoric of the pulpit, I read the 
overlooked but prolific texts that constitute anti-Methodist discourse. The emergence and 
rapid growth of Methodism sparked an immense cultural anxiety that can be seen through 
the 934 anti-Methodist publications between 1738 and 1800.
252
 Both scholars of 
Methodist history and eighteenth-century religious rhetoric have been attentive to the 
features that made the Methodists so compelling to the unusual audiences they attracted. 
Yet with the exception of Albert M. Lyles‘ 1960 survey Methodism Mocked, little focus 
has been given to the voluminous attacks that depicted the Methodists as dangerous 
hypocrites upsetting not only the contemporaneous politics and protocols of the church, 
but also the polite decorum that had come to rule the pulpit.
253
 In general, scholars 
approaching anti-Methodist discourse characterize it as a collection of fraudulent, 
insignificant, poorly written tirades. In his valuable 1902 bibliography of attacks on 
Methodists, the Methodist historian Richard Green predictably characterizes the collected 
works as ―ribald, profane, and filthy publications, which were a disgrace to the press and 
foul offence to public morality, revealing a deplorable corruption in the taste and moral 
sentiments of the age.‖
254
 Green‘s statement echoes late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Methodist historiography, practiced also by prominent Wesley and Whitfield 
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biographer Luke Tyerman. Tyerman characterizes the Methodists as the true purge to 
spiritual apathy and cultural depravity, virtually critic-proof. In introducing the first 
recorded attack on Wesley, a 1732 caricature of the ―Oxford Methodists,‖ Tyerman 
refuses to quote certain passages because they are ―so loathsomely impure, that it would 
be a sin against both God and man to reproduce it.‖ 
255
 In the first significant study of 
Methodism and literature, T.B. Shepherd shares Tyerman‘s opinion in characterizing 
―direct criticism of the movement‖ as lacking ―any claims to literary value.‖
256
 
Reviewing Lyles‘ effort to write sympathetically about anti-Methodist satire as a genre, 
John M. Aden complains that ―Abstract a few strokes by Churchill, Fielding, Foote, 
Goldsmith, Smollett, and Sterne, and the rest is oblivion.‖
257
 
Yet amongst that ―oblivion‖ rests a dynamic debate over dissident speaking 
practices and their place amongst both a cultural and intellectual elite looking to 
disseminate and instill polite values in middling sorts. The canon of anti-Methodist 
literature is a curious, intriguing addition to the literature of the eighteenth century, one 
that is often left unexplored merely because of its reputation. Many of the critiques of 
these the Anti-Methodists could apply to other religious dissenters. Often, as we will see, 
Methodists were described as Papists under a different name. However, the attacks on 
Methodism are unique because the writers focus primarily on oratory. While some of 
these texts are indeed marked by a narrow-minded and elitist frenzy, and others might be 
seen as mere doggerel or ragged, even hysterical prose, these texts nonetheless reveal the 
unease that the members of the established church expressed toward the new movement 
                                                 
255
 Tyerman, The Life and Times of John Wesley, 86. 
256
 T. B Shepherd, Methodism and the Literature of the Eighteenth Century (London: Epworth Press, 1940), 
207. 
257




in terms of its ability to generate intense audience reactions and fervent followings in 
rural areas. Discussions of extemporaneous preaching are a particularly vibrant setting for 
representations of orators.  
 This chapter begins by exploring the same civil war anxieties and exigencies that 
I outlined in my last chapter, only with more attention to the attempts to attribute, as 
Hobbes does, the recent turmoil to a style of preaching that had to be eradicated. Moving 
to the emergence and ensuing valorization of a rational religion, I show how homiletics 
writers emphasize a rigid textual authority to serve as the basis for a sermon. In the wake 
of the civil war, these writers are also keenly invested in a stability that conceivably could 
be realized through linguistic practice. Seventy years later, the Methodists‘ confrontation 
with what had become the authority of this idealized rational system was a threat to both 
polite oral practices and the culture that encouraged them. The success of Methodist 
preaching sparked a series of attacks that attempted to delegitimize the spiritual frenzy of 
the performances and the auditors‘ responses to them.  This passion had to be seen as 
resulting from calculated manipulators who aimed at conversion for financial or social 
motives. However, an equally involved attempt to code Methodist spirituality as artificial, 
more presentational than inspirational, comes through elaborate representations of 
preaching techniques as observed in various settings. This imperative rests on a 
dissociation that the rhetorical theorists Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca call 
―branding discourse as a device,‖ a strategy of preserving the outward expression as a 
calculated production that can be more easily internally critiqued because of that 
contextual separation.
258
 Reducing the internal content as secondary to operative 
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rhetorical features, this ―branding‖ operates as a method of dissociation that replaces the 
realistic appearance of an argumentative presentation with the ―mechanical, farfetched, 
abstract, codified, and formal aspects of a speech.‖
259
 To its followers, Methodism 
offered a model of spiritual sincerity and moral piety through internal revelations that 
could be externalized in the rhetoric of the public movement. To its critics, the 
phenomenon of Methodist growth could be deflated by pointing out the rehearsed 
features of pulpit performances, as a ―device‖ styled to appear spontaneous and targeted 
toward those unable to recognize this artificiality.  
On these competing criteria, both Methodists and their critics participate in, 
respectively, modifying and affirming a previous century‘s worth of homiletic discourse. 
Again, as with experimental philosophy, attempts to analyze, stabilize, or reinvigorate 
rhetorical practice give way to critical response. And again, rhetorical theory happens 
when its creators do not even set out to produce it.  Reading the constellation of diverse, 
sometimes disreputable figures who are ―first responders‖ to the emergence of a new 
religious identity allows for an understanding of the rhetorical tensions of a period that 
was often silent about the status of rhetoric as a discipline. To address the issue of mass 
persuasion was to engage the factors of its production, the problems of its results, and the 
future of its practice, even when those dynamics are seemingly uninvolved with the 
formation of rhetorical theory. For stakeholders of a polite culture who did not want to 
have their passions roused, these Methodist preachers presented the problem of a mass 
persuasion that threatened to undo the bonds of civil culture, bonds trumpeted as secure 
even as their most vulnerable elements were being rendered visible.  
 






“No Preaching’s Real That’s Extempore”: Toward a Rhetoric of Rational Religion 
Attacks on extemporaneous preaching occupy a significant portion of anti-
Methodist literature through a corpus of sermons, pamphlets, polemics, poems, and 
fictional accounts ranging from sympathetic to acidic to vindictive. The Methodists 
would become more and more successful at attracting new followers and nurturing 
converts in places that the establishment church had either ignored or overlooked. As a 
result, Methodist tactics came under the watchful and disapproving eye of establishment 
writers. Throughout their texts, anti-Methodists assert the primacy and spiritual integrity 
of a more rational preaching program since the civil wars. As Hobbes illustrates in the 
epigraph that opens this chapter, the connection between fiery preachers and civic 
disruption was a widely-held assumption, inspiring a rational religion which would 
inspire sedate contemplation rather than the disorder that could arise from highly 
passionate encounters with opposing religious or political ideologies. The Methodists 
continued to attract new followers and nurture new converts in places the establishment 
church had either ignored or overlooked. The shadow of this religious and political 
conflict impelled an urgency to stabilize and contain diffusive forces that threatened to 
revive the conflict of the past thirty years. Through the end of the seventeenth century, 
clergymen and homiletics writers celebrate the collective achievement of a pulpit style 
encouraging sedate contemplation instead of the slippery immediacy of passionate 
response. First articulated after the Restoration, this style would be valorized in the early 
eighteenth century in terms of a ―rational religion‖ more appropriate for the emerging 




The tensions that Methodist rhetors provoked are manifest in the homiletic 
context to which they reacted. After the civil war, the phenomenon of preaching and 
praying ―off-book‖ sparked a significant discursive reconsideration related to phenomena 
of inspiration and protocols of public worship. As Michael Warner notes, establishment 
preachers came to rely on the ―literary sermon‖ or ―an essayistic form.‖
260
  For these 
preachers, the offense of Methodism prompted a reevaluation of homiletic techniques that 
had gone unchallenged in the years before Wesley and Whitefield‘s emergence. Plainness 
was not merely a suggested protocol, but a cultural ideal that pervaded religious discourse 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This plainness could take many 
different forms, and could still exist in the form of a passionate sermon, but homiletics 
texts exhort a degree of propriety that later critics would argue the Methodists‘ lacked.  
There is a tendency to see all of the most populated denominations on the eve of 
Methodism as Elie Halevy has described the establishment church – ―apathetic, skeptical, 
lifeless; sects weakened by rationalism, unorganized, their missionary spirit extinct.‖
261
  
The church was unable to reach the majority of its members, and bishops found 
themselves embroiled in political conflict rather than attending to the needs of the rising 
population of their parishioners or crafting a message that took such criteria into account. 
As Henry Rack explains, even the dissenting churches legitimated by the 1690 Act of 
Toleration faced similar challenges in terms of an endemic ―dullness‖ because of 
―sermons as dry and moralistic as those of the Church of England without the redeeming 
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glories of the Prayer Book.‖
262
 Michael Watts claims that dissenters such as the 
Presbyterians lacked an evangelical agenda because they were constrained by ―a rational 
Arminianism which was inclined to treat Christianity as a philosophy to be debated rather 
than as a faith to be served‖ and thus ―no early eighteenth-century Dissenter regarded the 
world as his parish.‖
263
 While the apparently insular nature of various denominations 
might be disputed, the preaching techniques and evangelical fervor of the Methodists 
strike a sharp contrast to the establishment practices. 
 The Methodists upset ecclesiastical hierarchy by preaching in outdoor settings 
without the official sanction of the establishment. Of course, this violation was coupled 
with the radical form and function of the messages they presented, as their sermons 
seemed to renew a mode of preaching that had apparently been eliminated. The radical 
sentiments of preachers before the civil war and interregnum emphasized an intense, 
incendiary personal reaction often realized through prophecies and visions. For some of 
the sects that thrived off this spiritual energy, theological purity could only be attained 
through political revolt – a tantalizing message to those who felt displaced by the 
escalating latitudinarian deluge. In The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in 
England (1672), Lord Clarendon connects the constantly reviving flame of revolutionary 
desires before and during the conflict with the self-mobilizing, largely independent spirit 
of the clergy that acted on its own sense of urgency. Parliament, Clarendon claims, could 
―leav[e] it to their clergy to keep the fire burning in the hearts of the people by their 
pulpit inflammations,‖ fomenting revolt even from diverse sectarian collectives that at 
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least shared the passion of the anti-royalist message.
264
 That shared sermon took on many 
different forms, but later political thinkers such as Hobbes argue that the form was just as 
important as the content, recalling that the sensation of what ―was or seemed to be 
extempore‖ found receptive audiences looking to internalize the intense spiritual 
conviction that was being modeled for them. On the eve of the civil war, Royalists found 
themselves alarmed by the titular suggestion of the cobbler turned separatist preacher 
Samuel How‘s sermon, ―The Sufficiency of the Spirits Teaching, without Human 
Learning.‖
265
 Leaning heavily on the spirit, and growing fiercely antagonistic toward a 
humanistic religion, the separatist cause was driven by sectors of the occasionally 
divided, sometimes tenuously allied forces against what these contenders perceived as the 
Royalist ecclesiastical supremacy. Presbyterians, Jacobites, Brownists, Levelers, 
Congregationalists, Fifth Monarchists could disagree wildly on the specific resentments 
against the established church, yet still be unified in their stirring proclamations of its 
overall offense. After the Restoration, the established response to dissent was first one of 
persecution and then an uneasy and controversial toleration that paved the way for the 
Methodists to operate without strict penalty. When the Act of Toleration enabled the 
fringe to worship without penalty, it offered the irenic possibility toward what John 
Locke called ―the controversies that will be always arising between those that have, or at 
least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men's souls, and, 
on the other side, a care of the commonwealth.‖
266
  Yet the protocols instilled by 
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authorized churches, meant to inspire rational precision in both speakers and hearers, 
dominated approaches to homiletics. 
 The extemporary, whether found in the public devices of the sermon and 
corporate prayer or in the private setting of individual devotion, offered the at once 
exhilarating and troubling potential of stimulating subversive conclusions. To secure the 
stability of appropriate forms of religious practice, such powerful reactions had to both 
moderated from, and characterized by, its excesses. The stability of religious practice in 
the early eighteenth century was built on its encouragements and exhortations to a sedate 
spirituality performed through repose rather than response. Obviously, those staid 
methods worked to protect the hierarchy that encouraged them.  
Nonetheless, the place of spiritual immediacy was not dismissed, but intensely 
theorized. Considerations of spontaneity played a significant role in the development of 
spiritual practice during the early modern period. In Rituals of Spontaneity, Lori Branch 
traces an ideology of spontaneity contained within and disseminated from such diverse 
discourses as Puritan free-prayer texts and Romantic poetry. As Branch notes, early 
modern critiques of ritual led to its alienation from liturgical practices, only to be 
reinstilled through disseminated church publications that inspired routines to make the 
soul ―an echoing warehouse whose interior is furnished only with language and ready-
made phrases collected with an eye toward coaching devotion.‖
267
 As Branch puts it, free 
prayer becomes a ―recurring site of tension‖ in which what is at stake is a sense of the 
spiritual response as a performative act, one that should not be read as a mark of sincerity 
or authenticity, or certainly not true inspiration, but could be deconstructed by noting its 
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 Throughout the seventeenth century, diverse 
denominational figures produced a substantial body of texts, from the Parliament-issued 
Directory for the Publique Worship of God (1645) to John Bunyan‘s Grace Abounding to 
the Chief of Sinners (1666), designed to teach prompts from which a spiritually edifying 
spontaneous prayer might be achieved, including words and phrases that were essentially 
a way of ―coach[ing] devotion.‖
 269
  Branch finds a growing attitude that the emotionally 
resonant promise of extemporary responses is countered by ―anxieties attendant on 
requiring spontaneity, and the way its evidentiary, economizing logic seems to be at odds 
with the very notion of personal relation with god or others, perhaps with the very 
religiousness of religion.‖
270
 Seventeenth-century reconsiderations of heuristics such as 
―sincerity‖ and ―spontaneity‖ led to ―a profound skepticism that dismissed all prayer and 
worship as what it can only be, in some manner constructed, volitional, and 
performative.‖
271
 As spontaneity became alternately contested and endorsed, the 
provocative devotional literature of the dissenters came to be seen by their opponents, as 
a practical methodology more than a genuine spiritual experience.  
 A survey of texts produced in the eighty years between the interregnum and 
Wesley‘s perhaps apocryphal moment when he ―trust[ed] God for a sermon‖ reveals the 
degree to which post-Restoration Anglican writers distrusted spontaneity in the pulpit, 
instead favoring a plainness and simplicity that could be found by strictly adhering to a 
textual referent. These writers must sacrifice the exhilarating possibility of inspirational 
reaction for the stability its elimination might ensure. Concurrent with the attempts to 
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stabilize language through the methodologies provided by the innovations of science that 
I outlined in my last chapter, the message of the pulpit had to be reshaped and 
rearticulated, even sanitized to avoid the tendentious period that had just passed.  
When Joseph Glanvill turned to the achievements of experimental philosophy, he 
expressed that its results could ―tend to ending of disputes,‖
272
 and predicted that the 
agonistic inclination of the early seventeenth century would give way to a tranquility in 
which the metaphor of certainty through experimentation would offer a reproducible 
societal model. Predictably, as an establishment clergyman, Glanvill carries over this 
degree of empirical certainty to his consideration of new and old strategies of pulpit 
practice. In the same vein that he believed linguistic correctness could be achieved by 
mirroring the procedures of scientific inquiry, Glanvill advocates a form of purity and 
simplicity in homiletics that could remedy obscurity and dissolve theological controversy 
through the salve of propriety. Like Robert Boyle, Glanvill confronts the crisis with 
‖attempts to impose ideal concepts of order, ostensibly derived from the Bible, on a 
politicized and argumentative nation.‖
273
 In this, the anxiety of a revival of sectarian 
tendencies is countered by a latitudinarian imperative for biblical messages that 
encouraged a serene political climate. In An Essay on Preaching (1667), Glanvill 
encourages a preaching ―method‖ that could not be overly calculated, and must be free of 
ornate and obscure language that could confuse or mislead audiences. In particular, 
Glanvill opposes a method in which affective principles are privileged over substantive 
matters, yet does so in such a way that assumes a malleable, uninformed audience who 
should not be allowed to go too far into interpretative confusion. The message must be 
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shaped with this consideration in mind, as Glanvill argues throughout that the audience 
must internalize transparent spiritual and social imperatives. Given over to too much 
thought, the cryptic message can be distorted and disseminated through untrustworthy 
auditors. Glanvill writes,  
If the method be dark and hidden, it loseth its end, and neither helps the 
understanding, nor the memory. What some say here, that it should be Cryptick to 
surprise the Auditors, seems to me very vain, and weak; for our business is not to 
surprise, but to instruct; not to take the phancy with the unexpectedness, and 





In exhorting transparency, Glanvill views the divide between speaker and audience as 
one that must be bridged through a tightly-controlled simplicity. Auditors are to be given 
neither theological conundrums nor overly crafted rhetorical turns, as such preaching 
techniques will elude the memory and obscure the truth that the speaker should elucidate. 
He notes that this proper method ensures that ―the hearers know where we are, and their 
thoughts can go along with us.‖
275
 Though obscurity, bolstered perhaps through animated 
language, might ―surprise‖ and challenge an audience, the ultimate goal is enlightenment 
and moral education.  
Throughout the text, Glanvill views the process of preparing a sermon as an act of 
simplification and reduction, as well as an on-going evaluation of the parishioners and 
what they can or cannot process. He provides few examples of what might qualify as 
cryptic. The key problem is an audience who cannot interpret higher spiritual truths 
without the help of a pastor. Obviously, this gives the preacher a great degree of control 
not only over the content of the sermon but also the way it is interpreted. Glanvill‘s 
concern, consistent with the rhetorical-scientific agenda he shared with his Royal Society 
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colleagues, is that the rhetorician can dominate and delude uninformed audiences with a 
torrent of tropes and figures. In an Essay Concerning Preaching, Glanvill finds himself 
faced with an obvious oratorical setting and divests it of traditional oratorical methods. 
For instance, in the opening section he explains the end of preaching as ―the Instruction 
of the hearers in Faith and Good Life, in order to the Glory of God, and their present and 
future happiness.‖
276
 Shortly after, he rejects a rhetorical emphasis in crafting the sermon, 
noting ―When it is not so aim‘d, though the Discourse be never so elaborate, witty, or 
Learned, it is not preaching. It may have its proper commendation as a Speech, but ought 
not to be reckon‘d as a good Sermon.‖
277
 Glanvill‘s opposition between ―speech‖ and 
―sermon‖ best articulates the theory of preaching that the contemporary Church of 
England would espouse. It also sets a model for the early eighteenth century, when 
sermons, periodicals and religious publications nostalgically recall such plainness as part 
of a golden age of preaching. While Glanvill marks a ―speech‖ as reflecting the 
affectation and calculation of a performance, the sermon itself should be a solemn, sedate 
occasion in which overt rhetorical tactics have little place. In every case, Glanvill 
advocates plainness over such methods as ―inversions of sentences and playing with 
words, and the like, [which] is vile and contemptible fooling.‖
278
 These precepts 
anticipate the rational religion that would dominate the decades leading up to the startling 
appearance of the Methodists. 
Glanvill focuses the composition of sermons on the matter of audience 
consumption. The pastor controls the scripture and by removing its ―strangeness‖ in place 
of a pulpit-authorized explanation, he also controls the way it should be internalized and 
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performed. However, Glanvill makes many general assumptions about the nature of 
audiences: they will not understand dense theology, for instance, and they will be 
confused by Greek and Latin phrases. Deceiving an audience could lead to the 
unpredictable anarchy that Glanvill and his fellow members of the Royal Society aimed 
to end. This anxiety animates the desire for a comparable rationalistic religious discourse 
in light of the objectifying technologies of the new science. The danger of obscurity 
requires an endemic plainness that will stabilize and sanctify the pulpit. The scriptures 
themselves even offer the threat of a disturbing confusion, as the preacher should ―avoid 
the ordinary choice of abstruse, difficult, and mysterious scriptures, which some affect on 
purpose to ostentate their skill and learning.‖
279
 The crucible of stylistic precision, 
enhanced through an organized sermon that Glanvill delineates throughout the Essay, 
results in hearers placated rather than confused, understanding their own place in the 
reigning cultural and spiritual hierarchy as a result of this firm, unambiguous liturgical 
model. 
Following Glanvill, Gilbert Burnet‘s 1692 treatise, Of the Pastoral Care, can be 
read as a celebration of the cultural success that such plainness enjoyed even in the wake 
of the Act of Toleration. Though the newly enjoyed license allowed for dissenting sects, 
these denominations seemed to be adhering to the principles of propriety that Glanvill 
outlines. Burnet claims, ―Our language is much refined, and we have returned to the plain 
Notions of simple and genuine rhetoric.‖
280
 Burnet operates on the conviction that the 
earlier moves toward purification have finally purged language of its immoderate 
excesses. To what the ―simple and genuine‖ period in the history of rhetoric refers is 
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unclear, especially since figures such as Sprat and Glanvill seem to disparage the entire 
rhetorical tradition. Unlike Glanvill, Burnet offers precedents from the rhetorical tradition 
as models for exemplary speech, even as he comes to a similar conclusion. For instance, 
he describes the preacher as orator in the sense of Quintilian‘s definition of a good man 
speaking well, stating that ―An orator, if we hearken to them, must be an honest man.‖
281
 
However, Burnet rigidly stresses the need for a coherent text as a basis for the sermon. 
He even exhorts preachers to make a habit of opening the text (the Bible, a prayer book) 
in such a way that the audience sees it happening. At his most explicit, he is polemical: 
A sermon should be made for a Text, and not a Text for a Sermon; for to give our 
Discourses weight, it should appear that we led to them by our Texts; such 
Sermons will probably have much more Efficacy than a general Discourse, before 
which a Text seems only to be read as a decent Introduction, but to which no 




At no point does Burnet bring up the practice of extemporary preaching. Yet the 
oppositions and repetitions in this passage reveal his resolute belief that unvarying 
adherence to the text has an even greater affective potential than a ―general discourse‖ 
has, even if this ―general discourse‖ might allow for departure and improvisation. 
Whether intended or merely a decision made by the printer, the italicization of ―text‖ 
throughout further emphasizes the need for a textual referent. While he encourages a 
degree of pathos that Glanvill does not, the move toward extemporary speech remains a 
deviation from appropriate pulpit demeanor. 
In 1707, the prolific bookseller John Dunton indirectly extolled the virtues of the 
propriety celebrated by Burnet and Glanvill by attacking those who deviate from it. His 
poem ―The Pulpit Fool: a Satyr‖ attacks ―pulpit fools,‖ who preach exclusion rather than 
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toleration, and does so in a form of raillery that often takes on extemporary preaching.
283
 
An Anglican supportive of toleration, Dunton is sympathetic to all dissenting sects and 
emerging denominations, so long as they act as ―ambassadors of peace‖ and do not use 
rhetorical tricks, such as an affected style or calculated performance to incite seditious 
desires.
 284
 The title of ―fool‖ transcends all categories and is not specific to any particular 
religion, though the previous half-century provides many examples of those movements 
that Dunton believes came about through illicit means. Since ―all serious preaching must 
come from the heart . . . they are Fools that think not, yet exhort.‖
 285
 Echoing Glanvill, 
Dunton contends that plainness reflects both sincerity of feeling and a connection 
between sanctioned modes of pulpit performance and internal stability. Dunton writes, 
―That we do not Extempore Whims detect, Where we do pure Christianity expect.‖
286
 
Purity here is a form of transparency that only gets distracted by the ―whims‖ of an 
ostensibly unplanned sermon. Later, he extends this concept by claiming ―No Preaching‘s 
Real that‘s Extempore,‖
287
 establishing the epistemological basis that a ―real‖ form of 
preaching can be easily identified both by what it contains and what it lacks. The 
―Extempore‖ is equally (and oppositionally) illusory and calculated. For Dunton, these 
tactics confirm the inauthenticity of the preacher: an extemporary sermon cannot be 
―real‖ because it is calculated to appear spontaneous, and thus demystifies the apparent 
artlessness that poses as inspiration. In one sense, The Pulpit Fool shows the degree to 
which the mistrust of the spontaneous precedes the Methodists. Yet Dunton also affirms a 
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growing anxiety that religious factions are successfully stirred by those with pretensions 
to inspiration. 
If Dunton attempts to expose a sincerity that is altogether rhetorical in its 
production and its effects, then Richard Steele attempts to contain the divisive forces of 
religious enthusiasm by demarcating that sincerity as part of the decorum that he and 
Joseph Addison advocate in the larger project of The Spectator. In Spectator no. 103, 
Steele exhorts proper linguistic protocol through a polemical eulogy of John Tillotson, 
the venerated divine about whom George Whitefield would claim ―knew no more of 
religion than Mahomet.‖
288
 In the essay, which gives way to an extensive passage from 
the recently published posthumous edition of Tillotson‘s sermons, Steele uses an on-
going discussion of general discourse to situate the appropriateness of Tillotson as a 
pulpit model. The paper opens with a harangue by the unnamed divine about the spurious 
nature of ―compliments,‖ a ―prostitution of speech‖ that should be avoided because they 
corrupt the spectrum of discourse that The Spectator instills. This is a common theme in 
the Spectator Club, in which discussions of acceptable speaking practices build off 
examples of negative or overwrought rhetoric.
289
 In  no. 155, for instance, Mr. Spectator 
reproves dialogues in the marketplace for operating on a similar lack of sincerity: 
―instead of the plain downright lying, and asking and bidding so unequally to what they 
will really give and take, we may hope to have from these fine Folks an Exchange of 
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 Convinced that frivolous exchanges fuel and corrupt the marketplace, 
Mr. Spectator pushes for social exchange to operate not as mere diversion, but as an 
opportunity to reveal uncontaminated sentiment that can lead to rational discourse even if 
rooted in moments of immediate and apparently fleeting interaction. As Anthony Pollock 
argues, Mr. Spectator dedicates himself in large part to nurturing a public sphere in which 
there is a ―strict separation between an irremediably antagonistic social realm and a 
compensatory private sphere of ethically legitimated spectatorship.‖
 291
 Those who model 
themselves after this identity ―will not be particularly decisive or agential but will 
replicate (or become) new programming at the level of habit.‖
292
 In that specifically-
oriented space of polite behavior and practice, individual motives will be sacrificed for 
the sake of a political and social neutrality that perpetuates itself as a guiding virtue, and 
that is expressed in a carefully selected impartial language.  
The discussion of compliments acts an appropriate entry for a brief but pointed 
foray into the language of the pulpit, as the rhetoric of compliments is similar to the 
embellished conceits that Mr. Spectator worries are plaguing contemporary preaching. To 
counter this, he valorizes Tillotson as a recent model for pulpit simplicity who ―abhors 
any Pomp of Rhetorick on this occasion.‖
293
 In the arrangement of the essay, Mr. 
Spectator announces this fact before announcing that Tillotson‘s ―heart was better 
disposed‖ to preach gospel forms. Steele fittingly quotes Tillotson‘s ―Of Sincerity 
towards God and Man,‖ a sermon that venerates ―the old English Plainness and 
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  Tillotson‘s homiletic example mirrors the kind of impartial and frank 
discourse Steele and Addison advocate. In her analysis of Spectator no. 103, Christina 
Lupton writes that Mr. Spectator operates on and exhorts a ―linguistic sincerity . . . 
characterized by an internal dynamic of form and content rather than from a stable 
relationship of truths and objects.‖
295
 This sincerity, achieved through an idealistic 
rhetorical position that Mr. Spectator continually elucidates, often takes on the form of an 
acccomplished neutrality divorced from agonistic intention or selfish motives.  Looking 
back over the period when Burnet, Tillotson, and Glanvill advocated clarity over arousal, 
Mr. Spectator venerates a tradition in which logical proofs should be shared in simple 
language. Through this lineage, preaching from the heart becomes a process of 
homogenizing pulpit protocols into a more sedate and socially acceptable manner. Mr. 
Spectator, looking to instill discursive codes of conduct more generally, fittingly turns to 
the example of a preaching style that had been so carefully theorized over the past and its 
realization in the sermons of Tillotson. In 1711, when Steele examined this particular 
eulogy, the official church had protocols that, by their own evaluation, had successfully 
manifested the ideals of a rational religion. These texts limit the degree to which 
improvisation and creativity play into the moment of the preached sermon. By 1740, 
despite some disruptions, these techniques had endured to the point where they seemed 
rooted in religious practice, uncontested even by those who dissented from other 
establishment doctrines. 
“What then will your reason do here?”: The Power of Methodist Performance 




 Christina. Lupton, ―Sincere Performances: Franklin, Tillotson, and Steele on the Plain Style,‖ 




In two 1759 articles written for Weekly Magazine and Lady’s Magazine, Oliver 
Goldsmith considers the tenuous situation that preachers faced in light of the success of 
Methodism. By this point, the Methodists were no longer a fringe movement located 
primarily in scattered settings, but rather occupied a prominent if controversial place in 
religious culture. Despite some internal clashes between Calvinists (headed by 
Whitefield) and Arminians (following Wesley), the number of Methodist converts 
approached 20,000.
296
 Goldsmith addresses this phenomenon with what Paul Goring 
astutely describes as a seemingly firm endorsement that is nonetheless ―qualified with a 
careful distancing of his sympathy from any Methodist deviation from ‗common 
sense.‘‖
297
 Like many commentators, Goldsmith recognizes the deficiencies in 
contemporary preaching, while still denouncing the tactics of enthusiasm.
298
 In The 
Weekly Magazine, he acknowledges, ―the enthusiast ever makes disciples, the calm 
unpassioned speaker seldom if ever.‖
299
 Goldsmith defends established preachers as 
having to face the arduous task of walking a tightrope between reason and passion, as 
well as content and form. He offers a scenario that sympathizes with the challenges of 
established preachers in light of the energy of new movements: 
 We are told of an eminent preacher still alive, that addressing his audience with 
all the eloquence in his power, and he master of much, he found them quite 
insensible; either employed in whispers, or sunk in sleep; he encreased the 
pathetic, raised his voice, and felt what he could wish to have others feel, but all 
                                                 
296
 There are no membership figures before 1760, but by 1767 there were 25,911 members. By Wesley‘s 
death in 1791, that number would rise to 72,476 (Rack  Reasonable Enthusiast 437-38). 
297
 Paul Goring, The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2009), 79–80. 
298
 I will delineate more clearly the specific usages of the term ―enthusiasm‖ when I touch on the attacks 
that employ it. However, Henry Rack is helpful in noting that enthusiasm ―implied not only religious 
excess but social subversion‖ (275). Also, ―its basic theological meaning in the eighteenth century was a 
claim to extraordinary revelations or powers from the Holy Spirit; and, more vaguely and abusively, any 
kind of religious excitement.‖ See also Ronald A. Knox, Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of Religion 
(South Bend: Notre Dame UP, 1994). 
299









Goldsmith‘s passage can be read as allegorical. The ―eminent preacher‖ could easily 
stand for the Established Church writ large, caught between a plain and reasoned 
homiletics and ―encreas[ing] the pathetic.‖ The sleeping audiences needed stimulation 
from one who could properly employ the ―pathetic,‖ no matter what the guiding 
theological principle. As figured by Goldsmith, Establishment figures tended to view 
their audiences much as this preacher: not wanting to rouse them beyond an appropriate 
level, yet concerned by their lack of response, as well as the increasing conversions to the 
different sects categorized as enthusiasts. This tension derives, Goldsmith writes in The 
Lady’s Magazine, from the necessity of establishment thinkers privileging a ―prudent 
mediocrity to a precarious popularity.‖
301
 In these articles, Goldsmith expresses the 
conundrum that polite preachers have to engage, albeit reluctantly: the vehemence of 
what one satirist calls ―Fanatic Saints‖ was as highly effective as it was repellent to the 
establishment who watched with horror disguised as disdain.  
Throughout Goldsmith‘s writings on the negative state of preaching in the middle 
of the century, he also notes that while the Methodist theology is unacceptable, their 
homiletics might have something to offer a stagnant church. As Goring writes, Goldsmith 
acts as a ―topographer of politeness‖ in his attempt to inculcate a ―contagious 
enthusiasm‖ within more acceptable theological parameters because ―reserved delivery . . 
. is not effective civil practice and hence it should be transformed into something more 
emotively and effectively eloquent.‖
302
 Goldsmith‘s joint status as critic and admirer 
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links him with Richard Graves, whose The Spiritual Quixote (1773) conceives an 
appropriate level of eloquence ―between the poles of manic enthusiasm and soporific 
reserve.‖
303
 As Goldsmith‘s example of the Anglican preacher who works himself into a 
frenzy in a vain attempt to provoke his parishioners reflects, the practice could not be 
embodied because of polite doctrinal and homiletic limitations that served as a foundation 
for contemporaneous pulpit practice. By ignoring those restraints, Methodists were able 
to pursue converts in the most unlikely of places by offering the physical presence of a 
preacher who spoke q to the passions of his observers. In his adherence to a program of 
rational religion, Goldsmith understands the need for those more reserved standards of 
affective engagement. Seeing the ―conventicles of Methodism so crowded as they are,‖ 
Goldsmith attributes the phenomenal surge to an ―earnest exhortation which gives an air 
of masculine eloquence,‖ and thus recognizes the need for a more vibrant program.
304
 Yet 
he also contends that ―reason is but a weak antagonist when headlong passion dictates‖ 




Goldsmith expresses a sharp reaction to the Methodists‘ zealotry and to many of 
their methods while noting that establishment pastors need an injection of passion to stir 
their congregations. Rather than only further instill a method of reductive plainness, 
similar to several of the establishment figures I quote above, Goldsmith sees the needed 
change to be a synthesis instead of an opposition between appeals to reason and passion. 
The excesses of enthusiasm might have no place inside the somber confines of the 
Church of England, but Goldsmith prompts the necessary development of a stronger 
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―antagonist‖ to the apathy it faces. In this characterization of a national church 
unequipped to confront the needs of its parishioners, Goldsmith diagnoses a flawed 
response to groups like the Methodists: instead of adapting to a religious population 
desiring a richer spiritual experience, the church turned more inward and more sedate, 
and pursued more rational approaches that must have seemed a jarring contrast to those 
who had seen the fiery itinerants in their back-yards. 
 The undeniable success of Methodism is often seen as resulting from its unique 
and innovative evangelical tactics. Headed loosely by Wesley, itinerant preachers visited 
rural outposts, often preaching outdoors to those overlooked by organized religion. 
Methodists energized settings in which the stronghold of the Church of England had not 
been reinvigorated. As David Hempton notes, ―Methodism often took strongest root in 
marginal areas, scattered settlements, and new industrial and mining environments where 
the traditional social cement was weakest.‖
306
  The Methodists embraced every aspect of 
the oral performances both of pastors and parishioners. Charles Wesley‘s hymns 
replicated the passion of the Methodist sermon in a popular and memorable form. In 
1780, Wesley prefaces the Collection of Hymns by noting that these hymns contain ―all 
the important truths of our must holy religion‖ and act as ―a little body of experimental 
and practical divinity.‖
307
 Hempton notes that Methodists ―absorbed their faith through 
the words of their hymns and sacred verse."
308
 The Methodist sermon follows a similar 
tactic, preached in plain language vocally modulated to great effect. Rather than forcing 
audiences to find them, Methodists adapted to the field, targeting the geographically 
disparate poor and uniting them under a similar cause.  
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Early in the Methodists‘ evolution into a denomination, their leaders saw 
themselves as the antidote to the complacency of contemporary religious practice. In An 
Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1743), Wesley opens, ―We see, on every 
side, either men of no religion at all, or men of a lifeless, formal religion. We are grieved 
at the sight; and should greatly rejoice, if by any means we might convince some that 
there is a better religion to be attained, — a religion worthy of God that gave it.‖
309
 
Adding life to that formal religion is an apt description for what Wesley was aiming to do 
with the religion of his father, a rigid if passionless rector. Indeed, the early Methodists 
leveled forms both ecclesiastic and homiletic in their interference in establishment 
parishes and rejection of the boundaries placed on the setting of the pulpit.
310
 As Wesley 
explains in this passage, his task of invigorating English religion had to take on 
unorthodox means and challenge the old methods that had fashioned such a docile 
climate in the first place. Responding to his critics who asked of his religion, ―what is it 
good for,‖ Wesley claims ―I do preach to as many as desire to hear, every night and 
morning. You ask, what I would do with them: I would make them virtuous and happy, 
easy in themselves, and useful to others.‖
311
 This mission reflects Wesley‘s own 
conversion narrative that he and his disciples repeated regularly in an attempt to recreate 
the experience in the hearts of their hearers: five years before, he wandered into a society 
on Aldersgate street and heard a preacher reading the words of Martin Luther‘s ―Epistle 
to the Romans‖ and felt his ―heart strangely warmed.‖
312
 In his journals, he marks the 
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years preceding this experience as a period of spiritual confusion, originating in his desire 
for a rational, comprehensible universe at the hands of a creator who could be easily 
explained. It does not take a great leap to suggest that Wesley saw his pre-Aldersgate 
experience as synonymous with the religion of his father. As the establishment aimed to 
inspire rational contemplation, Wesley‘s Appeal depicts the pulpit as the place for 
inciting social and behavioral change by displacing the rational religion so long in place 
in England. Much more the provocateur, George Whitefield attacked the establishment 
veneration of John Tillotson as a preaching model, spitefully (and perhaps symbolically) 
comparing him to ―Mahomet.‖ While Wesley encouraged Methodist leaders to 
ameliorate rather than exacerbate the tenuous connection between their inspiration-based 
movement and the rational religion of the Church of England, Whitefield‘s complaint 
affirms the growing sentiment that a sense of complacency and secular reason had 
overtaken any efforts to address the spiritual struggles of its parishioners.  
Compared to the charismatic Whitefield, Wesley represents a more sedate faction 
of Methodism. After Whitefield‘s death in 1770, the term Methodism could be limited to 
those who followed Wesley because of his ―endless maneouveres to retain control of 
them.‖
313
 Wesley‘s organizational genius was in his ability to act equally as the 
inspirational and spiritual model for the movement and its foremost agent in uniting 
geographically and socially disparate followers toward a common cause. In the years 
before his death, Whitefield, who disliked administrative responsibilities, faced an 
already fracturing movement that would continue to diminish into the nineteenth 
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 Yet at their inaugural moments, the factions were largely untroubled as they 
pursued expansion through conversion. In those early years, Wesley defends his 
preaching by revealing the alarmist claims of his detractors as pure fiction. As the 
conciliatory title of his Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion indicates, he does 
not provoke his critics by pointing out the staleness of their rationalism. Rather, he 
scrutinizes their critiques and responds with a rational argument built on a keen 
understanding of scripture that shows the theological integrity that underpinned the 
movement. In so doing, Wesley meets the conjectural claims of his establishment 
opponents by pointing out their fallacies, politely indicting their exclusive empire of 
reason that nonetheless failed to inform their critiques of Methodism. That rationalism, 
flawed both in argument and in spiritual practice, needed to be invigorated through a 
passionate momentum that Wesley and his pastors encouraged through the pulpit, not 
merely in spite of it. In one of his ―appeals,‖ Wesley asks, 
What then will your reason do here? How will it pass from things natural to 
spiritual; from the things that are seen to those that are not seen; from the visible 
to the invisible world? What a gulf is here! By what art will reason get over the 
immense chasm? This cannot be till the Almighty come in to your succor, and 
give you that faith you have hitherto despised. Then upborn, as it were, on eagles‘ 
wings, you shall soar away into the regions of eternity; and your enlightened 
reason shall explore even ―the deep things of God;‖ God himself ―revealing them 




Wesley shrewdly yet amicably shifts the interrogation to the questionable possibility of a 
rational belief that could exist outside of the thrall he describes here. The ―gulf‖ is one 
that exists in all ―men of reason and religion,‖ and must be bridged by a kind of proto-
Kierkegaardian leap, an existential dilemma that exists outside of any rational category 
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and can only be encountered through religious faith. Far from advocating further 
separation, Wesley points out that he has merely offered a more complete and 
emotionally satisfying version of the Anglicanism of his youth. The appropriate response 
of his critics is similar to the contemporary responses of his audiences characterized by a 
physical reaction instead of a merely cerebral one.  
As a preacher, Wesley did not employ the intense tactics of Whitefield or the fiery 
self-flagellating Calvinist Howell Harris did. The opening anecdote of this chapter 
reflects the narrative that many preachers of the Methodist movement enacted, turning 
from the referent of the text to the exhilarating marvel of the extemporaneous in order to 
affect more powerful audience responses. In his rules for preachers, first published in 
1763, but probably circulated sooner in manuscript form, Wesley urges his itinerants, 
―Do not affect the gentleman. A preacher of the Gospel is the servant of all.‖
316
  Wesley‘s 
concern was that the polish and posture of the establishment would alienate his listeners, 
and thus he encouraged a rustic simplicity combined with the passion of unrehearsed 
testimony and exhortation. Methodists appeared surprisingly similar to their converts 
because they frequently were. Itinerant preachers were often former tradesmen who had 
been recently converted and had decided to take up the unordained calling of field pastor. 
Despite some unease about the messages that were being disseminated, Wesley was 
supportive and encouraging toward these peripatetics, claiming, ―I know that were I to 
preach one whole year in one place, I would preach both myself and most of my 
congregations to sleep.‖
317
 This statement can be read as an accusation against the 
establishment, and instills Halevy‘s comment about the ―extinct‖ nature of the 
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establishment missionary spirit. The enduring legacy of the Methodists – their progress 
from a sect into a significant denomination both in England and in America – is largely 
due to their consistent disregard for the conventional wisdom of contemporaneous 
religious demeanor. 
In his sermons, Wesley‘s rhetorical strategy is a contrast to the teachings of the 
establishment because of the vigor he brings to the spiritual experience of the sermon. 
Though the language of his sermons is possessed by an intense seriousness that shows the 
influence of his Anglican background, his persuasive methods frequently point to a 
manner of inward response that cannot be found in reason alone. While his demeanor 
might suggest a composed rational clergyman, the sermons encourage his audiences to 
respond with the passion that characterized his own conversion at Aldersgate. In a 1742 
sermon tellingly titled ―Awake, Thou Sleepest,‖ Wesley brilliantly recreates his own 
conversion in the form of the sermon itself. The first half of the sermon is composed of a 
judicious explanation – a thorough delineation of the apathy that causes spiritual sleep. 
Wesley does not immediately attack those who should be awakened, calling this lethargic 
parishioner instead ―a quiet, rational, inoffensive, good-natured professor of the religion 
of his fathers.‖
318
 While at points Wesley describes the ―wretchedness‖ of this position, 
he mostly offers an undisparaging description of those for whom ―spiritual sensation 
itself is . . . the foolishness of folly.‖ In these lucid analyses, Wesley shows an 
understanding of the concerns that possess those who reject the devout inward reactions 
that he will later attempt to animate. However, he sets up this rational actor in the clearest 
language so that he can deconstruct the sterility that stifles true religion. 
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If I speak to any one of you, more than to another, it is to thee, who thinkest 
thyself unconcerned in this exhortation. ―I have a message from God unto thee.‖ 
In his name, I warn thee ―to flee from the wrath to come.‖ Thou unholy soul, see 
thy picture in condemned Peter, lying in the dark dungeon, between the soldiers, 
bound with two chains, the keepers before the door keeping the prison. The night 
is far spent, the morning is at hand, when thou art to be brought forth to 
execution. And in these dreadful circumstances, thou art fast asleep; thou art fast 





The dual voices in ―Awake, Thou Sleepest‖ reveal Wesley‘s skill for ventriloquizing a 
sedate and crippling reason only to show what it is: an inadequate remedy for the spiritual 
stagnation that has become so widespread. Wesley responds with vivid images of 
condemnation designed to stir the passive believer out of apathy: the images of the ―pit,‖ 
the ―devil‘s arm,‖ and the ―jaws of everlasting destruction‖ would not be out of place in 
Jonathan Edwards‘ Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God (1741). Wesley‘s audiences 
most likely responded likewise, identifying themselves as those who ―sleep‖ and letting 
the sermon stir them out of complacence. While he did not operate with the same kind of 
inflection and charisma of Whitefield, Wesley constructs his sermons to animate 
conversions to a new spiritual happiness that can only be found outside of the 
conventional wisdom of the establishment. 
As Goldsmith‘s passage reveals, even establishment critics could not deny the 
efficacy of Methodist preaching. As I will show in my next section, the critics who attack 
their pulpit stylings do so on grounds of production rather than reception. Goldsmith‘s 
sympathetic response to Methodism offers one example of an opposing doctrinaire who 
might nonetheless be energized by adopting Methodist tactics. Yet to the deist Benjamin 
Franklin, Whitefield‘s preaching was equally a scientific phenomenon. Theologically, 






Whitefield and Franklin could not have been more different: the former firm in his 
predetermined Calvinism, the latter a rational deist suspicious of evangelical motives. 
Given this chasm between their respective religious beliefs, the sincerity and genuine 
respect that grew out of their friendship is inspirational in its bridging of what could have 
been divisive differences. The relationship began because of business motives, as 
Whitefield needed Franklin to print and publish his sermons, yet continued into a 
friendship because of shared political values and mutual respect.
320
 Later, the shared 
cause of revolution made them political allies as well, as they became vocal leaders of the 
opposition to the Stamp Act. 
 In his Autobiography (1771-90), Franklin describes Whitefield as a mentor and 
an influence, while distancing himself from Whitefield‘s Christian orthodoxy. Whitefield 
rose to the defense of his friend and later served as a character witness when Franklin 
controversially appeared in England before Parliament. As opposite extremists on 
religious matters, they found themselves close political compatriots. In the 
Autobiography, Franklin‘s laudatory, perhaps even hyperbolic, description of 
Whitefield‘s preaching offers a key account of the oral factors of the Methodists‘ success. 
Perhaps predictably given his secular humanism, Franklin never discusses the content of 
these sermons, but instead vividly articulates Whitefield‘s general ability to hold an 
audience captive, and more particularly to his nearly otherwordly ability to reach even the 
most distant listeners wherever they stood. Describing an outdoor sermon before ―streets 
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… fill‘d with his hearers to a considerable distance,‖ Franklin decided to see exactly how 
far Whitefield‘s words could be comprehended.
321
 After walking from one end of the 
street to the other, Franklin ―computed that [Whitefield] might well be heard by more 
than thirty thousand,‖ which reconciles him to ―to the newspaper accounts of his having 
preach'd to twenty-five thousand people in the fields, and to the antient histories of 
generals haranguing whole armies, of which I had sometimes doubted.‖
322
 Ever the 
scientific enthusiast, Franklin is more interested in the audible than the spiritual. Yet his 
comparison to those incongruous accounts of ancient orators and generals is telling 
because it bridges a connection between vocal performance and audience response. 
Whitefield‘s performance allows Franklin to account for the power of rhetoric both 
historically and contemporarily. Also, this analysis from an opposing religious 
perspective offers an objective report of the force that converts had experienced firsthand. 
In Franklin‘s further praise, however, lies the seed of suspicion (here, an amicable 
one) toward the apparently artless nature of this kind of preaching. When he summarizes 
his further experiences hearing Whitefield, Franklin remarks on his continual 
improvement: 
By hearing him often, I came to distinguish easily between sermons newly 
compos'd, and those which he had often preach'd in the course of his travels. His 
delivery of the latter was so improv'd by frequent repetitions that every accent, 
every emphasis, every modulation of voice, was so perfectly well turn'd and well 
plac'd, that, without being interested in the subject, one could not help being 
pleas'd with the discourse; a pleasure of much the same kind with that receiv'd 
from an excellent piece of musick. This is an advantage itinerant preachers have 
over those who are stationary, as the latter can not well improve their delivery of a 
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Franklin continues to extol Whitefield‘s ability, but connects that improvement to 
―repetitions,‖ ―rehearsals,‖ and the persistent attitude of perfection that caused Whitefield 
to dedicate himself constantly to rhetorical self-training. If part of the phenomenon of 
Whitefield‘s preaching skill was that it came so naturally, from inspiration and spiritual 
gifts rather than intense rehearsal, Franklin points out that the act of preaching itself is 
still a premeditated one. The ―advantage‖ that Franklin contends itinerant preachers have 
over those situated in a local parish suggests that itinerants use their travels to test and 
improve their rhetorical conceits. The comparison between the sermon and a piece of 
music extends Franklins interest in the aesthetic rather than the spiritual, further implying 
a prior organization through comparison with another artistic form. At no point does this 
become a criticism of Whitefield or the movement. Yet such an understanding of the 
development of technique suggests that the momentary phenomenon is rooted not in 
inspiration but in incessant fine-tuning and elocutionary improvement. 
The intimation of rehearsal challenges the classification of a truly 
―extemporaneous act,‖ connecting its success to one crafted through an incorporation of 
the artificial methods of invention found in the rhetorical tradition. David Garrick, in 
Whitefield‘s time the most celebrated actor in England, shared Franklin‘s sense of awe, 
but insinuates a similar suspicion that no speaker can be that effective from inspiration 
alone. Himself a master of moving the passions, Garrick nonetheless marveled at 
Whitefield‘s ability to ―weep or tremble merely by varying his pronunciation of the word 
Mesopotamia.‖
324
 Garrick confirms the identity of Whitefield as what Harry Stout calls a 
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 When Garrick the actor comments on Whitefield‘s oral ability, he 
suggests the performative qualities that Methodists often claimed to suppress. Rather than 
unplanned, one can picture Whitefield, like Garrick, practicing the ―o‖s that would have 
made ―Mesopotamia‖ roll so musically off his tongue. Even in praise, there is an aura of 
suspicion – however sympathetic – on top of the celebratory language that suggests that, 
at their root, Methodist practices were finely honed rather than extemporary, plotted 
through methods of rehearsal and calculated self-projection. In an early biography of 
Whitefield, the Scottish minister John Gillies also speculates about the source for his 
performance of inspiration: 
He had a strong and musical voice, and a wonderful command of it. His 
pronunciation was not only proper, but manly and graceful. Nor was he ever at a 
loss for the most natural and strong expressions. Yet these in him were but lower 
qualities. The grand sources of his eloquence were, an exceeding lively 
imagination, which made people think they saw what he described; an action still 
more lively, if possible, by which, while every accent of his voice spoke to the 
ear, every feature of his face, every motion of his hands and body, spoke to the 
eye; so that the most dissipated and thoughtless found their attention involuntarily 




In Gillies too, the ―lively imagination‖ is tellingly described as a ―source‖ of his 
eloquence, emphasizing a prior conception to those ―natural and strong expressions.‖ 
Further, Gillies describes Whitefield as operating on a firm, perhaps even shrewd, 
understanding of the psychology of his audiences, tailoring sermons so that ―the dullest 
and most ignorant‖ were captivated. While clearly pithier than Gillies‘ praise, Garrick‘s 
flattering quotation also suggests preconceived tactics perfected through Whitefield‘s 
long experience among provincial audiences. Rather than preaching from the heart, these 
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critics claim, Whitefield employed an ever-increasing, time-tested bag of rhetorical tricks 
that could be applied to an appropriate occasion. Seizing on this, anti-Methodist critics 
began an elaborate attempt to make visible these tactics so the passionate itinerants would 
be easily identified as counterfeit spiritualists using premeditated rhetorical conceits.  
If the congratulatory praise of Franklin, Garrick, and Gillies offers the seeds for 
condemnation, appraisers with more at stake would capitalize on the apparent artifice of 
Methodist preaching to displace the Methodists from the platform they had developed, a 
forum in which they could appear as speaking forcefully from the heart. As accounts of 
Whitefield celebrate the ―wonderful command‖ that Gillies describes, critics had to 
denaturalize it. As my next section reveals, turning the ―features‖ and ―motions‖ into a 
rhetorical device allows critics a space to conceive of the Methodists as possessing a 
shrewdness that belied their attractive purity.  
“Hosannas of the Giddy Mob”: Theorizing Extemporary Discourse 
When attacking and attempting to cauterize Methodism, anti-Methodists primarily 
attempt to deconstruct the sermons that they view as giving the movement its earliest and 
continuing success. This leads to them to visualize scenes of intense spiritual fervor 
ignited by a preacher whose aims, they contend, were less than honest. It also requires 
critics to challenge the ethos of the highest and lowest orders of Methodism: whether 
Wesley and Whitfield or the itinerants their movement spawned. Writing in his journal on 
December 5, 1739, Wesley describes the effect of his preaching on a woman who was 
―raving mad, screaming and tormenting herself continually.‖
327
 He explains, ―I had a 
strong desire to speak to her. The moment I began [preaching] she was still.‖ Wesley‘s 
calming of the mad-woman can be seen as a counter-image to the sharpest rejoinders that 
                                                 
327




would be leveled against both him and his movement; that counter-image, of parishioners 
going mad and interpreting that madness as an inspirational call, is an attack on the 
susceptibility of workers and rustics to be preached a gospel they cannot understand. 
Theophilus Evans, one of the most vocal opponents of all forms of religious enthusiasm, 
writes that the Methodists possess, ―the natural tendency of their behaviour, in voice and 
gesture and horrid expressions, to make people mad, which very frequently has indeed 
been the case with a great many of their followers.‖
328
 Methodism and madness were two 
sides of the same coin, or at least they could be, and this was the characterization their 
attackers aimed to propagate.  
 Emphasizing the artificiality of a discourse, marking the means through which a 
speaker attempts to achieve his or her persuasive intent, dissects substance from 
performance and emphasizes the latter in an attempt to oppose appearance to reality. In 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s terms, this is the critical act of ―branding discourse as a 
device.‖
 329
 In The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, ―The 
transformation of an act into a means often destroys the fortunate effects it could have: it 
is disqualified as a ‗device.‖  They add, ―It is often sufficient to qualify what has been 
said as ‗rhetorical ‗to rob it of its effectiveness.‖
330
 Emphasizing the artificiality of a 
discourse, marking the means through which a speaker attempts to achieve his or her 
persuasive intent, dissects substance from performance and emphasizes the latter in an 
attempt to oppose appearance and reality. This dissociation ―affects the discourse itself‖ 
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and ―strike[s] the hearer as a process.‖
331
 Crucially, much of the impetus for the 
dissociation between the verbal and the real is predicated on the values that the auditor 
does or does not share with the speaker. Anti-Methodists sought to undermine the 
Methodist movement through a selective criticism of its protocols.  
These attacks are motivated by a diverse, perhaps indecipherable collection of 
theological, political, and social interests, yet what is most germane to this project (and 
overlooked elsewhere) is their targeting of rhetorical practice as a way of exposing 
Methodist preaching and containing its effects. These strategies are linked insofar as they 
dissociate inward purpose and outward expression, or reality and appearance. Together, 
they brand the pathos of Methodist preaching as a device. By doing so, contemporary 
critics externalize Methodist faith in such a way that it can be critiqued as a mere 
performance dominated by factors that reveal its calculated formation, which challenges 
the unique feature on which the public face of the movement relied. For these critics, the 
performance of faith should be refined, not given to immediate reaction. In attacking 
Wesley and his followers, they seek to perpetuate a legacy of preaching from which the 
Methodists deviated. 
The inward motions that the Methodists came to rely on were ostensibly a 
defiance of the artificial and a reliance on the truly spiritual. In a nearly uniform critical 
posture, anti-Methodists would reverse what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note in their 
analysis of ―rhetoric as process.‖ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discussing the way the 
exposure of a ―process‖ can be avoided: 
To avoid the accusation of ‗device,‘ a better explanation of the behavior must be 
given . . . Thus the cult of spontaneity in art, and the presentation of art as a means 
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to social or religious ends, are different ways of showing that the techniques of 




In this analysis, spontaneity appears as a more authentic alternative to the premeditated 
rhetorical ―device.‖ To their opponents, the Methodists definitely must have seemed, to 
employ the terms of The New Rhetoric in a different way, as a ―cult of spontaneity‖ that 
kept drawing new members. The anti-Methodists‘ critical effort reverses Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s terms by proving that such seemingly natural discourse was actually 
the product of carefully designed artistic proofs. It was a challenge that critics met with 
intense fervor, though never quite successfully.  
Since Methodists claimed that their intense spiritual devotion led to feelings of 
inspiration that were authentic expressions of spiritual passion, exposing the rhetorical 
enterprise of preaching became a means of highlighting the enterprising yet dubious aims 
of preachers who privileged passion over reason. If Methodists consistently claimed that 
inspiration came from within, and that such motivation was not premeditated, 
establishment Anglicans argued that it came from outside, the result of calculated 
methods designed to appear spontaneous. In The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists 
Compared (1754), George Lavington describes ―this new dispensation‖ as a 
―composition of enthusiasm,‖
333
 a sentiment shared throughout attacks and diagnoses of 
Methodists. In many attacks, this evangelical enthusiasm is portrayed not as a disorder of 
the mind, but as a calculated method with obvious techniques that need to be described so 
that auditors can recognize them as a counterfeit spirituality. Rather than being produced 
by frenzied imaginations, it instead targeted them. Out of necessity, this strategy reverses 
the ―rhetoric as process‖ that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, which acts as a 
                                                 
332
 Ibid., 273. 
333




―devaluation [which] reaches the point where the spontaneous, unprepared speech, 
whatever its imperfections, is preferred to the considered, premeditated speech which the 
hearer considers as a device.‖
334
 Lavington inverts this devaluation toward the 
―unprepared speech‖ and instead marks the apparently improvised moment as a planned 
rhetorical conception. This could especially be seen in the case of texts like The 
Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared, which sought to demystify and offer 
self-interested motives for enthusiastic rhetoric.  
Anti-Methodists found it crucial to emphasize an ―off-book‖ sermon through the 
negative association of ―rhetoric as process,‖ going to great lengths to theorize the 
unseemliness and the impossibility of spontaneity that the Methodists were pursuing. In 
this regard, one of the common turns of phrase in anti-Methodist sermons is to refer to 
itinerant preachers as ―mechanics.‖ In his 1767 poem The Methodist, Evan Lloyd 
mockingly writes that ―Evr‘y Mechanic will commence / Orator, without mood or Tense‖ 
and then narrates a catalog of rustic laborers who decide to take the road as preachers.
335
 
For instance, a ―Baker, now a Preacher grown, / Finds Man lives not by Bread alone, / 
And now his Customers he feeds / With Pray’rs, with Sermons, Groans, and Creeds.‖
336
 
Like other satirists writing about the emerging phenomenon of lay preachers, Lloyd relies 
on two connotations of ―mechanic,‖ both as one skilled (often only) in perfunctory but 
mindless tasks, but also as a description for the preaching such laborers would employ: 
contrived, derivative, often plagiarized, aimed for raising emotions rather than 
participating in the rational discourse of polite preaching. The anonymous author of the 
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1778 poem The Fanatic Saints complains of the even more dangerous, if harder to 
substantiate, results of this apparently specious call to service, by connecting the 
deficiency to a crisis of authority and duty that leads to an unkempt natural landscape. In 
a footnote, the author analyzes the now-fomented religion on its inaugural terms, 
claiming that Whitefield ―blew up the embers of hypocrisy to such a flame‖ that ―the 
agriculture of some counties was almost totally neglected, and other species of mechanic 
Labour ceased.‖
337
 Making the link even more explicit, Samuel Bowden‘s The Mechanic 
Inspir’d (1754) argues that sermons are produced through a mindless but repetitive labor: 
―Where weavers expound, as they sit at a loom; / Where mechanics inspir‘d, the gospel 
explain, / And weave at a text, as well as a chain.‖
338
 Bowden‘s characterization of the 
lay-preacher as a weaver at a loom strikes back against claims to inspiration, arguing that 
even the rustic itinerants are more calculated than they appear. Having no training and no 
ordination, they had to be. Yet in their vituperative satirical aim, Bowden and  Lloyd 
betray an anxiety toward the success of the Methodists that requires them to explain these 
uneducated amateurs who were ―commenc[ing] orator.‖ The need to explain this 
phenomenon, even by mocking it, occupies a large portion of attacks on Methodists. The 
unconvincing answer by these satirists – that laborers untrained in preaching were 
actually shrewd improvisers with covert motives – testifies to the pressure that such 
critics felt by the growing population of Methodist converts and their encroachment on a 
threatened establishment. 
One of the more prominent and provocative pieces of anti-Methodist literature, 
Theophilus Evans‘ The History of Modern Enthusiasm (1757), develops a genealogy of 
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enthusiasm and speculates on its effects in an age of tolerance that has allowed such 
figures as Wesley to continue to prosper. The general thesis of Evans, A Welsh 
clergyman provoked by the growing number of converts in the area, is that enthusiasm 
eventually leads to atheism. He also begins by announcing, ―Methodism is now almost 
quite extinct.‖
339
 In 1757, he could not have been more wrong. While the History focuses 
on several branches of enthusiasm, historical and contemporary (Quakers, Ranters, 
Anabaptists), Evans dedicates two chapters to the Methodists and the most significant 
influence on them, the German Moravians. As Goring indicates, Evans depicts 
enthusiasm as a ―singular and monstrously deviant force, manifesting itself in offensive 
bodily behavior.‖
340
 He claims that true forms of inspiration might exist, particularly in 
the tradition of poetic enthusiasm that can be traced to Socrates‘ divine madness,
341
 but 
that such behaviors are dangerous and almost always lead to negative effects rooting 
from an ―eager Zeal violently attached to some extravagant Opinion or other.‖
342
 Evans‘ 
most compelling contribution to anti-Methodist discourse lies in his explicit speculation 
that enthusiasm can be used rhetorically as a means to impel audiences. The ―impostor,‖ 
Evans writes, ―acts against the Dictates of his own Conscience, pretends to Raptures and 
Visions knowing they are counterfeit and false, and his sole Purpose is to deceive 
knowing himself to be a Deceiver.‖
343
 The appearance of enthusiasm can be just as 
powerful as the thing itself, and Evans dedicates himself to exposing the techniques and 
methods that such ―impostors‖ usually employ.  
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Evans spends much time describing the actual tactics that Methodist preachers 
employ when facing crowds. For instance, he impersonates the style of a Methodist 
preacher replete with the overwhelming repetition of a fire-and-brimstone message: 
The preacher now grows more tempestuous and dreadful in his manner of 
address, stamps and shrieks, and endeavours all he can to increase the rising 
consternation, which is sometimes spread over a great part of the assembly in a 
few minutes from its first appearance. And to compleat the Work, the Preacher 
has his recourse still to more frightful representations; that he sees Hell-flames 
slashing in their faces; and that they are now! Now! Now! Dropping into hell! 
Into the bottom of hell! The bottom hell! This boisterous Method seldom or never 




Evans emphasizes that a lack of sanction from an authorizing denomination allows 
anyone to be a preacher, and he clearly hopes to instill this suspicion in audiences who 
view Methodist sermons. In imitating Methodist speech, and particularly tactics such as 
the repetition of imperatives (―Now! Now!‖), Evans highlights the artificiality and plays 
on the word ―method‖ in order to link overwrought rhetoric with false spirituality. Evans 
elsewhere writes that the ―general Method is to turn Exhorter,‖ and that ―every one of 
these illiterate vagrants pretends to expound by Inspiration.‖
345
 Evans cites The 
Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compar’d in viewing the Methodists as pursuing a 
―composition of enthusiasm.‖ By echoing and reapplying this allusion, Evans 
characterizes such preaching as a calculated attempt to inspire what he calls ―the 
hosannas of the giddy mob.‖
346
 Throughout this text, the unsanctioned vehement 
preaching must be moderated through a kind of censorship. Because itinerant preachers 
operated outside of any sanction, they could obviously rely only on ―frightful 
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representations‖ to inculcate not mere belief, but the shrieking ―hosannas‖ that signify 
assimilation through calculated emotional proofs. 
In a less earnest presentation, George Alexander Stevens‘ enormously popular 
1764 dramatic production, Lecture upon Heads, reproduces the stylistic excesses of 
Methodist preaching in a burlesque form. This extended monologue features paper-
mâché busts and wig blocks and allows Stevens to riff on contemporary and historical 
types as far-ranging as Alexander the Great and a Billingsgate Fishwife. The most 
popular character, the Methodist Parson, appears last in the presentation and is often 
reproduced out of context in revues or in introductory routines appended to plays.
347
 The 
rest of the characters are presented as genial and well-meaning, if ultimately daft and 
misguided. Yet perhaps because of the Methodist opposition to the theater, the Parson is a 
particularly vicious caricature. Clearly meant to be a negative version of George 
Whitefield, he looks ―with one eye . . . up to Heaven‖ and with the other, ―he looks down 
to see what he can get.‖
348
 Evans‘ satire of Whitefield‘s motives works through a familiar 
attack on his severely-crossed eyes that alternately made him an easy target for insults 
regarding his appearance and such an unforgettable presence to his listeners.  
When the Parson is finally allowed to give a speech, Stevens ventriloquizes the 
same repetition that Evans replicates and lampoons the assonance and alliteration used to 
provoke reaction. He opens by shouting, ―Bretheren! Bretheren! Bretheren! The word 
bretheren comes from the tabernacle, because we all breathe there-in – if you want 
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rousing, I‘ll rouze you.‖
349
 He continues by calling attention to his own rhetorical 
prowess as a sign of inspiration, spiritual integrity, and evangelical motive: ―from the top 
of my voice, will I bawl . . . and the sweet words that I shall utter, shall sugar candy over 
your souls.‖
350
 By announcing the method by which he preaches, he reveals it to be 
designed to give false assurance and to incite rapturous responses. The Parson‘s motive is 
clearly financial, as the repetitive language recurs in the conclusion when the parson 
reminds his listeners of their monetary obligation. After warning about the ways of the 
devils, he exhorts the audience to address the temptation by tithing. The dramatic gesture 
closes the play, as the parson shouts, ―Do put some money in the plate – Put some money 
in the plate; - and then all your iniquities shall be scalded away, even as they scald the 
bristles off the hogs back; and you shall be cleansed from all your sins, as easily as the 
barber shaveth away the weekly beard from the chin of the ungodly.‖
351
 While audiences 
found Stevens‘ burlesque uproarious, they were also witness to the spectacle of 
Methodist preaching and given its suspicious financial motive. For Stevens and his 
audience, preachers like Whitefield were deliberate charlatans who crafted sermons to 
swindle their rustic prey.  Stevens‘ caricature of Whitefield implies that to debunk 
Methodists, one only needed to see one in action. The classist assumptions underneath 
such a critique are obvious: to an Anglican elite, the Methodists can be seen for the fools 
they clearly are. The urban and rural working classes, however, were easy prey for these 
tactics because of their inability to respond to such scenes with an appropriate level of 
critical repose. However, Stevens‘ barbed portrayal did not take into account the growing 
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number from the leisured class who were participating in and financially supporting the 
Methodist cause. 
In addition to claiming that they deduce and exploit the Methodists‘ financial 
motives, anti-Methodists also aim to depict Whitefield using his sexual charisma to 
provoke female audiences. Given the prim character of the establishment, these sexual 
speculations showed that Methodist arousal of passion aimed at an altogether unspiritual 
effect. Stevens‘ ―lecture‖ is rife with scatological language and insinuations of sexual 
deviances.  The Parson‘s crossed eyes have opposing purposes; one is spiritual, while the 
other is carnal. When he begins by announcing, ―If ye want rousing, I‘ll rouze you,‖ 
Stevens emphasizes that the seductive potential of Methodist discourse lies in a spiritual 
deception that has a decidedly sexual motive toward the women (and perhaps men) in his 
audience. Though Stevens operates at the level of farcical caricature, he might be 
recalling the early romantic behavior of bachelor preachers like Whitefield and Howell 
Harris.
352
  The ―rousing‖ works as both a threat and a promise and, given the sexual 
connotation the language of his following lines reveals, his increasingly seductive aims: 
―the organ pipes of my lungs shall play a voluntary among ye; and the sweet words that I 
shall utter, shall sugar candy over your souls, and make carraway comforts of your 
consciences.‖
353
 In explicitly broadcasting his hypnotic abilities, the parson‘s arrogance 
extends to his belief in an irresistible sexual control. In order to ―rouze‖ his listeners, he 
will utter ―sweet words‖ that will make their consciences submissive and susceptible. 
Such Methodist ―sweetness‖ eradicates any rational faculties that might put up an 
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adequate defense.  Stevens devalues spiritual conversion by linking its efficacy with a 
worldly desire for seduction.  
If rhetorical deviance can be interpreted as sexual in Stevens‘ portrayal, the 
anonymous 1763 satire, A Plain and Easy Road to the Land of Bliss set up by Mr. 
Orator; on which a man may travel more miles in one day, than on any other highway in 
forty years, asserts that Whitefield‘s sexual charisma is his primary, devious method for 
attracting converts. Building off the brilliant absurdity of Jonathan Swift‘s A Tale of A 
Tub, A Plain and Easy Road acts as its unauthorized sequel, moving from the allegorical 
divisions of Martin (the Church of England), Peter (the Catholic Church), and Jack 
(Calvinists) to the briefly mentioned Eolists (presented here without the diphthong that 
Swift uses).
 354
 In Swift, the AEolists stand in for a radical dissent that surpasses even 
Jack‘s rigid nonconformists. For this sect, belching is ―the noblest act of a rational 
creature,‖ as such winds ―pervade and enliven the Universe.‖
355
 By caricaturing the 
uncontrollable impulses of a body no longer grotesque but now endowed with a sense of 
spiritual purpose, Swift highlights ridiculous religious practices that are ordered 
according to absurd feats of interpretation, and disseminated through media proliferation. 
Yet even in their charlatan performances, the narrator cannot deny the effectiveness of 
―subterraneous Effluviums of the winds‖ and ―Oratorical gusts‖ on the too-malleable 
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mind of uneducated rustics and, in typical Swiftian misogyny, women, ―whose Organs 
were understood to be better disposed for the Admission of those Oratorical Gusts.‖
356
 
Picking up where Swift leaves off, A Plain and Easy Road is most compelling when it 
attempts to justify the Methodist‘s preaching power by emulating the rhetorical strategy 
of Swift‘s hack who is ―an embodiment of the zeal, enthusiasm, and various kinds of 
eccentricity which he may seem to talk about satirically.‖
357
 By putting figures such as 
Whitefield and Wesley in lineage with the dangerous fanaticism of the seventeenth 
century, the author fashions an imaginative account of the motives that attend Methodist 
conversion.  
The narrative of A Plain and Easy Road focuses on the rise of Mr. Orator 
________, who is so clearly meant to resemble Whitefield that the author includes exact 
dates and incidents from his life to distinguish him from other Methodist figures. The 
author satirically acts as the kind of enthusiastic disciple whom Mr. Orator creates 
through forceful rhetoric, defending him adamantly against an Anglican soteriology that 
stresses individual morality as a prerequisite for salvation. By contrast, the Eolists exhort 
a practical judgment and reductive spiritual code divorced of any doctrinal affiliation. In 
a large sense, their skill in making converts relies on the expedient and less stringent 
vehicle for salvation they propose, yet the writer continues to exhort their methods. But 
the Eolists are primarily successful because, as in Swift, they use powerful ―puffs‖ with 
which the Orator is able to fill his audiences. Seeking to belittle those Methodist converts 
who hung on every word of preachers such as Whitefield and who acted without 
deliberation, the author of A Plain and Easy Road goes into more elaborate detail in 
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condescendingly describing the stirring of evangelical impulses in the audience. After 
hearing Mr. Orator, the zealous ―holders-forth‖ internalize the message and carry it forth 
into their communities:  
As then it is the property of air to rush in from all sides toward the rarefied part, it 
happeneth – that when any well-qualified holders-forth chuse to take a walk into 
the country for the edifying of the brethren, or the conversion of reprobates, they 
empty themselves to a very few globles of air – the heat of their zeal immediately 
rarefies what remains; so that (as I said before) they become next door to a 
walking vacuum. The business thus advanced, if they pass by any barn or field, 
the thrasher in the one, and the plower in the other, (if Eolists) begin in an 
involuntary manner, to move. The air within the orator – and for a certain circle 
without, being, by hot zeal, attenuated, causes that which is contain‘d within the 
thrasher, or the plowman, immediately to have a tendency towards it; upon which 
their insides become tickled . . . This wonderful rarefaction draws also your 
mowers, swine-dwellers, carters, nay farmers themselves, to leave their servants 




Driven by impulse, the passion spreads all over the countryside, inspiring more of the 
―brethren‖ to ―leave their servants to do just as they please.‖ Similar to the example from 
Evan Lloyd‘s The Methodist I quote above, this passage combines mockery and anxiety 
in its descriptions of mechanics and agricultural laborers who give up their trade to 
become untutored evangelists because of ―a few globles of air.‖ A single sermon has the 
potential to disrupt the pastoral landscape with a zealous fervor that can be replicated 
merely because of the inspired passions of its listeners. We can view the wind as a kind 
of extemporaneous speech, yet the author‘s description of its generation and ultimate 
effects characterizes the phenomenon of itinerant preachers as an endless chain of 
replication in which the message is corrupted further as it goes from Mr. Orator‘s mouth 
into the bodies of its converts, and through their evangelical efforts.  
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The Plain and Easy Road provides a complicated, fantastical origin story for 
Whitefield‘s ability to attract audiences rooted in his ability to connect kinetically with 
his audiences. In this case, the emerging scientific discourse of magnetism serves to 
explain the paradox of Methodist attraction. In an increasingly absurd series of events, 
perhaps drawing on the burgeoning genre of the gothic, Mr. Orator _______ has a dream 
in which he travels to the south of France and ends up in a hidden underground domain, 
where a charismatic figure named Towdrionello, ―the great founder and encourager of 
magnetical experiment,‖
359
 holds sway over an audience of mostly female listeners. 
When Towdrionello ―used violent motions with his head, face, and hands,‖ women are 
compelled toward him by magnetic force. Thus follows similar depictions of magnetism 
toward ―the wife of a custom house officer,‖ ―a fat, hard-favour‘d lady,‖  and ―very pretty 
nun.‖
360
 Desiring the same ability, Mr. Orator _______ speaks to a ―charming maid‖ who 
tells him that the speaker‘s gift comes from his ability to apply ―this most efficacious 
magnetic operation.‖
361
 After a lengthy discussion in which Mr. Orator strangely restates, 
with little variation, everything that the reader has just seen happen to him, the woman 
explains that Towdrionello ―has found out that, in every male and female, there is much 
magnetic virtue, and that what we call Love is a forcible exertion of it: That the female 
carries about her the magnet, and the male bears the needle: That the attraction between 
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In this fanciful explanation, the author depicts the magnetic reaction between 
speaker and audience as a consubstantial one. Audiences respond to the speaker because 
they share the same subversive desires to attain individual worth outside of a traditional 
authority such as the establishment church. By connecting these forces to nature, enacted 
through the irresistible and coercive powers of Towdrionello and later Mr. Orator ______ 
after his dream journey, the author shows that artificial processes inhabit the persuasive 
moment and become naturalized through association with a mystical internal process, a 
spiritual stirring that cannot be represented but must be taken as a profound act of faith. 
As it is elucidated here in the use of female bodies drawn in through the intensity of 
magnetic attraction, the rational explanation of this power becomes associated with a 
sexual seduction that lures the object of seduction through calculated acts crafted to 
appear as an internal force. Attributed to a powerful spirituality, the manufactured force 
is instead deviously coded as natural, thus giving it an even greater allure. In this satire, 
magnetism is symbolic of the superstitions that surround Methodist rhetoric and the use 
of such spectacle to target audiences who cannot resist it. The claims of calculated sexual 
seduction do not only apply to the more apparently predatory acts attributed to Howell 
Harris, but also become evident in the delivery of Methodist messages to audiences too 
dull-witted to resist them. This condescending posture toward the very audiences that 
critics aimed to influence surely did not help their cause.  
Thomas Green‘s Dissertation on Enthusiasm (1755) is a much calmer 
consideration of the Methodists and their use of the extemporary, yet it nonetheless 
employs some of the same techniques as other texts presenting a fraudulent methodology 




connection between extemporaneous performance and spiritual assistance. He explains 
the typical signs that should be seen as contrived: audience members should not ―mistake 




but those sudden emotions raised by that means in the breasts of the hearers, 
(which they consider as a true and spiritual edification) may be excited in a great 
measure by unusual tones of voice, solemn affected looks, vehemency of words 




Also, Green explains, a typical extemporaneous performance will begin with a preacher 
petitioning God for inspiration. However, given what a calculated endeavor this is, such a 
gesture can even be read as blasphemous. Green‘s purpose is ultimately didactic – the 
extemporaneous is, he writes, ―evidently the effect of art and study,‖ and his goal is to 
inform audiences of its feigned nature. 
365
 
By calling attention the factors of production, anti-Methodists are unified in 
highlighting supposedly unforced moments of inspiration as rhetorical rather than 
spiritual. Doing so allows them to reduce the Methodists‘ rise to a styled intensity 
formulated to ignite those most vulnerable to pathetic appeals. In policing the rigid 
standards that spiritual response should take in a polite age, Methodist critics stress a 
proper model of audience reaction predicated on an understanding of the signs of false 
enthusiasm. To avoid the possible hostilities that writers such as Glanvill and Burnet 
attempt to ameliorate through rational discourse, these critics turn toward a category of 
deceptive rhetoric and, throughout these voluminous texts, announce its specious 
presence. Methodism is effective because it targets, Green writes, ―ignorant persons; 
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whereas the wiser part of mankind are only to be moved by reason and sound 
arguments.‖
366
 In closing, Green warns, ―Christians must then be careful that they 
mistake not upon any occasions the sudden motions of the animal or natural spirits for 
divine and spiritual operations; or be deceived with the outward appearance of godliness, 
without the inward power and virtue of it.‖
367
 Simply, for Green, Christians must be 
suspicious of orators. Sincerity operates through a plain style that announces it own 
transparency and simplicity; anything else must be seen as a calculation on the part of the 
rhetor. 
As presented, the stakes for the established church are articulated in terms of 
practice, but take on their polemical power through a general understanding of imagined 
consequences. By describing practice, through the grotesque presentational form a 
Methodist sermon takes, establishment figures could focus on the moment from which 
impolite revolt would follow. Critics such as Green and Evans attempt to theorize the 
process by which extemporary preaching can be produced, as well as to identify its 
distinctive features so listeners can more critically audit such performances. By attacking 
the preachers themselves and reminding readers of their humble roots and lack of proper 
training, they hope to render suspect all Methodist preachers who might appear 
unannounced in an open setting to preach. The extempore becomes a tactic employed by 
those who have neither the knowledge to preach (or memorize) a theologically consistent 
sermon, nor the ability to present the text in a calm, reasoned manner. Yet the anxiety 
about a renewed state of religious division at lower levels of society, resulting from 
vehement messages, derives from an audience psychology initiated during the civil war 
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and affirmed over the seventy years before the Methodists began rapidly drawing 
members. As I note above, Glanvill‘s recommendation that preachers should craft 
sermons that are cognizant of the weaknesses of auditors lives on through Methodist 
critics. When the Methodists emerged, they represented the sharpest challenge to nearly a 
century of pulpit imperatives that marked preaching off book are as not only 
inappropriate, but also (as Burnet claims) ineffective. To account for the success of 
itinerant preachers, the effort appears almost unified in its attempt to discredit the 
phenomenon by revealing both the factors of production that prompted extemporary 
speech and the devices that one could expect when hearing a Methodist sermon. 
Ultimately, based on the Methodists‘ continued growth, missionary expansion, and 
enhanced organizational structures, the anti-Methodists were preaching to a choir 
dedicated to mocking and attacking dissenters, encouraging reactive responses from 
potential audiences who might see the techniques elaborated in their polemics. 
Preaching the Authorized Text: An Irenic Act of Plagiarism 
Discussions about rhetoric in the years between the civil war and the appearance 
of treatises from Scottish writers on rhetoric (I address the latter in my final chapter) 
address rhetoric as a phenomenon more than a theory, as a thing that happens more than a 
thing that can happen, or that occurs only in the abstract. Yet in dealing with practice, 
new rhetoricians inevitable assert an underlying theory in the form of cultural 
proclamations, critiques aimed at marginal groups, or value statements. Reading 
discussions of different kinds of rhetoric renders visible the cultural concerns that shape 
these ideas. For instance, much like his reflections specifically on pulpit rhetoric, Oliver 




British eloquence as incapable of reaching a nation that desperately needs moving. 
Preachers and speakers sacrifice too much in order to gain the appearance of composure. 
Goldsmith offers the vivid contrast of the Methodists as proof that a more vehement 
program will invigorate the country. He writes, ―When I think of the Methodist preachers 
among us, how seldom they are endued with common sense, and yet how often and how 
justly they affect their hearers, I cannot avoid saying within myself, had these been bred 
gentlemen, and been endued with even the meanest share of understanding, what might 
they not effect!‖
368
 Again, Goldsmith endorses the techniques of Methodism at the same 
moment that he cautiously challenges its doctrines. In this statement lies a subtle and 
simple desire that was more than likely shared by many of their more sympathetic 
opponents: if the Methodists could only preach appropriate messages, their effects would 
not be dangerous. Goldsmith‘s impossible hope – ―had these been bred gentlemen‖ – at 
once looks down on the rural itinerants and leads him to long for a combination of 
rhetorical skill with a sanctioned theology. Sympathetic critics like Goldsmith wished 
that their own denomination would aim for the passions the Methodists were so 
successfully engaging.  
In closing, I offer one effort toward conciliation between the world of spiritual 
inspiration and the more composed world of letters. Samuel Johnson commented several 
times on Wesley and his movement, often contemplating how Methodists might be 
reformed. In The Life of Samuel Johnson (1791), James Boswell asks about the 
Methodists and Johnson responds by praising the ―plain and familiar‖ tone of their 
preaching, particularly in contrast to the ―homely manner‖ of Boswell‘s Scottish 
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 Noting the link between vivid presentation and moral and spiritual response, 
Johnson adds, ―To insist against drunkenness as a crime, because it debases reason, the 
noblest faculty of man, would be of no service to the common people: but to tell them 
that they may die in a fit of drunkenness, and shew them how dreadful that would be, 
cannot fail to make a deep impression.‖
370
 Johnson pits plainness as a virtue against the 
―homely‖ manner that plagues preaching, arguing that common audiences are less likely 
to pursue moral reform unless it follows personal and emotional engagement – in this 
case through fear. Here, Johnson shares Goldsmith‘s belief that the church has become 
too reserved to address sin and debauchery, and that arousing proofs are necessary to 
―shew them‖ the error of their ways. Later, during a period when Boswell admits ―there 
was a total cessation off all correspondence,‖ he offers through ―Dr. Maxwell of 
Falkland‖ the report of Johnson‘s developing attitude toward the Methodists: 
Something might be necessary, he observed, to excite the affections of the 
common people, who were sunk in languor and lethargy, and therefore he 
supposed that the new concomitants of Methodism might probably produce so 
desirable an effect. The mind, like the body, he observed, delighted in change and 
novelty, and even in religion itself, courted new appearances and modifications. 
Whatever might be thought of some Methodist teachers, he said, he could scarcely 
doubt the sincerity of that man, who traveled nine hundred miles in a month, and 
preached twelve times a week; for no adequate reward, merely temporal, could be 




What was the ―something‖ that might ignite the lethargic ―common people?‖ Here and 
elsewhere, Johnson hesitantly proposes an adoption of Methodist techniques; like many 
Anglicans who saw the rise of Methodism, he doubts its theology while confirming its 
efficacy. He does not question the sincerity of the itinerant Methodist, even if that 
sincerity is misguided, as he responds suggestively to ‖whatever might be thought.‖ 
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Whatever differences in doctrine may exist, Johnson admires the Methodists‘ sheer 
ability to instill and perpetuate lasting conversions. 
If only, Johnson thinks, the Methodists could unite their affective and effective 
preaching with the language of politeness and reason. An encounter between Wesley and 
Johnson offers a telling illustration of the possibility that Wesley could use the tools of 
his media to preach a sort of authorized message. In 1775, Johnson published a 
transatlantic pamphlet advocating against revolution to the American colonists. 
Admonishing hawkish members of Parliament, he writes, ―But let us interrupt awhile this 
dream of conquest, settlement, and supremacy.‖
372
 In urging members on both side of the 
debate to decrease the intensity of their quarrel, and to think candidly about the 
challenges shared by both Americans and their British opposition, Johnson isolates the 
issues and addresses them using logical proofs. Johnson carefully yet vigorously lays out 
the case for taxation, deconstructs the flawed claim for representation, and ultimately 
argues both for the self-suppression of seditious measures and the cessation of any plans 
on Britain‘s part to increase aggressions. However, though the pamphlet remains a 
trenchant statement of pre-1776 British sentiment toward the colonies, it had little 
immediate influence by the time it circulated in a climate that had quickly progressed to 
the point of impending war. More than likely, it would have been quickly forgotten if not 
for what ensued. 
Six months later, Wesley produced his own pamphlet titled A Calm Address to 
Our American Colonies. Intention and approach are not all that Wesley‘s pamphlet shares 
with Johnson‘s; it also imitates the structure and reappropriates the theme to be consistent 
with Methodist policies. The final point comes to the same conclusion, and the ruling 
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logic of Johnson‘s argument remains  that taxation was justified, given the bounties the 
colonies enjoyed from their mother country. Though such practices of ―borrowing‖were 
not that uncommon, even within religious publications, this text incited vigorous 
criticisms from those looking for ammunition to further discredit Wesley.
373
 Caleb Evans, 
a Baptist minister, published an accusatory pamphlet in which he claimed Wesley used 
―contemptible sophistry‖ by stealing from Johnson ―verbatim, without 
acknowledgement.‖
374
 In addition, Wesley‘s pamphlet offered a sharp reversal on his 
earlier pro-American position. On this charge, even fellow pro-American Methodists 
joined Evans on the offensive. 
 Following the plagiarism charges, Wesley almost immediately published a 
corrected edition with a preface to address Evans‘ charge. He made no modifications at 
all to the text itself, maintaining the same irenic imperative. Yet while the preface 
addresses Evans‘ angry response, he spends only the first two sentences explaining the 
charge of plagiarism, asserting that he had indeed restated Johnson‘s pamphlet and 
―judged it my duty to impart it to others.‖
375
 This addition allows Wesley to strike back 
using the language that others had used against his followers and himself, accusing Evans 
of using florid provocations to incite public opinion against him. The new edition 
effectively ended the controversy. Though Wesley‘s plagiarism was indeed a violation of 
the current copyright, no charges were brought against him. Johnson‘s response to the 
occasion was measured and concise. When faced with Wesley‘s offense, he acted 
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consistent with his long-held views on the limited rights of authors to own their texts. 
According to Boswell, Johnson felt that while intellectual property laws should respect 
the authors, the enduring public benefit of the work is essential. For Johnson, stringent 
copyright laws imply ―a metaphysical right, a right, as it were, of creation, which should 
from its nature be perpetual;‖ rather, the work ―should be understood as no longer in his 
power, but as belonging to the publick.‖
376
 By these standards, Wesley had fulfilled his 
duty to Johnson by sharing his work with a larger audience. Yet against the numerous 
opinions toward the tendency for Methodists to act rashly, the pamphlet offers Johnson‘s 
advice in terms of a ―calm address,‖ attempting to quell rather than stir up dissent. 
Johnson sent a letter to Wesley after the occasion, not even acknowledging the charge of 




 What mollified Johnson, besides his general lack of concern for the legal 
technicalities that defined the act plagiarism? Faced with the master of the movement 
dedicated to both extemporary tactics and sharp diversions from Anglican orthodoxy, 
Johnson seems almost comforted by the fact that Wesley was – in a sense – preaching his 
message. It came perhaps as a relief when Wesley critically asked his followers, ―But 
whence then is all this hurry and tumult? Why is America all in an uproar?‖
378
 Those 
Anglican figures who feared further dissent must have been, like Johnson, thoroughly 
satisfied when Wesley issued ―a calm address‖ to Methodist converts in the colonies. In 
this moment, a meeting between perhaps the foremost figure of the establishment and the 
most notorious figure of dissent was an irenic one. The incident provided, at least for a 
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moment, the possibility of a Methodist church relying on the text over the inspiration that 
consumed it. 
Conclusion 
My first two chapters have focused on attempts to recognize rhetorical conceits 
where they are apparently absent. By stressing the artificiality of speaking and writing 
practices, critics of experimental philosophy and Methodist preaching hope to devalue the 
principles of these respective movements. By criticizing Methodists, for instance, these 
antagonists attempt to instill nostalgia for earlier oral practices (post-Restoration 
plainness) by challenging an emerging one (Methodist tactics). As the Methodists 
promote a revivifying spirituality, the various forces of the establishment look to muffle 
the sounds which are making more obvious its own inefficacy. 
 Anti-Methodists such as Theophilus Evans and the author of A Plain and Easy 
Road to the Land of Bliss do not offer much hope that Methodists might be reformed. 
Rather, they present images of excessive enthusiasm encourage audiences to worry about 
what further trouble these ―Fanatic Saints‖ might provoke. In my introduction, I argued 
that Tobias Smollett links the reform narrative of the sentimental novel with the potential 
to assimilate the Methodists into the culture that they ostensibly reject. Johnson and 
Goldsmith share the imperative by imagining the Methodists as participants in, rather 
than threats to, a sophisticated religious culture; if only, Goldsmith laments, ―had [they] 
been bred gentlemen.‖
379
 Of course, since the Methodists eschewed the trappings of the 
milieu of gentlemen, and sought out those who were clearly not gentlemen, their success 
could so haunt those who lamented their rise. 
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 The next two chapters ask both: ―what has oratory done?‖ and ―what will oratory 
do?‖ with an intensity that produces numerous anxieties. In my next two chapters, I take 
what I see as the next logical stop by showing engagements with what oratory might do, 
or more specifically, what the orator might be. Before turning to the changes in rhetorical 
theory as reconfigurations of the orator‘s motive and goal, I engage Alexander Pope‘s 
attempts to describe a proper office of rhetoric. Pope mostly presents rhetorical activity 
through its failure, which I argue is an attempt to elevate the value and affective efficacy 
of poetry over oral forms. Pope‘s presentation of oral moments is rife with conflicts that 
are embedded in his other poetry: a belief in his own poetic skill that prompts a desire for 






Chapter 3: ―He Spoke no more than just the Thing he ought‖: 
Alexander Pope and the Practice of Rhetoric 
Dullness’ Army 
In all of his versions of The Dunciad, Alexander Pope paints a particularly grim 
picture of the oratorical culture that persisted during his lifetime. Pope‘s portrayal of 
cultural excess, so vividly yet sympathetically portrayed in The Rape of the Lock (1712-
17), takes a turn to the grotesque in The Dunciad. As Fredric Bogel astutely claims, 
Pope‘s vision is ―expanded to apocalyptic scope: the world is seen as a demonic pattern, a 
lucid tableau of horror, uncomplicated by saving qualifications or recalcitrant details.‖
380
  
The inherent order that Bogel finds underneath the anarchy of nonsense and self-
presentation is built on the artifice that the Queen of Dulness mobilizes. For Dulness to 
thrive, she must be protected and enhanced by an army of publicists who will – to modify 
a phrase from An Essay on Criticism – ―hide with ornaments [her] want of art‖ (296).
381
 
Dulness‘ reign is one of ostentation and self-celebration; her existence and persistence are 
the product of her subjects who continually eulogize her. In many ways she is the inverse 
of another passage in An Essay on Criticism: 
 Some Figures monstrous and mis-shap‘d appear 
 Consider‘d singly, or beheld too near 
 Which, but proportion‘d to their Light, or Place, 
 Due Distance reconciles to Form and Grace. (171-74) 
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In the Essay, critical reading is defined as an act of careful adjustment and modulation to 
centralize the poetic vision that might be muddled by faults or prejudices of the 
observers. ―Distance‖ allows the seemingly ―monstrous‖ figure to be brought into focus 
and its features more clearly understood, more accurately evaluated through the necessary 
local contexts of ―light‖ and ―place.‖  However, in the Dunciad, the poetically distorted 
vision of Dulness‘ majesty requires the opposite. In order for her thrive, she must be 
―consider‘d singly‖ and ―beheld too near,‖ lest her illusory ―graces‖ be exposed. In short, 
she needs a good rhetorician. 
  Dulness relies on a militia of those most skilled in contemporary practices of 
technologies of mediation: booksellers, theater owners, patrons, painters, pamphleteers, 
publishers, editors, literary critics, preachers, and orators. She is first introduced in 
―clouded majesty‖ (B.I.45),
 382
 immediately emphasizing the vacuity that is obscured, 
protected, and rhetorically reinvented as ―majesty.‖ As her true image is concealed from 
onlookers, she looks out at the army of conceits that color her celebrations: 
There motley images her fancy strike,  
Figures ill paired, and similes unlike.  
She sees a mob of metaphors advance, 
Pleased with the madness of the mazy dance. (B.I.65-69) 
 
As Pope recognizes in a footnote, this poetic ―madness‖ allows Dulness to ―appea[r] in a 
thousand shapes‖ (273n4). Unlike the figure he describes in the Essay on Criticism, 
which requires a clearer point-of-view to see its graces, Dulness cannot be separated or 
clearly discerned from the figures that are used to shadow her true form. The Queen 
herself both corrupts and is corrupted by this artifice. Described as ―cloud-compelling‖ 
and ―tinsel‘d o‘er in robes of varying hues,‖ she ―Beholds thro‘ fogs‖ her ―wild creation‖ 
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(B.I.79, 81, 82). In this mock-celebration, Pope shows the degree to which ornamentation 
and excess have made it impossible to sever reality from the glistening façade that 
enhances and conceals it. 
Throughout The Dunciad, Pope mocks the hackneyed reliance on rhetorical 
devices that the dunces use to veil their empty productions. In Book III, oral persuasion 
receives special attention. When the shade of Elkennah Settle surveys the present state of 
duncery, he ―behold[s] an hundred sons, and each a dunce‖ (B.III.138). Amongst this 
galley, Orator Henley receives particular notice for his oral contributions to duncery. As 
vociferous and indecipherable noise is a celebrated feature of Dulness‘ kingdom, 
Henley‘s voice is exceptional: 
        Imbrown'd with native bronze, lo! Henley stands,  
        Tuning his voice, and balancing his hands.  
        How fluent nonsense trickles from his tongue!  
        How sweet the periods, neither said, nor sung!  
        Still break the benches, Henley! with thy strain,  
        While Sherlock, Hare, and Gibson preach in vain.  
        Oh great Restorer of the good old Stage,  
        Preacher at once, and Zany of thy age!  
        Oh worthy thou of Ægypt's wise abodes,  
        A decent priest, where monkeys were the gods! (B.III.198-208) 
 
Resplendent in his ―strain,‖ Henley‘s oratorical skills attract the lowest cultural common 
denominator. Pope‘s ire is stimulated by the real-life Henley and his ability not only to 
draw audiences, but also to educate them in his dubious practices.  
By the 1728 Dunciad, Henley‘s so-called ―Oratory‖ had flourished largely 
because of his ability to publish his methods and offer them wholesale to the public. A 
master of advertisement and self-promotion, Henley taught delivery and pronunciation in 
a way that was equally popular, affordable, and productive for his populist audiences. In 




sermons, lectures, and orations on subjects ranging from the reformation of manners to 
the history of rhetoric. As his biographer Graham Midgley explains, Henley‘s audience 
consisted largely of ―lower-and middle-class tradesman, often liberally sprinkled with the 
butchers of Newport and Clare market.‖
383
 However, though Henley appears in both the 
1729 and the 1743 Dunciad, the later poem can be read as particularly caustic given the 
failure of his commercial efforts over those fourteen years. By the 1740s, the famed 
orator was floundering, spending more time in the tap-house than the pulpit. The 1743 
Dunciad recognizes this by adding insult to injury: ―How Henley lay inspir‘d beside a 
sink, / And to mere mortals seem‘d a Priest in drink‖ (B.II.425). As the 1729 edition 
captures Henley emerging into a broader cultural consciousness, the 1743 version shows 
his legacy as fading yet still relevant enough to warrant a poetic attack. 
Such success clearly baffles Pope, especially because Henley outdraws the 
establishment doctrinaires Sherlock, Hare, and Gibson, who ―preach in vain.‖ The 
passionate response to Henley is opposed by the primacy of reason and subdued worship. 
Henley‘s fluency comes from a language that is familiar to the dunces and to the 
audiences they have no trouble finding and multiplying. As Adam Potkay notes, Pope‘s 
presentation of Henley is ―a dumb show of gesture and sound, a tuned voice and balanced 
hands, devoid of truth or even sense.‖
384
 He represents ―oratory‘s lowest ebb‖ and ―just 
another player in possession of oratory‘s lost prerogative.‖
385
 Yet Henley‘s ability to 
attract followers is evident in Pope‘s description of him. This passage reflects a belief 
that his ―fluent nonsense‖ has overcome the sensibility that Pope aims to instill 
throughout his works, and particularly in the Moral Essays. Henley offers a rhetorical 
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decorum appropriate for the world of the Rape of the Lock: what he lacks in content, he 
makes up for in presentation.  By 1743, Pope might have envisioned the elocutionist 
movement, of which Henley was one of the most famous disciples, dying in a haze of 
insignificance. Yet with the exception of changing the names of the pastors whom Henley 
opposes from the 1728 version, from the near-anonymous ―K**, B**, W**‖ to 
―Sherlock, Hare, and Gibson,‖ Pope retains Henley as a synecdoche for the bloated oral 
practices that he saw plaguing contemporary discourse. 
 Pope‘s depiction of the illustrious and confident Henley is a rich contrast to his 
own self-described inaptitude at public speaking. In Spence’s Anecdotes (1820), Pope 
makes an explicit reference on this failure: 
I never could speak in public: and I don‘t believe that if it was a set thing, I could 
give an account of any story to twelve friends together, though I could tell it to 
any three of them, with a great deal of pleasure. – When I was to appear for the 
Bishop of Rochester, in his trial, though I had but ten words to say, and that on a 
plain point . . . I made two or three blunders in it: and that notwithstanding the 




Pope admits a grand irony. On the page, his ability to ―give an account of any story‖ was 
legendary. Yet when he imagines giving a speech before an audience of more than three, 
he shares the same fear as a shy college freshman sitting in a speech class. Those familiar 
with Pope‘s physical appearance – what John Dennis cruelly described as ―a Lump 
Deform‘d‖
 387
  – would not be surprised that Pope rarely if ever took the rostrum. In 
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, Pope admits that as a child he ―lisp‘d in numbers‖ (128-29), 
reflecting a prodigious ability to write meter yet an inability to read them eloquently. 
There can be no greater disparity between the way Pope describes himself as a public 
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speaker than Orator Henley. While Henley can ―break the benches . . . with thy strain‖ 
(Dunciad 202), Pope‘s art does not allow such an immediate response. As he mocks the 
grotesque nature of the bombastic speaking presence, he cannot help but admire its public 
draw.  
The depiction of Henley is a vivid example of what in Pope‘s poems can be read 
as intense reflection on the potential ethics and efficacy of persuasive speech. Critical 
accounts concerned with Pope and rhetoric typically focus on his celebrated use of 
rhetorical tropes and figures in his poetry, or the persuasive agenda of his poetry.
388
 
However, though Pope offers complex representations of orators, there has been no 
extended discussion of the rhetorical and oral activity that he depicts in his poetry. In this 
chapter, I argue that these representations constitute a vexed but thorough theory of 
rhetorical practice that illuminates the most compelling tensions of his poetry. Pope‘s 
broader claims about art and judgment, particularly in his Moral Essays, stimulate an 
apprehension toward the effects of rhetoric – its ability to move too greatly or its inability 
to move at all. Pope‘s endorsement and rejection of rhetoric happen almost 
simultaneously; just as in the scene where rhetoric lies at the feet of Dulness, he imagines 
the possibility of a powerful and effective eloquence only to question it immediately. Just 
as Pope wrestles with his admiration for the polite culture he satirizes, moments of 
persuasion prompt a profound evaluation of orality and oratory. 
                                                 
388
 On argument and rhetorical style, see Fredric V. Bogel, ―Dulness Unbound: Rhetoric and Pope‘s 
Dunciad,‖ Pmla 97, no. 5 (October, 1982); Ruben Quintero, Literate Culture: Pope’s Rhetorical Art 
(Newark: Delaware, 1992); John E. Sitter, ―The Argument of Pope‘s Epistle to Cobham,‖ Studies in 
English Literature, 1500-1900 17, no. 3 (July, 1977): 435–449; John E. Sitter, Arguments of Augustan Wit 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007): 844–855. A notable exception is Potkay, The Fate of Eloquence in the 
Age of Hume. Potkay sees Pope participating in a discourse of nostalgia toward eloquence that works to 




 I begin by examining poems in which art is discussed in the abstract. In these 
poems – the early An Essay on Criticism, Epistle to Cobham (1734), and An Essay on 
Man – Pope stages a conflict between passion and reason, appearance and reality. I look 
to these poems because they so strikingly contrast presentation with substance, and the 
murky epistemology that results from confusing the former with the latter. The role that 
art plays in stimulating these conflicts is central, and justifies the representations of 
orators such as Orator Henley. These issues, so central to rhetoric, inform the 
presentation of persuasive scenes in Pope‘s narrative poems. Pope‘s questions about the 
effects of art more generally are essentially questions about judgment and knowledge, 
which correspond to his depiction of rhetoric in its potentially destabilizing effects. I then 
turn to The Iliad and The Rape of the Lock, which I read as companion pieces, as epic and 
mock-epic, for their vividly distinctive depictions of orators. In the project of translating 
The Iliad, Pope is challenged by a presentation of rhetoric different from the one he 
wishes to convey. As a result, he spends much time articulating the proper office of 
rhetoric and comes to a fairly extensive theory of rhetorical propriety. Amidst a number 
of competing concerns – classical orthodoxy and departure, poetic innovation, moral 
propriety, and the eventual public reception of the translation, Pope still finds space to 
wrestle with the production and reception of rhetoric. Confronted by the potentially 
troubling efficacy of rhetoric and the possibility of its cultural disruption, Pope qualifies 
the primitive power of persuasion. This potential turbulence also surfaces in the mock-
epic styling of The Rape of the Lock. However, the cultural setting allows him to ―neuter‖ 
and contain this energy by staging speeches that fail. Appeals for virtue or order fall on 




restore a lock of hair to its owner. Pope uses later revisions of the poem to emphasize 
further this incapacity. The inclusion of Clarissa, the ―grave‖ prude, serves as a wry 
commentary on his own inability to appease the dueling forces to whom the poem is 
addressed. Throughout, I contend, Pope was deeply concerned with the potentially 
dangerous effects of rhetoric and used his own poetic power to contain or repurpose 
them. 
“False Eloquence:” Abstractions, Adornment, and Anxiety 
In this section, I focus on diverse poems that are linked by anxieties about 
judgment, appearance, and epistemology: An Essay on Criticism, An Epistle to Cobham, 
and An Essay on Man. Before moving to my more detailed readings of The Iliad and The 
Rape of the Lock, these more abstract works provide the intellectual and philosophical 
undercurrent that rises to the surface in the narrative poems.  The themes that are central 
to Pope in these poems are also central to rhetoric, in particular a concern that 
ornamentation and presentation will create a corrupt and falsified culture that thrives on 
its indecencies. These poems are crucial because they anticipate the vexed role that 
rhetoric plays in the narrative poems. Debates about the ethics of rhetoric stage the same 
conflicts that Pope repeatedly invokes: about the worse appearing the better, the passions 
subverting or overcoming reason, and the endlessly subjective nature of observation.  
Pope frequently pits ornamentation against the reality it is meant to conceal. In 
The Rape of the Lock, for instance, Pope playfully presents this opposition in the form of 
the ―cosmetics‖ that can enhance and obscure appearances. This artificiality is equally 
evident in the machinations of poetic style. As the opening lines of the Rape admit, 




setting, the mock-epic narrator elides the substance or emptiness that might be found 
beneath the ―cosmetic‘ pow‘rs‖ (I.124), preferring to dwell on the glistening surfaces. 
The reader is constantly aware of the contrast between ―subject‖ and ―praise,‖ between 
poetry and reality, and between the ―toyshop‖ (I.100) culture and the rhetoric its 
participants use to eulogize themselves. Throughout the Rape, Pope consistently mimics 
the self-fashioning tactics through which his cultural combatants elevate themselves. The 
mock-epic mode itself is a linguistic version of this adornment, as the participants are 
―exalted by their epic context, and their fall is all the sillier because it is from so high a 
perch.‖
389
 The mock-epic heightens the narrative of the poem to the point where even the 
most serious of sentiments are rendered absurd. If the Baron violates Belinda‘s virtue by 
defacing her beauty, he does so in such a way that exemplifies how subjective and 
frivolous those cultural values are. Pope‘s ―Cosmetic Pow‘rs‖ necessary for physical 
embellishment are analogous to those figures and devices necessary for aesthetic 
exaggeration.  
The connection between rhetoric and cosmetics recalls one of the earliest critiques 
of rhetoric.
390
 As far back as Plato‘s Gorgias, Socrates condemns the practice of rhetoric 
as a ―made art‖ or ―an ability to gratify people.‖
 391
 He compares worthwhile arts with 
false arts, noting that rhetoric is a corruption of justice in the same way that ―self-
adornment personates gymnastic.‖
392
 Like that false beauty culture, rhetoric possesses a 
―rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature [that] deceives men by forms and colors, 
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polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous sort that 
comes through gymnastics.‖
393
 Plato employs the critique of physical ornamentation to 
enhance his related critique of rhetoric, as both create forms that have no correlation in 
reality, are developed through selfish motives, and are used to suggest often ignoble 
courses of action. Plato‘s binaries between true and false arts operate on the transcendent 
idealism that distinguishes his philosophy, in which appearance can suggest a higher truth 
but cannot reflect it accurately. His famous proscriptions against art, particularly in The 
Republic, arise out of similar concerns about its ―rascally, deceitful, ignoble and illiberal 
nature,‖ as well its ability to reify and substantiate a merely impressionistic view of the 
world.   
Plato‘s concerns about rhetoric may have risen out of the Athenian social and 
political climate in which Sophists profited from the cultural primacy of oral persuasion; 
however, the opposition between rhetoric and truth can also be located both in Pope‘s 
poetry and the world-view that it encourages. As he ponders the idealistic order that 
undergirds nature and should be used as a model both for civil society and aesthetic 
order, Pope‘s reverence for Plato is both implicit and explicit. In An Essay on Man, for 
instance, he exhorts man to ―soar with Plato to th‘empyreal sphere‖ (23). Pope also 
shows the influence of Plato‘s thought in a letter to John Caryll. Commenting on the 
success of Joseph Addison‘s Cato (1712), Pope tells Caryll that the play is an example of 
―that which Plato thought the greatest pleasure an exalted soul could be capable of, a 
view of virtue itself, great in person, colour, and action.‖
394
 Though he never references 








Gorgias or any of Plato‘s other writings about rhetoric, he offers a similarly idealistic 
view of the role that art plays in obstructing or enhancing human understanding.   
For Pope, as with Plato, questions of aesthetics, cosmetics, and oratory are 
essentially about epistemology and judgment. In an Essay on Man and the so-called 
Moral Essays,
395
 Pope concerns himself with art‘s ability to create shadows of reality and 
dangerous illusions that have monumentally dangerous effects. To both Plato and Pope, 
true arts restore the body and the soul, while false arts only further corrupt. Pope vividly 
describes the coercive effects of both art and artists to come to false conclusions that are 
further proliferated through persuasive activity. Like Plato‘s conception of rhetoric, Pope 
describes a negative art that is compulsive and obscuring, affective yet destructive. As 
Fredric Bogel notes, it results in an error ―not [in] seeing only a part, but taking the part 
for a whole, treating the portion that we can see as though it were the entirety and, 
therefore, as though it were self-contained.‖
396
 Artifice enhances some parts, shrouds 
others.  Though it might seem strange coming from such a master of tropes and figures, 
Pope nonetheless expresses an anxiety about the impulsive responses to artistic 
productions. The tenor of this apprehension is rarely consistent, but it can be found in the 
moral and aesthetic concerns that Pope engages in his poetry. Reflecting his enthusiasm 
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that Cato offers ―a view of virtue itself,‖ Pope contends that art should enforce and 
inspire virtue rather than become lost in its external trappings. 
An Essay on Criticism (1711), Pope‘s earliest success, offers a critical 
engagement with aesthetic values that he would continue to clarify and revise throughout 
his career. Pope defines an ideal poetic decorum based on the study of the harmony and 
order that Nature teaches, or as he puts it, ―Nature Methodiz‘d‖ (89). By relying too 
heavily on the tradition of rhetorical figures, the poet never produces a unique creation, 
and only arbitrarily recycles the tropes of familiar works. In the scene from The Dunciad 
that opens this chapter, we see this at its most grotesque and ostentatious excess. To 
emphasize the glory of nature, he frequently contrasts the authentic with the artificial: 
 False Eloquence, like the Prismatic Glass, 
 Its gawdy Colours spreads on ev’ry place; 
 The Face of Nature we no more Survey, 
 All glares alike, without Distinction gay. (311-14) 
 
Poets turn to the artificial, or ―False Eloquence,‖ to enhance and adorn what is pure or 
natural, but they end up replacing it. The simile of the prismatic glass allows Pope to 
describe the initial effects of eloquence proliferating and corrupting to a point that ―the 
Face of Nature‖ has been exchanged for the artificial spectacle. He continues: 
But true expression, like the unchanging sun, 
Clears and improves whate'er it shines upon; 
It gilds all objects, but it alters none. 
Expression is the dress of thought, and still 
Appears more decent, as more suitable, 
A vile conceit in pompous words expressed, 
Is like a clown in regal purple dressed.  (314-22) 
 
―True expression‖ offers an empirical and formal ideal. Rhetorical embellishment 
―alters‖ through ―vile conceit[s]‖ to the point that it creates flamboyant absurdities. 




flaws of over-embellishment in poetry, concluding that formal propriety comes from an 
adherence to nature rather than art. The proper aesthetic ―gilds‖ but does not ―alter‖: it is 
―decent‖ without being ―vile.‖ These passages from An Essay on Criticism are 
emblematic of the conflict between the artificial and the natural, and the degree to which 
the latter must be preserved and the former cautiously utilized. The description of the 
―vile conceit in pompous words‖ recalls the age-old negative characterization of rhetoric 
as making the worse appear the better. It recalls Robert Boyle‘s description of the use of 
rhetoric in science writing as painting the eyeglasses of a telescope.
397
 Implicit in the 
Essay is a sense that rude audiences still enjoy the stage show of the ―clown in regal 
purple dressed.‖ However, Pope‘s implicit message is that the poet should think of 
artistic integrity before public reception, even if crude audiences typically celebrate the 
pompous style he attacks. 
In an earlier passage, Pope chastises those who rely too heavily on poetic 
ornamentation rather than natural wit: 
 Poets like Painters, thus, unskill‘d to trace 
The naked Nature and the living Grace, 
With Gold and Jewels cover ev'ry Part, 
And hide with Ornaments their Want of Art. 
True Wit is Nature to Advantage drest, 
What oft was Thought, but ne'er so well Exprest. (293-298) 
 
The oft-quoted closing couplet can be seen as an epigrammatic sentiment of Augustan 
aesthetics.
398
 Lacking skill, poets turn to the overwhelming ornamentation of 
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metaphorical ―Gold‖ and ―Jewels‖ to hide the ―Want of Art.‖ They are driven to amplify 
and adorn the surface in hoping that their own minimal artistic merits will be submerged 
by the gloss of presentation. Christina Knellwolf notes that Pope‘s couplet proves that 
―Any mode of representation is a cover because it imposes a mode of seeing, perceiving 
and judging.‖
399
 The appropriate aesthetic activity – the formal features of an ideal 
composition – is still ―drest‖ by an artist‘s skill, yet done in such a way that preserves 
whatever might be called ―natural.‖ Setting the mechanism of ―thought‖ against the 
innovation of expression, Pope concludes the opposition throughout the Essay between 
servile imitation and the truly distinct creation. 
Pope argues that the poem should have a didactic purpose before lamenting that 
current artists aim only for displays of stylistic virtuosity.
400
 Further, the poetic work 
should not merely be a cryptic and elusive message between a creator and himself. Such 
writers ―make themselves the measure of mankind‖ (453). The poet who seeks for public 
adulation merely aims to ―catch the spreading notion of the town‖ (409). Rather, the 
poem should transcend both the immediately personal and the pragmatic goal of cultural 
approval. He writes, 
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Yet let not each gay Turn thy Rapture move 
For  Fools Admire, but Men of Sense Approve; 
As things seem large which we thro‘ Mists descry, 
Dulness is ever apt to Magnify. (390-393) 
 
The two reactions – admiration and approval – must be evaluated according to their 
source. Though fools celebrate using the same language that the pompous poets do, the 
responses of ―Men of Sense‖ are modest and subdued, even in approval. Dull artists will 
take advantage of the ―Mists,‖ relying on the showiness of poetic enhancement that 
cloaks an inherent emptiness in a calculation to gain admiration of ―Fools.‖ As an early 
moment in Pope‘s development, An Essay in Criticism sets in motion a poetic concern 
with affective deception. In her reading of The Rape of the Lock, Laura Claridge notes 
that ―Art-ifice and art-full-ness in woman must be dismantled‖ because it possesses a 
―slipperiness [that] turns out to be emblematic of woman‘s covert power.‖
401
 In 
Claridge‘s claim lie the problems that An Essay on Criticism begins to unfold: the 
inherent ―slipperiness‖ of art, its alluring potential, and its destructive effect. The 
precepts of An Essay on Criticism exist in large part to avoid continuing the poetic 
culture that Pope sees as endemic at the time of the poem: ―Such shameless Bards we 
have; and yet ‗tis true, / There are as mad, abandon‘d Criticks too‖ (610-611). In these 
closing lines, Pope exhorts a critical reexamination of classical models because a return 
to their native purity will discourage the servile imitation and audience pandering so 
prevalent among writers of the age. 
 In later poems, Pope extends the problems of reception and observation beyond 
the domain of the critical evaluation of poetry. Taking it out of the realm of the aesthetic, 
Pope offers competing versions of the ideal conditions for interpretation to avoid dire 
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 More explicitly, Pope shows the results of acts of interpretive failure 
that have corrupted social and intellectual life. As acts of critical examination are 
distorted by the false principles Pope aims to correct, the later poems discuss the moral 
problems that ensue from errors of judgment. His 1734 An Epistle to Cobham contrasts 
an intellectual order that comes through a more correct observation against cautionary 
scenarios of dangerous interpretative conclusions. He uses the orator to make a central 
point: corruption happens both internally and externally, as the persuasive speaker first 
deludes himself and then others. To establish these dangers and their eventual 
personification, Pope begins by stressing the ease with which the senses can be deceived: 
Yet more; the difference is as great between 
The optics seeing, as the objects seen. 
All manners take a tincture from our own; 
Or come discolour'd, through our passions shown; 
Or fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies, 
Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dyes. (23-35) 
 
Pope widens the gap between ―seeing‖ and ―seen,‖ severing the connection between 
subject and object by emphasizing the distortions that occur in observation. 
―Discolour‘d‖ by the passions, the object appears in the divergent configuration of ―ten 
thousand dyes.‖ Substantial knowledge is perpetually funneled through the flawed senses, 
or ―in passions‘ wild rotation tossed‖ (41).
 403
 As fancy ―enlarges‖ and ―multiplies‖ the 
already problematic observation, it leads to unfortunate and misguided action. Built 
largely on phantasm, these actions are rarely the subject of deep analysis: 
When Sense subsides, and Fancy sports in sleep  
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(Tho‘ past the recollection of the thought),  
Becomes the stuff of which our dream is wrought:  
Something as dim to our internal view  
Is thus, perhaps, the cause of most we do.  (46-49) 
 
That ―dim‖ stuff does not die in thought, but is revealed in action. It must be checked 
through reason, not stimulated through passion. In Cobham, these fantasies happen 
mostly in seclusion, as seen in the dream imagery of the above passage.  We are driven 
by a tendency to trust first impressions, the ―tincture of our own,‖ without weighing 
perception against reality through close study or intellectual conversation.  
After these abstract ruminations, Pope‘s assault on judgment, dangerous passions, 
and the contingent nature of accepted knowledge finds its most caustic personification in 
the figure of the Duke of Wharton. Wharton was an Opposition Whig, a Jacobite who had 
spent time with James the Pretender and would later join his army, and a member of the 
controversial Hell-Fire club.
404
 Wharton was a notorious rascal towards whom Pope had 
some degree of personal animosity.
405
 After further embarrassments that led to his being 
outlawed by both England and Scotland, Wharton would face the ignominy of a 
drunkard‘s death in Spain. As David Morris notes, Wharton serves as Pope a fitting 
example of ―internal contradiction‖ in which ―all innate or acquired powers are rendered 
futile or tormenting.‖
406
 Pope expresses this contradiction when he introduces Wharton as 
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the ―scorn and wonder of our days‖ (181).
407
 Biographical accounts of Wharton also 
emphasize his almost unnatural skill in eloquence in the House of Lords, in particular his 
famous defense of Pope‘s friend, Francis Atterbury.
408
 Pope recognizes Wharton‘s oral 
abilities, describing him as blessed by ―each gift of nature and of art‖ (192), in particular 
his ―angel Tongue‖ (199). However, Pope modifies each of these respective talents with 
critical qualifications. Despite his gifts, he is ―wanting nothing but an honest heart‖ (193). 
His ―angel Tongue‖ is one which ―no man can persuade.‖ In Wharton, Pope finds an 
infamous exemplar of the numerous vices and deceptions that his poetry chronicles.  
By personifying the error of self-deception in the figure of a notorious 
contemporary rake known for his eloquence, Pope depicts oratorical power as a vehicle 
for conveying flawed principles and bad ideas with great force. Because of his notoriety, 
Wharton is an obvious victim of the ―Ruling Passion‖ that consumes its object. As a 
renowned persuasive speaker, he represents the degree to which the orator finds the most 
receptive audience in himself through acts of self-deception and self-enrichment. Further, 
Wharton basks in the glory of audience‘s adoration: it is ―Enough if all around him but 
admire‖ (190). John Sitter argues that "His is a failure of self-knowledge, since with both 
eyes on the audience . . . Wharton makes no attempt to view his own life.‖
409
 Serving as a 
sort-of closing parable, the image of Wharton looks to spreads the deception that Pope 
describes as internally corrupting its host. He is most dangerous in his ability to influence 
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others, as he ―forfeits‖ his life in ―a thousand ways‖ (197). Though successful in 
immediate social and political actions, Pope‘s Wharton is the antithesis of the calm 
reflection and quiet conversation that Lord Cobham models. As Sitter recognizes, in this 
poem Pope crafts himself as a ―genuinely moral artist [who] uses poetic form to penetrate 
social forms and personal illusions.‖
410
 His damning obituary of Wharton serves as both a 
didactic argument against the dangerous pursuits of the rake, as well as a shrewd analysis 
of troubled psychology of the orator. 
 Even though the social climber and grand opportunist Wharton sought public 
appreciation above all else, his corruption results from, as Sitter recognizes, a ―failure of 
self-knowledge.‖ A crucial implication of Cobham is that social interaction and self-
education can resolve the problems that come from an extreme solipsism. However, An 
Essay on Man complicates this conclusion by noting the problems that come from 
external sources. If Cobham presents the life of solitude as one that encourages self-
deception, An Essay on Man privileges the isolated intellectual life over the robust 
marketplace of ideas. This creates an even more muddled epistemological picture, as both 
domains are fraught with uncertainty and confusion. The sentiment in Cobham that 
―actions best discover man‖ is taken to a troubling conclusion in the Essay on Man: 
Hence different passions more or less inflame, 
As strong or weak, the organs of the frame; 
And hence once master passion in the breast, 
Like Aaron‘s serpent, swallows up the rest. (II.129-133) 
 
In both the first and third line of the above passage, the ―hence . . . passion[s]‖ 
construction suggests the foreboding inevitability for passion to consume reason. The 
strategy of the first couplet is inverted in the next, as the spatial terms of ―frame‖ and 
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―breast‖ suggest the thinking body that will be ―swallow[ed]‖ and ―inflame[d].‖ Pope 
employs the biblical allusion of Aaron‘s serpent, one of God‘s many miracles for the 
Israelites traversing to Canaan, to negative effect to exemplify this totalizing process. In 
the earlier passages, Pope notes the problematic perspectives that allow the part to serve 
as representative of the whole, creating false knowledge through perception alone. Such 
error can be remedied by contemplation and an understanding of the cosmology that Pope 
elaborates throughout An Essay on Criticism. However, this hopeful conclusion is 
undermined by his competing depiction in Cobham of the errors that come from such 
deliberation. 
In the next stanza, Pope closes his comments on passion before privileging 
―nature‖ over ―art.‖ If man is doomed by impulse, he can be saved by relying on reason 
and contemplation to counter the energy of ―different passions.‖ Reason, Pope later 
writes, can ―rectify, not overthrow‖ passion by placing it within definable boundaries.
411
 
However, in what marks a grim, final note, Pope shows passion physically overwhelming 
its subject, like a parasite consuming its host: 
So, cast and mingled with his very frame, 
The mind‘s disease, its ruling passion came; 
Each vital humour which should feed the whole, 
Soon flows to this, in body and in soul: 
Whatever warms the heart, or fills the head, 
As the mind opens, and its functions spread, 
Imagination plies her dangerous art, 
And pours it all upon the peccant part. (II.133-44) 
 
But what is that ―dangerous‖ art? The second epistle suggests that passion can never be 
overthrown, but can be ―rectif[ied]‖ through a strict rational control. Again, employing 
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spatial terms, Pope shows how this ―disease . . . fills the head.‖ The abundant imagination 
only accelerates this process. An earlier passage from the second epistle elucidates the 
effect of art as well as a potential response. Given the destructive tendency of the 
passions to consume judgment, art must be reconsidered within the epistemological 
framework that Pope delineates throughout An Essay on Man: 
What reason weaves, by passion is undone. 
Trace Science, then, with Modesty thy guide; 
First strip off all her equipage of pride; 
Deduct what is but vanity or dress, 
Or learning‘s luxury, or idleness; 
Or tricks to show the stretch of human brain, 
Mere curious pleasure, or ingenious pain; 
Expunge the whole, or lop th‘ excrescent parts 
Of all our vices have created arts; 
Then see how little the remaining sum, 
Which served the past, and must the times to come! (II.44-52) 
 
Just as in An Essay on Criticism, Pope implies that contemporary ―arts‖ have been 
distorted by vices that threaten to contaminate judgment. The imperatives he uses clearly 
show this: ―strip,‖ ―deduct,‖ ―expunge,‖ ―lop.‖ He imagines a pure art that can stand 
apart, rather than among, the excesses of the polite culture that characterized the study of 
rhetoric analogous to An Essay on Man. Reflecting the theme of Cobham, passion 
―undoes‖ the tightly-knit project that reason is capable of weaving. Yet Pope is more 
specific in targeting causes – the ―luxury‖ of learning, the ―tricks‖ that in the later line are 
tellingly called ―arts.‖ Vice animates the kind of passionate frenzy that results from ―the 
stuff of which our dream is wrought.‖ The invasive quality of art impels Pope‘s selective 
acts of expunging and sanitizing. 
Throughout these poems, Pope brilliantly writes in an abstract language that 




Pope defends his own aesthetic methods from the kinds of criticisms that An Essay on 
Man might direct toward his work. In Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot (1735), his frustration is 
evident when he asks, ―Soft were my numbers; who could take offence / While pure 
description held the place of sense?‖ (146-47). The Essay on Criticism serves as an early 
example of the program that Pope purported to employ both reflexively and creatively. 
He exhorts the dictum that he claims to follow: ―Avoid extremes; and shun the fault of 
such, / Who still are pleased too little or too much‖ (384-85). Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot 
also offers a thorough condemnation of the use of art to produce scandal or controversy: 
Cursed be the verse, how well soe‘er it flow, 
That tends to make one worthy man my foe, 
Give virtue scandal, innocence a fear 
Or from the soft-eyed virgin steal a tear! (283-86) 
 
In An Essay on Man, Pope extols the virtues that the ―cursed‖ poetry perverts. The 
dangers of such poetry push him to pursue a morally responsible art, and much of the 
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot defensively points out the high-mindedness behind his own 
efforts. Poetry should not merely entertain, but educate and compel moral action. In An 
Essay on Man, Pope credits Bolingbroke for directing him to this worthy endeavor: ―That 
urged by thee, I turned the tuneful art / From sounds to things, from fancy to the heart‖ 
(IV. 391-92). No longer merely ―tuneful,‖ Pope‘s verse strives to direct passion toward to 
the moderating grasp of reason. 
 These poems are concerned with the corruptive role that art plays in provoking 
action, as well as its potentially redemptive function that can only come about through 
the critical examination he so explicitly develops. In what follows, Pope views rhetoric as 
at once exemplifying and animating concerns about the elusive yet pervasive ―art‖ that 




issues of argument and judgment. In the otherwise glowing encomium to Pope in Lives of 
the Poets, Samuel Johnson sees the Essay on Man as an ―egregious instance of the 
predominance of genius, the dazzling splendour of imagery, and the seductive powers of 
eloquence.‖
412
 Johnson sees Pope as guilty of the artifice he so vigilantly warns against. 
For Johnson, the greatest sin of the Essay is in its inability to follow its own dicta: 
―disrobed of its ornaments . . . left to the powers of its excellence, what shall we 
discover?‖
413
 In calling for the purification of art, the Essay robes itself in the artifice that 
it explicitly aims to reject. If we agree with Johnson‘s appraisal, Pope uses ―seductive 
eloquence‖ to attack the arts that produce effects similar to eloquence. Pope depicts 
judgment as fraught, easily susceptible, and requiring an intense system of moderation. 
Lacking that system, Wharton was reduced to the ―scorn of our age,‖ capable of 
deceiving himself and others, possessed by a ruling passion that threatened to 
contaminate further through his eloquence. In Cobham, the eloquent Wharton becomes a 
composite figure for Pope‘s concerns about art and its effects, yet through his almost 
cartoonish malevolence he risks becoming a caricature. In what follows, I discuss the 
orators in The Iliad and The Rape of the Lock who become early repositories for the 
epistemological and aesthetic tensions that Pope later defines so explicitly. 
Easy Art: Rehabilitating Rhetoric in The Iliad 
Pope began translating The Iliad in 1714, after the successes (even amidst some 
controversy) of An Essay on Criticism, The Rape of the Lock, and Windsor Forest (1713). 
Though the first volume was published in 1715, Pope was preoccupied with Homer for 
the better part of the next twelve years, when the final volume of The Odyssey was 
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published. During this time, Pope continued to revise The Rape of Lock; in 1717, he 
introduced the ―moral of the poem‖ by giving it voice through the character of Clarissa. 
In The Iliad, Pope turns his critical attention to violent scenes of persuasion in Homer. 
The ―wildness‖ of these moments provokes Pope to qualify through extensive critical 
commentary and to revise them through dramatic poetic changes. In The Rape of the 
Lock, he adds a crucial revision to his poem by creating an orator modeled after a 
Homeric precedent. These moments prompt what Paula McDowell calls a ―heightened 
reflection on oral communication.‖
414
 When Pope confronts an oral culture, he is struck 
by a peculiar sense of nostalgia that drives him to intense qualification and revision. The 
classical turn, whether in epic or its revision in mock-epic, pushes Pope to think more 
deeply and explicitly about the consequences of persuasive speech. As we will see, 
rhetoric can either produce too great of a change, or it can bring about no result at all. 
These two competing possibilities are present in both The Iliad and The Rape of the Lock. 
Homer‘s depiction of rhetoric plays a pivotal role in Pope‘s reaction to what he 
perceives as primitive excess that must be reformed. In particular, Pope‘s process of 
translation involves isolating and containing potentially dangerous persuasive energies. 
Even amidst the challenge of translation and the weight of its ambition, Pope turns to 
rhetoric and its effects in order to deal with the potentially overwhelming vigor that he 
finds in the original text. For Pope, translation prompts rhetorical theory when he turns to 
his evaluation of Homer‘s configuration of persuasion. Of course, Homer lived and wrote 
in an age before the advent of rhetorique, both as a term and a discipline.
415
 Rhetoric did 
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not operate as a trade, an ethos, or a pedagogy in the same sense that it would in the fifth-
century Athenian world of Plato and the Sophists and, later, Aristotle. In Homer, 
persuasion appears not at the behest of any theory, but as a coercive and often amoral 
means of gaining what one wants when one wants it. What makes oral scenes so fertile 
for scholarly attention is that Homer avoids the abstract and presents the persuasive 
moment as a purely narrative act. Any theorization of rhetoric is submerged in story and 
presented through intense and immediate action. For Homer, rhetorical activity is 
characterized by its violence. The totalizing power that persuasion can have in Homer‘s 
texts prompts Pope to moments of revision and prolonged commentary. 
 The Iliad was a monumental undertaking for Pope, one that he thought would 
ultimately define or discredit him.
 416
  As he would later tell Joseph Spence, the gravity of 
expectations haunted him: 
The Iliad took me up six years; and during that time, and particularly the first part 
of it, I was often under great pain and apprehension. Though I conquered the 
thoughts of it in the day, they would frighten me in the night. I sometimes still 
even dream of being engaged in that translation; and got about half way through 




Pope‘s final translation met with criticism from the usual detractors, such as John 
Dennis.
418
 Also, in an acerbic recognition of what he felt was Pope‘s opportunism and 
lack of antiquarian learning, Richard Bentley reportedly scoffed, ―a pretty poem, Mr. 
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Pope but you must not call it Homer.‖
419
 Brushing aside such antiquarian critiques, 
Samuel Johnson calls it, without irony, ―the noblest version of poetry which the world 
has ever seen.‖
420
 These two extremes reveal the criteria by which Pope‘s Homeric 
translation have been judged. For Johnson, the poem‘s ―nobility‖ exists apart from the 
ambition of classical fidelity that Bentley sees Pope as failing – this makes it merely 
―pretty.‖ Whatever Pope‘s desire to participate in a culture of antiquarian thought, his 
interest in showing his own poetic mastery seems to have triumphed over his desire for a 
faithful translation. However, Pope‘s revisions are not merely poetic. In examining his 
changes and his protracted commentary in footnotes and explanatory essays, it becomes 
clear that he saw aspects of the classical world that challenged his own moral and 
philosophical perspectives.  
 In examining Pope‘s translation, I eschew the more traditional categories of 
discussing classical engagement in the early eighteenth century as ―neoclassical‖ in terms 
of imitation or departure. The problems with this term can be seen in the most relevant 
and influential critical studies of the period. For instance, James William Johnson‘s 
agenda can be seen in the title of his seminal study, The Formation of English Neo-
Classical Thought.
421
 As the title suggests, Johnson historicizes a teleology of neo-
classical thought by isolating a collective engagement with classicism that resulted in a 
specifically Augustan idea of classical literature. Johnson defines the archetypal classicist 
as a ―man who saw within preserved Greco-Roman literature a total and applicable 
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world,‖ whose aims were ―not simply ‗literary‘ but utilitarian.‖
 422
 This suggests an 
engagement beyond mere nostalgia, as it posits an authority that I argue Pope rejects even 
as he clearly wants to operate from a position of classical veneration. Pope provides a 
crucial example of a canonical poet engaging a classicist project but forced to 
discrimination and revision, a far cry from the appropriation that Johnson locates in the 
so-called ―neo-classicist.‖ Readings in the legacy of Johnson, such as those by Howard 
Weinbrot and Joseph Levine, generally follow suit in seeing literature after the sixteenth 
century as invested in a certain kind of classicism that reveals itself it in the creation of an 
emergent nationalistic literature.
423
   
By contrast, I read The Iliad in the context of what Adam Potkay calls ―the 
ongoing tension between the ideals of ancient eloquence and modern manners,‖ and the 
teleology of eighteenth-century literature as one in which can be traced ―a gradual shift 
away from the ideal of eloquence toward one of politeness.‖
424
 As Laura Brown notes, 
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Pope ―makes a classical past out of his own present beliefs.‖
425
 Pope‘s ambition is not to 
do Homer better than Homer could, but to remove what would make the classical world 
unsettling for a modern audience. The Iliad can be seen as an act of what Maynard Mack 
calls ―an act of irradiation of poetry by poetry‖ where ―what emerges is neither narrowly 
Augustan nor uniquely Homeric.‖
426
 Elsewhere, Mack adds, ‖What was barbarous, he 
softened, and what was gross or vulgar he mitigated.‖
427
 Much like the ―art‖ Pope 
describes in An Essay on Man, Homer must be relieved of his excesses. What is 
―barbarous‖ must be expunged and replaced through a complex act of translation. 
 Pope articulates these concerns through what I call ―classical rehabilitation.‖ In 
this reconfiguration, the activity of rehabilitation is often prompted by a contemporary 
aversion to the perception of classical impropriety. Rather than the more authoritarian 
and corrective act of poetic revision, the act of rehabilitation suggests a curative approach 
that concentrates on restoring the body while removing the malady. As I will show, Pope 
clarifies and justifies his role as translator through this paradigm of restoration. Through 
translation, Pope reconfigures both the classical orator and the value of eloquence to 
which such speakers would aspire. Here, Potkay‘s analysis is useful for evaluating the 
peculiar and contradictory attitudes toward classical eloquence. Potkay surveys the texts 
that call for the revival of the eloquence of Cicero and Demosthenes, and finds a lurking 
anxiety about the effects it may cause. For instance, within the emerging discourse of 
politeness, David Hume sees rhetoric as having largely conciliatory aims even as he 
nostalgically recalls the Athenian scene in which the aesthetic object of the oration is to 
be celebrated and revived. In Of Eloquence, Hume‘s eulogy to eloquence is accompanied 
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by a belief that the power of classical oratory is inappropriate for his own contemporary 
scene. The ―blaze of eloquence‖ Hume locates in Demosthenes and Cicero must be 
tempered by ―our modern customs, or our superior good sense.‖
428
 What results in terms 
of persuasive activity in the ―Age of Hume‖ is an endemic plainness that, Potkay notes, 
―seeks to placate or stabilize rather than, as with eloquence, to make things happen.‖
429
  
The conciliatory impulse fits Richard Weaver‘s characterization of the ―neuter‖ rhetoric 
that reframes affective failure as a virtue that can be realized in disinterested discourse, or 
a language notable for its enlightened self-interest and philosophical objectivity. This 
disinterested stance, valorized in the figures of Addison and Steele‘s Mr. Spectator as 
well as Adam Smith‘s moral ideal of the ―impartial spectator,‖ emerges from the vexed 
dialectic that Potkay describes, in which the energy of classical veneration is countered 
by a code of polite manners than must be instilled (ironically) through classical forms.
430
  
 The changes Pope makes are significant in that he creates, like Hume, a kind of 
classicism that is at once edifying and inoffensive. Pope‘s fidelity to the epic narrative 
does not suggest that he has any interest in changing or adapting Homer at the level of 
action. However, Pope finds moral and intellectual aspects of Homer‘s text that must be 
rehabilitated for the eighteenth-century reader. The Homeric world presents Pope with 
startling scenes of energy and passion in the form of an agonistic, warrior ethos that was 
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incompatible with the manners of the age in which he was writing.
 431
 In the lengthy 
explanatory preface to The Iliad, Pope reflects on this passion: 
Our author's work is a wild paradise, where, if we cannot see all the beauties so 
distinctly as in an ordered garden, it is only because the number of them is 
infinitely greater. It is like a copious nursery, which contains the seeds and first 
productions of every kind, out of which those who followed him have but selected 
some particular plants, each according to his fancy, to cultivate and beautify. If 
some things are too luxuriant it is owing to the richness of the soil; and if others 
are not arrived to perfection or maturity, it is only because they are overrun and 




Pope sets in motion a number of oppositions that must be managed in the challenge of 
classical rehabilitation. Just as the ―great‖ contrasts with the ―judicious,‖ the vehemence 
of the ―wild paradise‖ is countered by the ―ordered garden‖ in which beauty might be 
distinctly seen.  Pope must cultivate and prune that garden of its primitive excesses. 
Through these gardening metaphors, Pope gives himself license to celebrate the 
―richness‖ of the soil while seeing a garden overrun with powerful narrative and 
linguistic ―weeds‖ that must be trimmed, pulled, or transformed into the flowers that they 
clearly could have been. ―Pure and noble simplicity‖ and an abundant ―poetic fire‖ are 
corrupted by the excesses of an uneven growth. Later in the preface, Pope notes that these 
concerns are both poetical and moral: 
But after all, it is with great parts, as with great virtues, they naturally border on 
some imperfection; and it is often hard to distinguish exactly where the virtue 
ends, or the fault begins. As prudence may sometimes sink to suspicion, so may a 
great judgment decline to coldness; and as magnanimity may run up to profusion 
or extravagance, so may a great invention to redundancy or wildness. If we look 
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upon Homer in this view, we shall perceive the chief objections against him to 




He uses careful language to challenge the value of the moral virtues that are both 
intended by and can be extrapolated from Homer. In particular, Pope‘s consistent use of 
the conditional ―may‖ shows his concern with offending and countering an orthodox 
classical position. Pope shares the ―objections,‖ even if he interprets the ―excess‖ as 
coming from a noble cause. Homer‘s virtues ―border on some imperfection‖ without 
overrunning those borders completely. Pope‘s task then is to contain those energies, to 
renovate them where necessary, while still maintaining the ―spirit‖ that makes Homer 
endure.  
His task falls uneasily between anachronism and fidelity, yet it underwrites all the 
principles he will apply to the translation. This is where Pope‘s most notable act of poetic 
―irradiation‖ occurs; in the gauging of the potential for magnanimity to become 
extravagance, the careless translator can only further steer the Homeric vision toward 
excess. Pope must manage that extravagance even as he keeps alive the ―great virtues‖ 
and originary ―richness.‖ Though the ―wildness‖ of the text must be preserved in some 
form, Pope makes clear that he is going to rehabilitate the classical text, to qualify and 
amend the classical text‘s pre-Christian, pre-modern excesses and conceits, and to give it 
the level of sophistication that he feels it deserves. The ―faults‖ must be removed and the 
―virtues‖ heightened. In his preface, this is the act that Pope symbolizes as turning a 
―wild paradise‖ into an ―order‘d garden.‖ 
 Pope views himself as maintaining an equilibrium between his unique poetic style 
and Homer‘s primitive energy. However, Matthew Arnold finds Pope elevating the 
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former over the latter to awkward effect. In his 1861 lecture ―On Translating Homer,‖ 
Arnold takes Pope‘s intentions at face value and uses them as symptomatic of a general 
error that translators make when approaching classical texts. Arnold criticizes Pope‘s 
translation for ―an artificial evolution of thought and a literary cast of style.‖
434
 At the 
heart of Arnold‘s critique is a conservative reverence for the original text and a critique 
of its corruption at the hands of translators who seek to produce an Iliad more fitting for 
their own age than the one in which it was written. Pope deserves special notice because, 
Arnold argues, he violates the original by placing his immediate cultural and personal 
concerns above the task of translation. Through the enhancement of poetic couplets, for 
instance, Pope replaces rather than restores Homer‘s language. Perhaps most incisively, 
Arnold claims: 
One feels that Homer‘s thought has passed through a literary and rhetorical 
crucible, and come out highly intellectualised; come out in a form which strongly 
impresses us, indeed, but which no longer impresses us in the same way as when 




What exactly does Pope do to Homer? He certainly does not submit to Homer‘s altar, but 
he also clearly expresses a desire for fidelity to preserve the original character of the epic. 
The ―literary and rhetorical crucible‖ invites further qualification that Arnold does not 
make.  In what follows, I consider Arnold‘s allegation literally, in arguing that Pope takes 
the persuasive scenes and characters of the Homeric world and channels them through 
rhetorical sentiments more appropriate to the climate in which Pope lived. Far from 
embracing the classical orator, he follows in the line of Anglican ideologues and 
experimental philosophers who saw themselves as fighting a battle to defend language 
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from the rhetorical excesses that had overtaken it through centuries of disciplinary 
involvement. In a strange contrast to his own often extravagant poetic voice, Pope uses 
The Iliad to elevate plain and purified sentiment above the surface pleasantries of style in 
an even more forceful way. 
Book III of The Iliad contains a scene in which two kinds of oratorical style 
provoke Pope to significant analysis. The captive beauty Helen, wife of the Spartan king 
Menelaus, stands at the walls of Troy with king Priam and a company of nobles. Helen 
offers her captors inside intelligence, identifying the Grecian commanders and describing 
their virtues and deeds. When she sees Odysseus, the Trojan elder Antenor recalls a pre-
war moment when Odysseus and Helen‘s husband Menelaus came to persuade the Trojan 
council to return her, thus avoiding any potential war. In Antenor‘s account, Menelaus 
delivers a brief, lucid, but ultimately unimpressive speech. However, when Odysseus 
rises, Antenor is struck by his strange yet powerful eloquence. What follows is the most 
vivid image of the orator in either of Homer‘s poems. As a point of reference to clarify 
the eventual departures that Pope and his contemporaries would make, here is what might 
be considered the most literal translation of the passage: 
 he would just stand and stare down, eyes fixed on the ground beneath him 
 nor would he gesture with the staff backward and forward, but hold it 
 clutched hard in front of him, like any man who knows nothing. 
 Yes, you would call him a sullen man, and a fool likewise. 
 But when he let the great voice go from his chest, and the words came 
 drifting down like the winter snows, then no mortal 
 man beside could stand up against Odysseus. Then we 
 wondered less beholding Odysseus‘ outward appearance.
436 
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Odysseus‘ speech is paradoxically gentle and overpowering. He captivates his audience 
and causes them to overlook his odd speaking manner and physical inferiority. While 
Odysseus is apparently unsuccessful in his persuasive goal (Helen still remains with her 
captors, obviously), he establishes an ethos through the skill of his performance. Antenor 
remembers Odysseus‘ rhetorical presence even if he does not remember his exact words. 
That presence is brought about through the speech, and contrasts greatly with Antenor‘s 
initial judgment of the ―outward appearance.‖ The empirical image is replaced by the 
more suggestive mental one that Odysseus manufactures for his listeners through his 
performance. Despite his curious and unimpressive manner (he is older and smaller than 
Menelaus), his speech gives him the power to indicate a presence that contrasts with his 
appearance. Odysseus uses words that flow like ―the winter snows,‖ separating him from 
any other mortal. 
 For seventeenth-century translators, whom Pope cites as precedents,
437
 this scene 
is reduced to its most basic description. As Antenor offers little in the way of moral 
commentary, neither do the translators. John Ogilby, for instance, renders the passage to 




 A torrent swift as featherd snow 
 Not any with Ulyffes duft contend 
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 translations. For the issues at stake in such choices, see Phillip Young, The Printed Homer 








In this abbreviated version, Ogilby still conveys the fundamentals of Antenor‘s 
description – Ulysses‘ gesture is strange, but his words are strong. However, Ogilby ends 
by inverting the order of Antenor‘s narration, closing with the strangeness of the gesture 
rather than its transformation through Ulysses‘ oral skill. George Chapman‘s earlier 
translation offers a similar approach. Though noted for his protracted and hyperpoetic 
stylings, Chapman nonetheless summarizes this scene briefly, ―And words that flew 
about our eares like drifts of winter‘s snow, / None thenceforth might contend with him, 
though nought admird for show.‖
440
 These versions share a fidelity to the original in 
briefly describing Ulysses‘ superiority contrasted with his strange appearance, while 
comparing words to falling snow. 
 When Pope turns to this scene, he extends the description longer than his 
predecessors: 
But, when he speaks, what Elocution flows! 
Soft as the Fleeces of descending Snows, 
The copious Accents fall, with easy Art; 
Melting they fall, and sink into the Heart! 
Wondering we hear, and fix‘d in deep Surprize, 
Our Ears refute the Censure of our Eyes. (3.283-88) 
 
Pope‘s revision seems, at first glance, a glowing encomium to the orator and his skills. 
However, his description of the effects of speech inscribes the scene with implications 
upon which neither Homer nor Pope‘s prior translators expounded. These added details 
are significant to Pope‘s vivid portrait of the classical orator. In this depiction, he brings 
in a modern sensibility and casts the scene as a cautionary moment rather than an 
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aesthetic triumph. The connotation of ―Elocution,‖ a word no prior translator uses, is 
highly anachronistic. In Latin, elocution equates to style rather than delivery 
(pronunciato), the context in which Pope utilizes the term. Pope‘s use of the term mirrors 
its contemporaneous usage amongst the figures of the emerging Elocutionary movement 
dedicated to teaching pronunciation and delivery. These speakers and their elocutionary 
texts dominated the rhetorical landscape of the early eighteenth century. The use of 
―elocution‖ is the first sign that Pope is conflating classical and contemporary rhetorical 
sentiments. Ulysses‘ elocution may be ―soft,‖ but it has a potentially damaging effect. 
 In the following couplet, Pope continues to describe Ulysses‘ skill by using 
terminology that characterizes him as modern orator: his ―Accents‖ fall with ―easy Art,‖ 
a term that does not have any clear corollary in Homer‘s Greek. When Pope invokes 
―easy Art‖ here, his connotation recalls the corruptive prospects of art in the Moral 
Essays. After introducing the ―art,‖ he immediately describes its effect through a series of 
illusory images that conclude with sound refuting sight. The words melt and sink, and 
appearance overcomes reality through the vehicle of persuasive speech. It is the kind of 
artifice that Pope argues in the Essay on Man must be ―expunged‖ because of its 
potentially dangerous qualities. In the body of the translation, the language that Pope uses 
to characterize persuasion articulates the specific threat he later repudiates in the Moral 
Essays. 
As I have noted, Pope later makes a satirical target of the elocutionary movement 
for prioritizing and popularizing their culture of flamboyantly empty speaking practices 
through the composite figure of Orator Henley. However, the description of Ulysses 




show rather than substance. Pope maintains the celebration that Antenor intended, but 
includes these striking additions that qualify and refocus the passage toward the orator‘s 
potential for disruption. The final couplet can be read as a kind of chaos, in which 
nothing is as it seems, and meaning and coherence have been disrupted so that the orator 
can control and create an artificial reality to his benefit. He is a representative of what 
Lanham has called the ―rhetorical man‖ who ―is trained not to discover reality but to 
manipulate it.‖
441
 Pope‘s embellishments convert Ulysses from a gifted fluent and 
persuasive speaker to the kind of arch-manipulator Lanham describes. When Antenor 
describes the result of persuasion as ―Our Ears refute the Censure of our Eyes,‖ he 
confirms the transformation that a kairotic application of artifice has occurred. The 
performance dominates the senses and bypasses the reason. By augmenting the simile of 
―fleeces of descending snow,‖ Pope‘s translation reveals the totalizing power of rhetoric 
when exploited by a gifted speaker like Ulysses. 
 However, while Pope breaks precedent with his elongated, anachronistic 
description of Ulysses, his revision of Menelaus is even more telling as it elevates an 
appropriate speech practice over the ―melting‖ words of an ―easy art.‖ When Menelaus 
speaks before Ulysses, Pope‘s translation of Antenor‘s description emphasizes the virtues 
of his plainness: 
 When Atreus‘ Son harangu‘d the list‘ning Train, 
 Just was his Sense, and his Expression plain, 
 His Words succinct, yet full, without a Fault; 
 He spoke no more than just the Thing he ought. (3.275-278) 
 
Unlike Ulysses, Menelaus speaks with clarity and precision. His speech is short and 
―succinct,‖ and does not attempt to overwhelm argument with artifice. In the second 
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couplet, Pope emphasizes the propriety of the speech with the qualifier ―yet full, without 
a Fault.‖ The description reveals that, despite an apparent brevity or simplicity, the 
speech is composed with more attention to substance than to style. Antenor‘s description 
of Ulysses‘ performance focuses on the performance itself – the way the words melt like 
snow and overwhelm the listeners in ostentatious display. When Pope celebrates 
Menelaus‘ ―plain‖ discourse, he evokes the cultural and linguistic ideals that I have 
described in my last chapters. Menelaus achieves the kind of empirical accuracy and 
linguistic decorum that ideologues such as Sprat and Burnet were promoting in scientific 
and preaching texts.  
By valorizing plainness, Pope departs from other translators who use this moment 
to highlight Ulysses‘ fluency against Menelaus‘ coarseness. George Chapman translates 
the scene using language that casts Menelaus as an inarticulate brute: 
And when their counsels and their words, they wove in one, the speech  
Of Atreus sonne was passing loud, small, fast, yet did not reach  
To much; being naturally borne Laconicall: nor would  




In Chapman, Menelaus (here ―Atreus sonne‖) does not speak with faultless clarity, nor 
does Antenor‘s description of him emphasize the virtues of his speech. Rather, the terse 
language Antenor uses to characterize the speech is analogous to Menelaus‘ discourse 
itself: ―loud, small, fast.‖ In a footnote, Chapman writes that the shortness ―maketh even 
with his simple character at all parts – his utterance being noisefull, small or squeaking, 
an excellent pipe for a foole.‖
443
 Figured as inconsequential and unmemorable, it mainly 
sets up the portrayal of Ulysses‘ vocal talent.  
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In his commentary on this passage, Pope directly challenges Chapman and 
explains the choices he makes in presenting Menelaus‘ plainness as a virtue. Even though 
he is engaged with oratory throughout his corpus, Pope makes his longest direct 
statement Pope makes about oral protocols and propriety in this note. In particular, Pope 
frames his commentary as a response to Chapman‘s coding of Menelaus‘ speech as proof 
that he is a ―foole‖: 
Chapman in his Notes on this Place on the second Book, has described Menelaus 
as a Character of Ridicule and Simplicity. He takes advantage from the word 
here made us of, to interpret that of the Shrillness of his Voice, which was 
apply‘d to the Acuteness of his Sense; He observes that this sort of Voice is a 
Mark of a Fool . . . In short, that he was a weak Prince, play‘d upon by others, 
short in Speech, and of a bad Pronunciation, valiant only by fits, and sometimes 
stumbling upon good Matter in his Speeches, as may happen to the most slender 
Capacity. This is one of the Mysteries which that Translator boasts to have found 
in Homer. But as it is no way consistent with the art of the Poet, to draw the 
Person in whose behalf he engages the World, in such a manner as no Regard 
should be conceiv‘d for him; we must endeavour to rescue him from this 
Misrepresentation. First then, the present Passage is taken by Antiquity in general 
to be apply‘d not to his Pronunciation, but his Eloquence. So Ausonius in the 
foregoing Citation, and Cicero de claris Oratoribus: Menelaum ipsum dulcem 
illum quidem tradit Homerus, sed pauca loquentem [Menelaus is a pleasant 
speaker even if he is a man of few words]. And Quintilian. Homerus brevem cum 
animi jucunditate & propriam (id enim est non errare verbis) & carentem 
supervacuis, Eloquentiam Menelao dedit, &c . . . [Homer has attributed to 
Menelaus a style of eloquence agreeably concise, appropriate (for such is the 
quality meant by not mistaking in words), and free from superfluity, and these are 
the merits of our first species of eloquence].
444
 
After summarizing the supposed deficiencies of Menelaus, Pope counters Chapman with 
classical sources that present the scene in a different light. Though Pope is not 
particularly committed to a strict classical agenda, he relies on the writings of antiquity 
here to ―rescue [Menelaus] from this Misrepresentation.‖ Pope then moves to a more 
general discussion of Menelaus‘ virtues before concluding, ―Thus his Character is 
compos‘d of Qualities which give him no uneasy Superiority over others while he wants 
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their Assistance, and mingled with such as make him amiable enough to obtain it.‖
445
 He 
uses Menelaus‘ style as a way of restoring what he sees as Homer‘s true character. With 
the contention that such brevity is eloquent, Pope‘s long defense reframes what Chapman 
views as an affective failure into an appropriate rhetorical protocol. Menelaus is 
characterized by his ―eloquence,‖ even if the speech he gives does not match a 
conventional definition of the term. By invoking Cicero and Quintilian, allusions that 
evaluate Menelaus‘ terseness as positive, Pope uses classical texts to defend 
contemporaneous stylistics. Both describe the style of Menelaus as appropriate for the 
occasion and as an example of a useful, if pithy kind of eloquence. We might assume 
Pope is merely doing the same in reclaiming Menelaus‘ propriety from misguided 
predecessors like Chapman. Yet Pope‘s defense of Menelaus throughout Book III is so 
meticulous that it extends this discussion beyond a simple act of archival commentary. In 
an earlier note that appears at the beginning of Antenor‘s narration, Pope claims that the 
―close Laconick Conciseness of the one, is finely oppos‘d to the copious, vehement, and 
penetrating Oratory of the other.‖
446
 This turns into an extensive celebration of Menelaus.  
Pope refuses to characterize Menelaus with the deficiencies that previous translators 
assign him. If Chapman connects the ―Shrillness of his Voice‖ with ―the Acuteness of his 
sense,‖ Pope‘s critical effort is to ―rescue him from this Misrepresentation.‖ By 
―rescuing‖ him from this caricature, Pope emphasizes that his plainness should not be 
read as uncouth, but as an intentional rhetorical choice that reflects on his integrity and 
prudence.  








In Pope‘s translation, Menelaus‘ speech comes across as a desirable rhetorical 
ideal when contrasted with the overly ornamental words of Ulysses‘, characterized by 
descriptors that stress the artifice he employs. To invert Pope‘s description, Ulysses 
speaks ―more than the Thing he ought.‖ Pope depicts this ―oratory‖ as an ―easy art‖ 
aiming at selfish motives. By emphasizing the premeditated aspects of Ulysses‘ speech, 
Pope reminds his contemporary reader that beneath the surface of a pleasing oratorical 
performance is the sinister ―vehemence‖ that Ulysses‘ manipulates. The ability to make 
words ―soft as the fleeces of descending snow‖ is an ―easy art,‖ a hypnotic artificiality 
that should be distrusted. 
While Menelaus offers one positive model of rhetorical style removed from 
ornamentation and premeditated performance, Pope offers the most productive use of 
rhetoric and its effects through the character of Nestor. In Homer‘s text, Nestor is 
depicted as a wizened, eloquent mentor, whose purposes are often best served in an 
advisorial capacity. Nestor shares the integrity of Menelaus, but brings it to more violent 
scenes that require his calming presence. Further, Nestor‘s persuasive activity allows 
Pope to conceive appropriate rhetorical protocol in the form of an orator whose impulse 
is to quell rather than to incite, who provokes rational thought by dissecting and placating 
passionate impulse. Though he is a seasoned warrior, his old age makes him a liability on 
the battlefield; in Book IX, he is wounded and must be rescued by Ulysses. Nestor‘s gifts 
lie in his remarkable persuasive abilities. In Book I, Nestor first appears as a mediator of 
conflict when he calms the fiery scene that develops from Agamemnon igniting Achilles‘ 
wrath. In the action that stirs the narrative, Agamemnon demands that Achilles return his 




that Athena appears to stop them from killing each other, Nestor responds to the tense 
moment. Chapman‘s translation emphasizes the lucidity of Nestor as ―cunning‖: 
The cunning Pylian Orator; whose tongue powrd foorth a flood  
Of more-then-hony sweet discourse: two ages were increast  
Of diuerse-languag'd men; all borne, in his time, and deceast  
In sacred Pylos, where he reignd, amongst the third-ag'd men:  




Chapman stresses Nestor‘s history and the powers of his ―tongue.‖ However, Pope 
situates the scene within the familiar moral context of the destructive ―passions:‖  
 To calm their passion with the words of age 
 Slow from his seat arose the Pylian sage, 
 Experienced Nestor, in persuasion skill‘d 




These two introductory couplets establish Nestor‘s responsible use of language. Nestor 
intervenes between disputing warriors to calm, rather than to ignite passions. In 
describing the passion that Nestor will calm, Pope reflects on the hard-earned wisdom 
that he will bring to the moment. Unlike Ulysses, who uses language as a means to 
construct alternate realities in order to realize his persuasive ends, Nestor‘s gift lies in 
assuaging and moderating the tensions that those like Ulysses create. Ulysses offers the 
model of the rhetor as provocateur and verbal magician. Even as he is ―slow‖ to rise, he 
emits a calm demeanor that counters the violent animosity of the feuding warriors. 
 Throughout the poem, Nestor exemplifies the pacifying function that Potkay 
locates at the heart of polite rhetorical protocol. While these actions are in the original 
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 .. . and between them Nestor 
 the fair-spoken rose up, the lucid speaker of Pylos 
 from whose lips the stream of words ran sweeter than Honey (1.248-250) 
Pope amends Homer‘s description of Nestor‘s oral grace by adding the qualifying phrase, ―To calm their 




Homeric text, Pope reserves a special ardor for the language and criticism that surround 
Nestor‘s oratorical appearances. When Nestor intervenes in Agamemnon and Achilles‘ 
feud, Pope commends him in a lengthy note: 
The Quarrel having risen to its highest Extravagance, Nestor the wisest and most 
aged Greek is raised to quiet the Princes, whose Speech is therefore fram‘d 
entirely with an opposite Air to all which has been hitherto said, sedate and 
inoffensive. He begins with a soft affectionate Complaint which he opposes to 
their Threats and haughty Language; he reconciles their Attention in an awful 
manner, by putting them in mind that they hear one whom their Fathers and the 
greatest Heroes had heard with deference. He sides with neither, that he might not 
anger any one, while he advises them to the proper Methods of Reconciliation; 
and he appears to side with both while he praises each, that they may be induc‘d 
by the Recollection of another‘s Worth to return to that Amity which would bring 
Success to the Cause . . . and yet that the Eloquence of his Nestor might not be 
thrown out of Character by its proving unavailable, [Homer] takes care that the 





Crucially, Pope adds that Homer invokes Nestor in ―all the great Emergencies of the 
Poem.‖ Nestor is able to bring about change in a way that Ulysses and Menelaus cannot. 
As delineated in this note, Pope finds the ideal of Nestor‘s eloquence in his ability to 
reconcile rather than animate. He combats ―threats and haughty language‖ with affection 
and sensibility. In addressing the violence between Agamemnon and Achilles, he reminds 
them of their mutual respect for each other and appeals to transcendent virtues. As the 
final line of the above passage reveals, he is a manager of disputes.  
 In the speech that follows his intervention, Nestor emphasizes his role as resolver 
of conflicts by recalling a history in which his rational language played a crucial role. He 
reminds the feuding warriors and the audience who watches them of the company he kept 
amongst ―the Godlike Race of Heroes once I knew‖ (I.345). As a companion of these 
more prudent warriors, Nestor claims, ―with these soft, persuasive arts I sway‘d / When 
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Nestor spoke, they listen‘d and obey‘d‖ (I.358-59).  Again, the adjective of ―soft‖ is 
Pope‘s addition; it has no parallel sentiment in Homer. In his reconception of the classical 
scene, ―soft‖ persuasion is the best kind. Rather than compelling to action, it halts 
commotion that could grow more dangerous, serving as an alternative to the problems 
posed by the agonistic epithets that Achilles and Agamemnon shout at each other. 
 Nestor‘s valor lies in his ability to intervene with ―softness‖ amongst violent 
words. As his fellow warriors are quick to use aggressive speeches or rhetorical gestures, 
Nestor reacts with rational language. In Book II, Nestor‘s services become necessary 
again to remedy the wrongs of a colossally misguided speech given by Agamemnon. In a 
shrewd act of manipulation, Agamemnon exhorts his soldiers to return to their homes 
rather than continue to fight an unwinnable war. Pope describes the speech in terms of the 
premeditated ―art‖ Agamemnon uses to plan this rhetorical strategy. The speech ―lab‘r[s] 
in his artful breast‖ (II.66) until he stands before his army and ―artful thus pronounc‘d the 
speech designed‖ (II.137). He produces an oration that emphasizes their weakness when 
facing the fate of the gods. Because they are weary of an already prolonged war, the 
soldiers do not fall for Agamemnon‘s tricks and retreat to their ships. Once again, Nestor 
must intervene with calm words to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation. Pope 
describes Nestor as possessing a ―Gravity‖ that ―covers and strengths the other‘s 
Arguments‖ (146). Nestor‘s restraining practicality counters an energy that threatens to 
move its listeners to immediate regrettable action. In his attempt to marshal the volatile 
and emotive power of persuasive speech, Agamemnon brings about a climate of 
confusion and hostility. In response, Nestor tells his listeners to ignore the artfully 




opening gesture, he commands, ―These vain debates forbear‖ (II.402), characterizing 
both the effort of this speech and his rhetorical motives more generally. The unproductive 
arguments keep them from serving a higher duty: ―While useless Words consume th‘ 
unactive Hours, / No wonder Troy so long resists our Pow‘rs‖ (II.409-10). After further 
stressing their obligation to king and country, Nestor closes by suggesting that the 
invading troops be organized by tribe and nation to ensure a patriotic and militaristic 
unity. This practical directive steers the climate from words to action, from unproductive 
argument to strategic action. Fittingly, Nestor‘s speech about the problematic potential of 
speeches effectively settles the tensions. As Pope notes in his commentary, Nestor 
opposes ―Threats and haughty language‖ with ―proper Methods of Reconciliation‖ so that 
the ―Violence with which the Dispute was manag‘d should abate immediately upon his 
speaking‖ (104). In so doing, Nestor annuls the negative effects that Agamemnon‘s 
rhetorical misfire provokes. 
Much like the goal that Pope establishes in his preface for his role as a translator, 
Nestor‘s aim is to contain and calm the energy that threatens to prevail. Through his 
irenic presence, he vocalizes a prudence that Pope uses his translation to increase and 
clarify. In the ―rhetorical crucible‖ that Arnold sees the spirit of Homer traveling through 
and coming out ―intellectualized,‖ Pope qualifies a violent argumentation and the 
animosity that could ensue by valorizing Nestor‘s more modest and productive goals. 
Pope‘s extensive commentary reveals his critical attention to these orators and 
their potential effects. Concerned with Ulysses‘ ability to replace one reality with another 
through ―melting‖ words, Pope makes a detailed case for the unadorned and 




inherent violence of Agamemnon‘s language. As we will see, when epic turns to mock-
epic, Pope restages this conciliatory ideal for a comic effect. In the genteel world of The 
Rape of the Lock, he wonders whether those effects are possible at all. In The Iliad, the 
persuasive moment is a vexed one. If it offers the potential for positive change, it does 
not fulfill that potential. If it is the product of artful composition, its impulses are to be 
distrusted. For Pope, rhetoric is bound in a dense and indiscernible matrix of intention 
and effect. Even as Ulysses‘ performance is magnificent, Pope elaborates on the 
disruptive potential of that performance through suggestive phrasing and critical 
commentary. As a translator, Pope manages these tensions through acts of commentary, 
qualification, and rehabilitation.  In the epic absurdity of The Rape of the Lock, Pope 
engages in further acts of isolation and containment for the power of speech. The best 
way to render a persuasive attempt innocuous is to place it in the mouth of a speaker 
whose speech falls on deaf ears. The continuing revisions of The Rape of the Lock offer 
Pope opportunities to expand and exaggerate affective failure.  
“Restore the Lock!”: The Rape of the Lock and the Efficacy of Rhetoric 
As I have shown, as rhetoric prompts revision, Pope channels the classical moment 
through contemporary ideals. In The Rape of the Lock, he conveys a contemporary 
moment in classical terms, turning a drawing room practical joke into a mock-epic 
scenario. The violent efficiency of the titular activity of the poem – the severing of 
Belinda‘s lock – stands in stark contrast to the many persuasive speakers who have no 
effect on their audience. The presentation of these failed persuasive speeches allows Pope 
to privilege his own aesthetic ideal over the one that rhetoric offers. Tita Chico has 




and rakes, but between Pope‘s belief in the superiority of his poetry against the ―art‖ of 
cosmetics.
450
 Comparable to the ―aesthetic rivalry‖ in which poetry endures while 
cosmetics fade, we might consider a similar battle between the written and the spoken 
word. This conflict is most apparent in a key moment in which ―airy‖ Belinda ignores the 
earnest spoken advice of Ariel as soon as she eyes a ―billet-doux‖ that offers her 
titillating possibilities (I.118). However, when we consider Pope‘s ambitions for the 
poem as he stated them in letters and other material that circulated with the poem, it 
becomes clear that he wonders about the persuasive potential of both writing and speech.   
 The earliest two-canto version of The Rape of the Lock was an immediate success 
in its covert publication in 1712. It was ―the talk of the town,‖
451
 and while its success did 
much to enhance Pope‘s fast-growing reputation, the poem was taken as an affront by its 
barely concealed subjects.
452
 As Pope based the poem on a real situation, the ―snipping‖ 
committed by Lord Petre on Arabella Fermor, the subjects were not happy seeing 
themselves even in this playful satire. In 1714, Pope expanded the poem to include the 
epic machinery of the sylphs and the war-like game of ombre. Affixed to the 1714 
publication was an open letter to Arabella Fermor in which Pope apologizes for the 
unintended shame she felt it had brought her. The letter is often read as part of the 
satirical project, particularly in its gentle mockery of its subject‘s offense at such a 
trifle.
453
 We might still imagine Pope and his circle snickering at the satirical necessity of 
its inclusion even as Arabella and her entourage read it in earnest. However, the letter 
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 Christina Knellwolf claims, ―The joke of dedication appears to be that only a woman would be gullible 






 To Arabella, Belinda is meant to ―resembl[e] you in 
nothing but beauty.‖
455
 In the letter, Pope states that he only intended to ameliorate the 
tensions between the Petre and the Fermor families by making light of the event that 
caused them. He contendss that his intentions were and are (in the wake of this revised 
version) nothing but noble. The success of the poem, he claims, baffles him: ―as it was 
communicated with Air of a Secret, it soon founds it Way into the World.‖
456
 
Interestingly, Pope uses the surprising reception of his own poem to symbolize the 
slippery nature of the written utterance, as well as the lack of control its author has after it 
is published. This clearly has a euphemistic quality; Pope likely suspected and hoped that 
poem would be popular and made continual revisions to capitalize on that popularity.
457
  
Whatever the case, the affixed letter at least offers the façade of conciliation. Pope 
later told Spence that he was prompted by John Caryll to poeticize the event in the hope 
that by representing the scenario in a playful way, he could ―make a jest of it, and laugh 
them together again.‖
458
 In this recounting, his intentions were ameliorative even if the 
effect was nothing of the sort. If the poem aims to assuage the tensions resulting from a 
conflict Pope only heard about, then the letter to Arabella attempts to alleviate the 
animosities and embarrassments the poem caused.  According to the letters to the 
Fermors and to Caryll, he sees a tense social moment that can be resolved by stepping 
back and examining the situation rationally. Therefore, the Rape can be read as having a 
similar interventional purpose as Nestor in the Iliad: aiming to calm selfish passions with 
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rational argument. As Nestor stood between the feuding Agamemnon and Achilles, and 
attempted to redirect the violence to rational discussion, Pope moves to diffuse the 
tensions by ―laugh[ing] them together.‖ Even if the sincerity is undercut by his pervasive 
wit, the impetus of intercession is the same. Pope presents himself as wanting to calm the 
hostility first between his veiled subjects, and next between those subjects and himself. 
As a direct address, the letter to Arabella attempts to persuade toward conciliation, both 
with Lord Petre and Pope. 
 In the poem, orators surround and amplify the success of the central ―rape,‖ 
emphasizing the Baron‘s violent success alongside the failures of rhetorical activity.  In 
the first two cantos, Ariel delivers two warnings that are ignored. As Belinda wakes, he 
expresses a lengthy speech impelling her to avoid falling victim to the ―gay ideas [that] 
crowd the vacant Brain‖ (I.83). Ariel concludes, ―Beware of all, but most beware of 
Man!‖ (I.114). Ariel serves as a representative figure for an intense system of moderation 
that is necessary to avoid the excesses of culture and commodity: 
Know farther yet; Whoever fair and chaste 
Rejects Mankind, is by some Sylph embrac'd: 
For Spirits, freed from mortal Laws, with ease 
Assume what Sexes and what Shapes they please. 
What guards the Purity of melting Maids, 
In Courtly Balls, and Midnight Masquerades, 
Safe from the treach'rous Friend, and daring Spark, 
The Glance by Day, the Whisper in the Dark; 
When kind Occasion prompts their warm Desires, 
When Musick softens, and when Dancing fires? 
'Tis but their Sylph, the wise Celestials know, 
Tho' Honour is the Word with Men below. (I.68-78) 
 
The epic machinery is suggestive of all the acts required to ―guard the Purity of melting 
Maids‖ when the young women are surrounded by forces that aim to corrupt them. 




guardian of the ideals of chastity and purity. As Ariel explains, the ethereal sylph is 
synonymous with the abstraction of the ―honour‖ characterized by ―men below‖ that 
results from their unseen protection. Whether through the magical presence of the sylph 
or through the system of control and protection he describes, Ariel‘s directives serve as 
the kind of moral instruction needed to resist the compulsions that lead to Belinda‘s 
humiliation. Much to his consternation, all of Ariel‘s moral proscriptions are ignored. 
Pope does not waste much poetic space on Belinda‘s deliberation over this solemn 
warning. Upon waking, Belinda sees a ―billet-doux‖ and ―all the Vision vanish‘d from 
thy Head‖ (I.119-20). Ariel‘s counsel foreshadows the events of the narrative, in which 
―gay ideas‖ and the dangers of a self-interested man lead to Belinda‘s tragic 
embarrassment. Ignoring the high-minded lecture, Belinda is swayed by ―wounds, 
charms, and letters‖ of the billet-doux. Ariel possesses an intense loyalty to Belinda and 
advocates the pursuit of a higher virtue that should animate all human action. However, 
Belinda ignores the oral advice for the more titillating aspects of the written. In the next 
verse paragraph, she further replaces Ariel‘s vision of self-moderation with a more 
powerful visualization of self-importance when she steps into the toilet to glance at her 
own ―heav‘nly image in the Glass‖ (I.125). Ariel‘s speech is eloquent, poetic, and full of 
moral dicta that any principled reader should follow. That Belinda immediately ignores 
this advice emphasizes not the mediocrity of Ariel‘s attempt, but the futility of oratory 
itself on such genteel audiences as Belinda who can so quickly turn to more enticing 
options. Ariel valorizes the abstract while Belinda is driven to the glistening yet empty 




Ariel alludes to a power that romantic language can hold when wielded by an 
effective user: 
 What tender Maid but must a Victim fall 
 To one Man‘s Treat, but for another‘s Ball? 
 When Florio speaks, what Virgin could withstand, 
 If gentle Damon did not squeeze her Hand. (I.95-98) 
 
When Pope refers to the conflict of Florio, he most obviously alludes to a conflict 
between two caricatured gentlemen for the hand of the ―tender Maid.‖
459
  However, Pope 
also relies on a double-meaning apparent in the homonymic quality of ―Damon‖ and 
―Daemon.‖
460 
If we read the line as two lovers competing for the maid‘s hand, Ariel‘s 
advice suggests going from one negative prospect to another, as both fall firmly in the 
category of suspicious and dangerous men. In that sense, ―gentle‖ is clearly meant as a 
seductive gesture, perhaps referring to a male suitor possessing a feminine softness. 
However, the homonym offers the alternative to understand the ―gentle Da[e]mon‖ as 
serving Ariel‘s function in assisting the virgin from resisting the alluring words of Florio. 
Like a Platonic Daemon,
461
 the sylph helps fortify the defenses against seductive 
language. Unfortunately, as the poem will vividly reveal, the sylphs‘ ethereal nature 
limits their ability to intervene. When a sylph tries to throw itself between the scissors to 
prevent the cutting of the lock, it is ―cut . . . in twain‖ (III.151). However, in the scenario 
between Florio and the gentle ―Damon,‖ the presence of the moderating impulse 
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successfully wards off the scheming suitor whose words would otherwise be 
overwhelmingly forceful. Florio‘s speech requires the temperate response that the sylph 
personifies. The opening canto establishes a paradigm of rhetorical response that the rest 
of the poem will restage. In Canto II, Ariel rallies his sylphs to arm themselves against 
those ―black Omens [that] threat the brightest Fair / That e‘er deserv‘d a watchful Spirit‘s 
care‖ (II.101-102). Though Ariel‘s command is strong and his words reflect his profound 
sense of duty, this effort will only end in the failure of defend against the ―rape.‖  
Throughout the poem, Pope calls attention to the ―Force of Female Lungs‖ only to 
characterize that force by its boisterous futility (IV.84). After the ―rape,‖ the choleric 
Thalestris attempts to characterize the injustice of the event through a passionate 
invective. However, Thalestris also admits her own ultimate powerlessness. Thalestris‘ 
goals are to defend Belinda and compensate for this injustice. However, she recognizes 
that in mending the lock, she primarily aims to restore Belinda‘s reputation. Since the 
lock cannot be restored through any physical or rhetorical action, Thalestris recognizes 
her own incapacity: 
 Already hear the horrid things they say, 
 Already see you a degraded Toast, 
 And all your Honour in a Whisper lost! 
 How shall I, then, your helpless Fame defend? (IV.106-110) 
 
The first three lines of this passage assert the toxic effects of speech, in the form of 
gossipy whisperers who will rearticulate this story in the most corruptive fashion. 
Thalestris recognizes that her ceremonial speech is helpless against another form of oral 
persuasion, the persuasive whispers that will destroy Belinda‘s ―Honour.‖ Belinda‘s 
already-tattered reputation will become further tainted through the destructive and 




anger, Thalestris cannot vindicate Belinda from the court of public opinion. The final 
rhetorical question has a resigned tone. The lines that follow emphasize the losing battle 
that language alone can fight. The only possible alternative is the physical restoration of 
the lock, which leads Thalestris to implore the Baron to return it. Unmoved, the Baron 
refuses. 
 Thalestris calls attention to the impotence of both the orator and the redemptive 
rhetoric she might attempt. She succeeds only in fanning the flames of Belinda‘s anger. 
Interestingly, this unintended effect is comparable to Pope‘s description of the result of 
his poem in the letter to Arabella. Pope‘s self-described ambition is to remedy the 
embarrassment he has inadvertently aggravated. In the poem, the Baron‘s response 
characterizes the dual effort of Pope‘s announced poetic ambition and Thalestris‘ attempt 
at restoring Belinda‘s name: ―It grieves me much (reply‘d the Peer again) / Who speaks 
so well shou‘d speak in vain‖ (IV.131-32). Realizing that she is incapable of restoring 
Belinda‘s reputation, she provokes her entourage instead to turn to the impossible: the 
restoration of the lock. Until this point, persuasive speech has been considered a potential 
catalyst for change and restoration but shown to be inadequate. When Clarissa appears, 
she is the embodiment of this inefficacy. 
 In 1717, Pope released what would be the most familiar version of the poetic text, 
though later editions included additional explanatory footnotes and introductory material. 
While previous versions included a character named ―Clarissa,‖ whose function is largely 
to provide the instrument for the ―Rape,‖ the 1717 poem gave Clarissa a lengthy speech 




the Poem, in a parody of the speech of Sarpedon to Glaucus in Homer.‖
 462
 In case that 
moral was not clear in the original two canto version – and apparently it was not, much to 
Pope‘s consternation – this latest version made it inescapable. Pope gradually expanded 
the moral and social significance just as he incrementally increased the presence of 
Clarissa. By voicing this moral through a character who is duplicitous, Pope seemingly 
undercuts the seriousness with which it is supposed to be taken. In addition to serving the 
didactic moral, Clarissa‘s narrative purpose as a speaker is to intervene between hostile 
combatants. Compared to Nestor in The Iliad, Clarissa would seemingly exemplify a 
noble purpose, as does the content of her speech which calls for moral correction and the 
elevation of merit over appearance. However, it ultimately proves to be consistent with 
the rest of the persuasive speeches in the poem insofar as it fails to bring about its 
intended effect. Her speech is immediately ignored and forgotten, only serving to 
interrupt the narrative. 
As Pope explains in the footnote, Clarissa‘s oration is modeled on Sarpedon‘s 
plea to Glaucus. In 1709, Pope translated Sarpedon‘s activity (which spans the twelfth 
and sixteenth books of The Iliad) and grouped it together as The Episode of Sarpedon.
463
 
Contending that their ―extended reign‖ as privileged warriors and members of Trojan 
society requires ―Deeds transcending our command‖ (27, 40), Sarpedon incites Glaucus 
to second him in retaliating against the Greeks, even though their deaths might result, 
linking their social and physical advantage as heroes to the responsibility they have to 
deserve their reputation. They must ―give to Fame what we to Nature owe‖ (50). 
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Sarpedon urges an obligation to making appearance and reality meet, for heroic 
presentation to be enacted through heroic action. As Pope notes in the epic ―Argument‖ 
that precedes the translation, this is an ―admirable Speech.‖ The translation emphasizes 
Glaucus‘ immediate positive response: ―His Words the list‘ning Chief inspire / With 
equal Warmth, and rouse the Warrior‘s Fire‖ (53-54). Sarpedon successfully gives life to 
the abstraction of honor to provoke virtuous action. The effectiveness of the speech is 
realized instantaneously, a stark contrast to Clarissa‘s oration. Clarissa clearly views 
herself as a reformer whose task is to maintain the distinctions of a sociable and 
aristocratic culture while remedying some of what she perceives as its most misguided 
values. Mirroring Sarpedon, she urges a shift from aristocratic vanity to a responsible 
humility occasioned by rank. Even if Clarissa‘s virtue is questionable, the speech she 
gives vividly and plainly articulates the opposition between ornamentation and simplicity 
that Pope repeatedly stages. However, it is useful to remember that when Pope removes 
Sarpedon‘s speech from the narrative of The Iliad to be a stand-alone translation, he does 
so to preserve the moral imperatives. When Pope uses Sarpedon‘s model as a moral for 
the Rape of the Lock, he does something quite the opposite. He adds a valuable moral to a 
narrative in which no moral is otherwise present.
 464
 If Pope wanted the moral to be taken 
seriously, why would he put it in the mouth of Clarissa? And if he would ventriloquize 
the moral through the prudish, ―grave‖ Clarissa, why even include it all? 
Clarissa‘s role has generated interesting critical accounts of her function and 
Pope‘s reason for her late inclusion. The speech is often viewed as transformative 
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because it offers moral clarity in the form of a challenge to both the fictional listeners of 
the poem and the genteel culture they are meant to represent.
465
 This reading is 
perplexing given Clarissa‘s inability to move any of her listeners even slightly. Yet these 
analyses underscore the positive moral value of the speech regardless of its reception. 
From this perspective, the vitality of Clarissa‘s message transcends its frivolous setting, 
suggesting that the reader affirms what Pope‘s aristocrats ignore. Though Clarissa issues 
a sharp challenge to the combatants, the only effect of the speech is to emphasize her 
prudishness. If Clarissa is a critic, she serves as one only in the sense that her critiques 
focus attention on her own failures. John Trimble argues that Clarissa‘s prudish nature 
―complicates and enriches‖ the moral she conveys because ―she is as blind to her own 
vanity as she is aware of it in others.‖
466
 For Trimble, Clarissa is ―the poem‘s only 
character with a brain.‖
467
 Ellen Pollak convincingly locates the central conflict of the 
poem not between the Baron and Belinda, but between Belinda and Clarissa, or ―the twin 
freaks of coquette and prude.‖
468
 As Pollak claims, every move Clarissa makes is to 
ingratiate herself with the Baron, as the ―two-edged weapon‖ of the scissors is equivalent 
to the powers of speech she attempts to use to put Belinda in her place.
469
 In their 
conferral of agency and intelligence on Clarissa, Trimble and Pollack still do not account 
for the swiftness with which her entreaty is rejected. Thomas Woodman sees Clarissa‘s 
speech as opposing an ideal politeness to the ostentatious behavior of her companions, 
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and thus the failure of her speech shows the inability of vain socialites to evaluate 
themselves and their behavior.
470
 These readings emphasize Clarissa‘s representation of 
virtue amongst a culture of excess even as they undermine on her as a deliverer of these 
values. Even if she has little effect on her immediate listeners, the moral of the poem is 
not to be rejected by the discerning reader.  
This critical attention emphasizes the complexity of both Clarissa‘s failure within 
the narrative as well as the strange degree to which Pope subverts his own didactic 
purpose by placing it in the voice of a character who will be immediately ignored. The 
violent potential that Pollak locates in Clarissa‘s linked verbal and physical assault is 
undercut by the inefficacy that Woodman recognizes. Further, her moral authority is 
undermined by her participation in the Baron‘s activity that stems from her petty rivalry 
with Belinda. If Clarissa is a reformer, she is not a very good one; if she is the poem‘s 
most intelligent character, she is still blind to her own excesses that she condemns in 
others. Clarissa‘s effect, like Nestor‘s in the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles, 
is not only to referee the violent moment, but also to restore an earlier honor by recalling 
the guiding virtues that were obeyed and modeled. By calling attention to the decadent 
present, both rhetors nostalgically evoke the past. Like Nestor, Clarissa aims for 
conciliation and to elevate the culture beyond its starkly agonistic impulses.  
Within the context of the narrative, the ambition of Clarissa‘s speech is 
remarkable. While her companions complain about social niceties, Clarissa presents a 
restorative vision: she  apparently wants nothing less than for this moment to serve as the 
beginning of a cultural shift from the ostentatious and the trivial to more fundamental 
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virtues outside of contemporary social practice. Clarissa‘s entry is preceded by scenes in 
which persuasive speech has mixed effects. The fourth canto ends with Belinda 
lamenting her newly deprived state. The fifth Canto opens with ―the pitying Audience 
melting in tears‖ (V.1) in response. However, the primary audience, the Baron, is 
unmoved. His ears are ―stopp‘d‖ by ―Fate and Jove” (V.2). In the action of this opening 
couplet, the affective reaction of Belinda‘s sympathetic audience, especially Thalestris, is 
balanced by a more significant non-response by the Baron, the only one with the power to 
resolve the grief. Thalestris repeats her recognition of the inability for language to 
remedy the situation when she asks, ―For who can move when fair Belinda fails?‖ (4) 
Finally, Clarissa rises to speak. She makes a dramatic physical gesture in waving her fan 
to quiet the clamors. Pope immediately establishes Clarissa as a ―grave‖ orator giving a 
speech before a captive audience (7). She moves from appearance to reality and 
concludes by reiterating the conflict between the two. She declares, 
Say, why are Beauties prais'd and honour'd most, 
The wise Man's Passion, and the vain Man's Toast? 
Why deck'd with all that Land and Sea afford, 
Why Angels call'd, and Angel-like ador'd? 
Why round our Coaches crowd the white-glov'd Beaus, 
Why bows the Side-box from its inmost Rows? 
How vain are all these Glories, all our Pains, 
Unless good Sense preserve what Beauty gains: 
That Men may say, when we the Front-box grace, 
Behold the first in Virtue, as in Face! 
Oh! if to dance all Night, and dress all Day, 
Charm'd the Small-pox, or chas'd old Age away; 
Who would not scorn what Huswife's Cares produce, 
Or who would learn one earthly Thing of Use? 
To patch, nay ogle, might become a Saint, 
Nor could it sure be such a Sin to paint. 
But since, alas! frail Beauty must decay, 
Curl'd or uncurl'd, since Locks will turn to grey, 
Since paint'd, or not paint'd, all shall fade, 




What then remains, but well our Pow'r to use, 
And keep good Humour still whate'er we lose? 
And trust me, Dear! good Humour can prevail, 
When Airs, and Flights, and Screams, and Scolding fail. 
Beauties in vain their pretty Eyes may roll; 
Charms strike the Sight, but Merit wins the Soul (V. 8-34) 
 
In the opening lines, Clarissa uses rhetoric to attack rhetoric, noting that occasions for 
ceremonial speech often lead to a celebration of false virtues or vain appearance. Physical 
beauty, even attained through artificial means, is elevated through ―The wise Man‘s 
Passion, and the vain Man‘s Toast.‖ Clarissa shows the obvious degree to which all men 
are taken by physical appearance, but puts it in the specifically oral terms of the ―Toast‖ 
(V.10). The toast represents the kind of ceremonial rhetoric that is used only to celebrate 
ceremony itself, or outward appearances that reveal nothing about the lurking character 
or virtue or lack thereof.  
She contradicts appropriate oral celebrations of artificially-achieved beauty 
(―Why Angels call‘d, and Angel-like ador‘d?‖ [V.12]) with celebrations of virtue (―That 
Men say, when we the Front-box grace, /  Behold the first in Virtue as in Face‖ [V.17-
18]). Moving from the ―angel-like‖ to the clearly virtuous allows Clarissa to shift from 
the contemporaneous vogue for beauty found in rhetorical and poetic celebrations to an 
ideal language that elevates action and character above appearance. The structure of this 
initial section establishes the vain focus of the genteel world, echoing the actions that 
Pope has just narrated. After introducing ―Virtue,‖ Clarissa more openly attacks the 
perception of beauty. By noting its finite quality and the artificial means with which it is 
attained, her oration itself is like removing the powder from what the poetic voice earlier 




deconstruct and lay bare the ―frail Beauty‖ that obsesses the culture to which she belongs 
(V.25). Unlike Sarpedon‘s exhortation, this effort to level distinction happens at a 
physical rather than a social level. Her stated interest is to refine genteel behavior within 
firmly established boundaries, not to demolish those standards for inclusion. 
In her final four lines, Clarissa imagines a future not only for her sentiment, but 
also for herself and her speech. Her grand optimism that ―good Humour can prevail‖ 
comes in spite of the excess that surrounds her. In the ―Screams‖ and ―Scolds,‖ she again 
points to the unproductive speaking that threatens to further corrupt.  The last couplet 
finalizes the move from appearance to reality, from charm to merit, and from vain 
rhetoric to true sentiment. The emphatic shift of the final line from sight to the soul 
prepares the auditors for the grounds on which the speech should be judged. 
 Just as in the precedent by Sarpedon, the response to Clarissa‘s oration is 
immediate. Yet where Glaucus is inspired, Clarissa‘s audience views her effort as wasted 
energy. Pope has his characters immediately dismiss the moral that has become 
increasingly explicit over the course of five years of revisions. The response is limited to 
a couplet: ―So spoke the Dame, but no Applause ensued; / Belinda frown‘d, Thalestris 
call‘d her Prude‖ (35-36). In addition, the reader of the poem has seen Clarissa‘s 
complicity in the ―Rape‖ and can easily cast her as a hypocrite. A footnote affixed to the 
1736 edition again calls attention to the classical contrast: ―It is a verse frequently 
repeated in Homer after any speech, So spoke – and all the Heroes applauded” 
(II.199).
471
 As the note delineates the epic parallels of this poem, mockingly comparing 
Homeric heroes with the ―toyshop‖ participants, it also unfavorably compares the 
response to Clarissa‘s speech with Homer‘s auditors.  
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 Pope consistently presents the inability for language to bring about favorable ends 
for any of the characters. It cannot mend Belinda‘s reputation, nor can it repair her 
damaged beauty. As the poem draws to a close, Belinda‘s frustration leads to a final oral 
attempt to remedy the grievances committed against her. Unlike Clarissa, Belinda does 
not connect injustice with the culture around her, but myopically focuses only on her own 
survival (―ah let me still survive‖) and disrepute. In this crescendo of Belinda‘s anger and 
desolation, Pope characterizes her response as a failed speech act: 
 Restore the Lock! she cries; and all around 
 Restore the Lock! the vaulted Roofs rebound. 
 Not fierce Othello in so loud a Strain 
 Roar‘d for the Handkerchief that caus‘d his Pain. (V.103-107) 
 
In this last vocal moment of grief and indignation, Belinda looks only to the past. She 
cannot share Clarissa‘s vision to use the incident as an impulse to change. She remains 
defiant that the only salvation can come through an impossible restoration. That Pope 
compares her to the famous tragic fate of Othello signifies and foreshadows a similar 
doom. In J.L. Austin‘s terms, Belinda‘s statement is an illocutionary act that fails.
472
 
Because Pope notes the immediate lack of response to each of the speeches – Ariel‘s 
warning, Thalestris‘ appeal, Clarissa‘s didactic oration, and now Belinda‘s plea – they 
can all be characterized by Austin‘s description of ineffective performatives that are 
defined by a lack of a desired reaction. Because the request is so strongly worded, it 
emphasizes the failure that follows. Of all the speeches, Belinda‘s closing cry is the most 
deafening and passionate of them all, even as it shares a similar futility. It has no effect in 
the reality of the poem, where her lock remains detached, nor for the reader who knows 
Belinda‘s desire will not be satisfied. Only the poet can give the lock meaning by 
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imagining its future in the heavens, an unlikely fate,  where ―mid‘st the Stars inscribe 
Belinda‘s name!‖ (V.150) 
The re-envisioning of the epic, albeit in a ―mock‖ form, in The Rape of the Lock is 
one in which successful rhetoric has no place. In his explicit contrast with the affective 
and effective persuasion of The Iliad, even the most thoughtfully composed and morally 
admirable speeches have, at best, limited effects. These stand in sharp contrast to the 
violent accomplishment of the Baron, which leads to drastic ramifications. If the physical 
act of  the ―rape‖ acts as the centerpiece of the poem, it is surrounded by moments when 
speech fails to bring out its intended effect. These frustrated efforts heighten the violence 
of the Baron‘s action while emphasizing the impossibility of its remedy. In conjunction 
with the specific moral and social purpose that Pope uses the inclusions of the revisions 
to clarify, Pope casts the failure of rhetoric in the personal terms he uses the letter to 
Arabella to establish. The addition of Clarissa and her moral purpose, much like that 
letter, is an attempt to give purpose to the frivolity and to assuage the tensions that the 
poetic missive had caused. Even if its tone is satirical, the affixed letter asks its audience 
to remedy their own quarrels and animosities with what Clarissa calls ―good Humour.‖ 
Pope announces his intentions to point out the frivolities that should cause gentle laughter 
rather than spiteful division. Clarissa‘s speech extends the conciliatory gesture of the 
letter to the narrative of the poem. If we take Pope at his word, which is often difficult to 
do, Clarissa‘s inclusion and addition are in themselves an argumentative justification for 
the poem itself. Like Pope and his later rendition of Nestor, Clarissa intervenes between 
angry warriors, magnanimous in their own way as Agamemnon and Achilles are, who 




as guilty and offers, as he tells Caryll, to ―laugh them together again.‖ Through ―soft 
words,‖ he attempts to restore order and harmony to a scene that could grow increasingly 
hostile And like Clarissa, instead of alleviating the spite, Pope was unsuccessful at doing 
anything other than further drawing attention to himself.  
Clarissa might be seen as a satirized figure who speaks a moral she herself does 
not perform, yet the moral itself is admirable and presented mostly without satire. In 
regard to the language itself, the high tone of its sentiment stifles the silliness that 
surrounds it, suggesting the restorative potential of the orator. As Maynard Mack notes, 
Clarissa‘s speech is a ―moment of revelation and judgment.‖
473
 When it builds to its 
climax, in which charm is vituperated and merit exalted, it hints at the cultural vision that 
Pope would endorse in his ambitious Moral Epistles. In the Essay on Man, he exhorts his 
reader to ―deduct what is but vanity, or dress‖ ( II. 45), ―to ―expunge‖ the arts that have 
been created out of ―vice.‖ Clarissa‘s oration argues just that – to aim for higher 
abstractions even if the surrounding culture offers the pleasures that Ariel warns against. 
Clarissa‘s speech further affirms the sylph‘s caustic  speech that opened the poem. Yet 
like Ariel‘s address, the attention to that moral is immediately diverted. In a poem in 
which the abstract language of restraint is frequently opposed by more vivid images of 
indulgence, even the most appropriate persuasion has no effect.  
Of course, throughout his career Pope alternately met the inability to control the 
interpretation of his own work with frustration or amusement. In 1715, following critical 
attacks on his most recent revision, Pope adopted the pseudonym ―Esdras Barnivelt‖ to 
publish a pamphlet titled A Key to the Lock: Or, A Treatise Proving Beyond all 
Contradiction, the Dangerous Tendency of a late Poem, Entitled, The Rape of the Lock, 
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To Government and Religion. As the title indicates, the Key mocks any who would find a 
―Dangerous Tendency‖ in such a seemingly innocent poem. ―Barnivelt‘s‖ anxious 
interpretation sees the Baron becoming the Earl of Oxford, Belinda as the recently 
departed Queen Anne, and the various spirits as the ―two contending parties of this 
nation.‖
474
 In the Key, Barnivelt offers a competing reading in which the poem conveys 
the ―Popish doctrine‖ represented in the figure of Belinda, or the ―Whore of Babylon.‖
475
 
As the poem opens, Barnivelt claims, ―It is a common and just Observation, that when 
the Meaning of any thing is dubious, one can no way better judge of the true Intent of it, 
than by considering who is the Author, what is his Character in general, and his 
Disposition in particular.‖
476
 Directing the ad hominem attack to Pope‘s religious 
identity, his mock-epic must be the vessel for Papist prophecy, and so on and so forth. 
This passage could, from Pope‘s perspective, be used to characterize any and all of his 
critics, who turn their engagement from the text to the person composing it. The Epistle 
to Cobham discusses with greater gravity the escalating problems of interpretation and 
the injurious problems that arise from such frenzied leaps of imagination. Knowing he 
could no longer control the reception of The Rape of the Lock, Pope offers an 
exaggeration of the language that is used to attack it. What Barnivelt calls ―secret 
designs‖ are going to be found even in the most innocent of poems, just as valuable 
morals are going to be dismissed by those who focus instead on the moralizer.  
Since he cannot moderate the way readers extrapolate meaning from his poetry, 
he is left to deal with a host of assumptions and explanations. Therefore, the offense that 
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Arabella Fermor took to the poem left Pope, apparently in spite of his conciliatory letter, 
can be seen as a spark that led to the expansion of Clarissa. In the poem, he characterizes 
his own attempts to ―laugh them together‖ through the vehicle of a speech that is ignored. 
In this regard, Pope is Clarissa. Equally exasperated and bemused by the confounding 
reception of his poem, Pope‘s inclusion of Clarissa represents his inability to get his point 
across no matter how clearly or responsibly he makes it. 
Conclusion 
In Book IV of The Dunciad, Pope gives a grim sense of finality to the decaying state of 
persuasion. Because of charlatans like Orator Henley who ―break benches‖ and seduce 
audiences with their bombast, Dulness has replaced virtuous arts with their dark 
opposites: 
There foam'd rebellious Logic, gagg'd and bound, 
There, stript, fair Rhet'ric languish'd on the ground; 
His blunted Arms by Sophistry are born, 
And shameless Billingsgate her Robes adorn. 
Morality, by her false Guardians drawn, 
Chicane in Furs, and Casuistry in Lawn, 
Gasps, as they straiten at each end the cord, 
And dies, when Dulness gives her Page the word. (B.IV.23-30) 
 
Captured by Dulness, replaced by the zany and popular fluency of Henley, rhetoric has 
been replaced by what Plato saw as its ―sham‖ alternative – sophistry. Rhetoric‘s 
consignment to the feet of Dulness suggests two possibilities: it is either the tool that 
Dulness has manipulated to publicize and evangelize the salvation she provides, or it is 
the virtuous activity that she and her followers have no need for. Either way, the fate of 
the ‖languish‘d‖ art is grim. Now, ―Art after Art goes out, and all is Night” (IV. 640). 
This apocalyptic scenario describes the opposite of Pope‘s imperative in Essay of Man 




lop[ping] th‘ excrescent parts.‖ Instead, the world of the Dunciad presents bloated arts 
practiced by equally bloated figures. 
 But if the closing book of The Dunciad visualizes the death of rhetoric, Henley‘s 
earlier appearance shows it existing with a dangerous vitality and an unquestionable 
effect. Based on the examples surveyed here, we might ask what exactly is ―fair‖ about 
―Rhet‘ric‖ at all. Perhaps what lies at Dulness‘ feet is the conciliatory virtue that finds 
success through Nestor and failure through Clarissa. What remains is the worst version of 
what Ulysses offers: ―melting‖ manipulative words that replace one reality with another, 
much like the devious ―art‖ of the Moral Essays. Like ―fair Rhet‘ric‖ at the feet of 
Dulness, these speakers are confined by a powerful poet who does not allow their 
speeches to be persuasive. Pope frequently dramatizes aesthetic failure as an 
unthreatening response to the vehement orator. Contained in the satirical, comic, or 
classic is a notable anxiety toward the ability of rhetoric to move too strongly. What we 
are left with is a dangerous art that must be neutered by the controlling author who 
depicts it. 
 Where could rhetoric go from here? Pope suggests that it will be replaced by a 
crude and selfish art practiced by the sophists of Billingsgate. He could not have foreseen 
the new direction rhetoric would take in the years that followed, particularly in the 1750s 
in Scotland. Though the elocutionists would continue and even thrive in the work of 
Thomas Sheridan, the move by such thinkers as Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, and George 
Campbell to recapture rhetoric as a worthwhile study was clearly successful. But what to 
do with these competing representations of the orator that I have described: the disruptive 




figures are two ways of depicting the affective potential of rhetoric, they must be 
accounted for by those who would reconfigure its pursuit. 
 To characterize the Scottish rhetoricians and their ambitions, it is useful to 
employ and evaluate terms that share the prefix of ―re-―: ―revise,‖ ―rehabilitation,‖ 
―reform,‖ ―reexamine,‖ ―reevaluate,‖ ―reject.‖ For this reason, the rhetoric of the latter 
half of the eighteenth century is distinguished as the ―New‖ rhetoric. At various points, in 
various projects, each of these terms seems appropriate. In revising the rhetorical 
tradition, the new rhetoric theorists also train their students and readers to be suspicious 
of oratory and to recognize its dubious qualities. In so doing, they carry on the cultural 
project that I have described in my previous chapters through a revived intellectual 
discourse. However, I argue that these theorists do not merely revive, but rehabilitate the 
rhetorical tradition. I consider the excesses located in rhetorical practice that I outline in 
the previous three chapters as prompting the kind of work that these inheritors pursue. 











Chapter 4:  ―We Forget the Orator‖: The Orator in Rhetorical 
Theory 
 
Rethinking the New Rhetoric 
In my previous chapters, I have argued that representations of orators are theory. 
By presenting orators in practice, writers offer theories of language, persuasion, and 
judgment as well as examinations of the ethics and efficacy of rhetoric. However, I now 
turn to thinkers who were consciously producing or reproducing rhetorical theory. For the 
earlier neoclassicists (John Ward, John Lawson, John Holmes) and elocutionists (Orator 
Henley, Thomas Sheridan, John Mason), the enduring classical theories were perfectly 
relevant in spite of or because of emerging Enlightenment forms of epistemology and 
moral philosophy. The so-called ―new‖ rhetoricians (Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, George 
Campbell, and Joseph Priestley) saw themselves as advocating a more appropriate 
rhetorical protocol for the age in which they lived.
477
 But as they crafted new theories that 
incorporated and rejected earlier models, these seemingly more progressive rhetoricians 
possessed a general anxiety toward and suspicion of the orator that also animated the 
critics of rhetoric from Sprat to the anti-Methodists. Once again, those who challenged 
the practice of rhetoric were dedicated to posing new theories of persuasive speech. Yet 
in this case, they were knowingly teaching rhetoric and  calling their work rhetorical 
theory. In their lectures, Adam Smith and Hugh Blair were responding to a practice and 
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theory that they found inadequate and thought needed to be changed. As Wilbur Samuel 
Howell explains in his influential Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric, the 
state of the discipline ―was not so much in need of repair as replacement. And so they 
formulated a new rhetoric to replace the old.‖
 478
 As I will explain in more detail, Howell 
posits a teleological narrative that culminates in the success of a ―replacement,‖ as the 
defect of classical theory is supplanted by the improvement of a ―new rhetoric.‖ Here, I 
examine what was at stake in this transition: specifically, that new rhetoricians reject the 
priority of the orator as the central feature of rhetorical theory. By examining the role that 
orators play within the new formations of rhetorical theory, I expose the philosophical 
agendas and cultural anxieties that stimulated such changes. My previous chapters argued 
that attacks and satires on orators reveal a central anxiety toward their potential to ignite 
the wrong passions and disrupt tranquil scenes. This chapter develops my argument by 
revealing the anxieties that rhetorical theorists inherited and channeled through their 
theories, which can be viewed as a response to these vexed conceptions of orators.  
To see the contrast between the previous configuration of the rhetorical tradition 
and that instantiated by the new rhetoricians, I begin by describing the reception of 
classical theory both from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. In their missives about 
the lack of eloquent characters in England, David Hume and Oliver Goldsmith celebrate 
the idea of classical oratory while questioning the way it is taught and institutionalized. 
They respond to early eighteenth-century neoclassicists such as John Ward and John 
Lawson, who uncritically adopted classical forbearers such as Cicero and Quintilian 
through their representations of the heroic orator, who unites wisdom and eloquences in 
the promotion of public and private virtues. Along with the elocutionists, who possessed 
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an equal classical ardor, neoclassical views of rhetoric dominated the thinking about 
rhetoric in the early eighteenth century, setting the stage for their eventual invalidation by 
later theorists. I then move to Adam Smith as an inaugural figure for the new 
rhetoricians, both in his explicit rejection of classical ideals and in his reconfiguration of 
the dynamics of persuasion. As Smith‘s moral philosophy and his rhetorical theory 
intersect, he contends that sympathy is found outside of artifice and through seemingly 
naturalized and arhetorical speaking and writing practices. Convinced that orators 
obstruct rather than encourage sympathy, Smith doubt that the traditional rhetorical 
performance is capable of bringing out the  affective response it is designed to achieve. I 
then turn to Blair‘s Lectures and his rejection of what rhetoric had become, as well as his 
anticipation of what it would be. In his own words, Blair ―forget[s] the orator‖ and 
articulates new persuasive strategies and theories of language that depart from the 
emotion-based persuasion that had dominated previous approaches. Blair revises and 
―replaces‖ the old rhetoric with a new philosophy of affective speech and linguistic 
precision because of his anxieties about passionate oratory. Finally, I look to Joseph 
Priestley, who incorporated the work of the association psychologist David Hartley to 
craft a theory of the function of the emotions in the production and audition of rhetoric. 
Priestley‘s theory of the listener serves as a response to the power of the emotional orator. 
“We Should All Be Orators” 
―In enumerating the great men, who have done honour to our country, we exult in 
our poets and philosophers; but what orators are ever mentioned?‖ David Hume asks in 
his 1742 Essay ―Of Eloquence.‖
479
 As a point of comparison, Hume offers the classical 
forbears to whom British writers so often looked to celebrate the masculine force of 
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language. Ostensibly, Hume writes to encourage a native strand of eloquence that reflects 
the dynamic oratory of the classical speakers. He explicitly notes the stark contrast 
between Athens and London: 
We are told, that, when Demosthenes was to plead, all ingenious men flocked to 
Athens from the most remote parts of Greece, as to the most celebrated spectacle 
of the world. At London you may see men sauntering in the court of requests, 
while the most important debate is carrying on in the two houses; and many do 
not think themselves sufficiently compensated, for the losing of their dinners, by 
all the eloquence of our most celebrated speakers. When old Cibber is to act, the 
curiosity of several is more excited, than when our prime minister is to defend 




While British speakers such as Cibber are capable of performing in the theater, politicians 
in Parliament have no comparable oratorical qualities. Cibber‘s ability to produce 
―excited‖ response is all but absent in the ―two houses.‖ In the Athens of Hume‘s 
imaginative reconstruction, audiences flocked to see a political speech. In England, they 
can only be counted on to fill the theaters to watch the dramatic eloquence of an ―old‖ 
actor. In order to find the settings of persuasive and energetic oral moments outside of the 
theater, one cannot look to the history of England for models, but to a classical world in 
which the moderated protocols of politeness had not yet ―reject[ed] as wholly monstrous 
and gigantic‖ the stirring ―blaze of eloquence.‖
 481
 Through his nostalgia for classical 
eloquence, Hume advocates the recovery of the ancient ―blaze‖ in order to make politics 
more interesting, coherent, and attractive. Yet as Adam Potkay has argued, Of Eloquence 
finds Hume curiously vexed about those ―monstrous‖ possibilities, as his desire for 
rousing language is tempered by his concern about its effects.
 482
  Much like Pope in his 
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translation of The Iliad, Hume is at once enlivened and concerned by what he finds when 
he imagines Athenian oratory. 
 In his uneasy exhortation for eloquence, Hume reflects that something must be 
done to invigorate the general mediocrity of oratory. In 1759, Oliver Goldsmith took to 
the pages of The Critical Review to argue that, while the models of classical speakers 
should be celebrated, the contemporary approaches to teaching their theory had resulted 
in an endemic monotony. In his review of the posthumous publication of John Ward‘s 
lectures, Goldsmith maintains that ―eloquence is born with us before the rules of 
rhetoric.‖
483
 He denounces the prescriptive classicism of Ward and his contemporary, 
John Lawson, for only providing ―they who seek to understand rhetoric‖ with ―the 
disgusting dryness of names and definitions.‖
484
 Here and elsewhere,
485
 Goldsmith 
challenges contemporary methods of formal instruction: such precepts obstruct rather 
than assist eloquence, and are symptomatic of the meek oral culture. In a homogenizing 
move, Goldsmith asks the provocative question that opens this project, ―We would all be 
orators: we live in an age of orators: our very tradesmen are orators. Were it not 
worthwhile to ask what oratory is?‖
 486
 Though he does not make the connection explicit, 
Goldsmith signals the transition away from classical influence that rhetorical theory had 
already taken in the academy, and that would continue in publications throughout 
England, Scotland, and America. 
Hume  and Goldsmith operate on different sides of the dialectic that this project 
engages between rousing language and attempts to systematize it. Writing in the middle 
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 As I noted in Chapter Two, Goldsmith was particularly interested in the fate of preaching, writing about 
this topic in two articles in The Lady’s Magazine. 
486




of the eighteenth century, both see the inadequacy of British eloquence and offer 
competing solutions that nonetheless share a concern about the affective potential of 
rhetoric. Pivotally, both writers deal with the problem not merely of what rhetoric should 
be, but also of what kind of orator is appropriate for a contemporaneous audience. And 
both find a discord between the classical theory and polite practice. The question that 
animates Goldsmith is, how might an orator energize a dormant public? Hume believes 
that the energy of classical rhetoric can invigorate the contemporary setting, while 
Goldsmith contends that the reliance on ancient methodologies and precepts has stifled 
eloquence. Hume pushes for the revival of eloquence and the orator in the vein of the 
―spectacle‖ of Demosthenes. Goldsmith sees the commercial world as a new ―age of 
orators‖ in which tradesmen are more naturally persuasive than those who study the 
mundane generative prompts of Cicero and Quintilian. If Hume argues for a more 
vigorous approach to encourage passionate orations, then Goldsmith suggests that 
―[n]ature alone is the mistress of the art.‖
487
 Hume admires the aesthetics of eloquent 
speech while seeking to isolate and contain its results. Goldsmith questions the 
formalities involved in preparing the speech and only wants to see the result, defining 
―Oratory [as] nothing more, than the being able to imprint on others, with rapidity and 
force, the sentiments of which we are possessed ourselves; thus sometimes even silence is 
elegant, and action persuades when words might fail.‖
488
 Goldsmith longs for the return 
of eloquence, but is deeply skeptical of the system of rhetorical training that endures in 
Ward. After all, Demosthenes did not study the Ciceronian precepts that would later be 
associated with the production of persuasive speech. Yet if Hume and Goldsmith differ 
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on the creation of orators, both lament their absence and explain the necessity for the 
improvement of public speaking. 
Enter the new rhetoricians. They invigorated a discipline that, in England at least, 
had become fragmented and somewhat irrelevant since the strictures of the Royal Society 
and the denunciations by Hobbes and Locke. During the Scottish Enlightenment, the 
study of rhetoric was culturally relegitimized, beginning with Adam Smith‘s 
groundbreaking lectures at the University of Edinburgh in the 1750s. As a professor of 
rhetoric, he grapples with ideas of exchange and propriety that would become central to 
his later thinking; his discussion of communication lays the seeds of his work both as 
moral philosopher and economist. Smith‘s student, Hugh Blair, began his own lecture 
series in 1759 in Edinburgh, which resulted in the 1783 publication of his Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres. Blair‘s lectures produced students ―virtually anywhere the 
English language was spoken.‖
489
 George Campbell‘s Philosophy of Rhetoric was 
reprinted forty times between its original 1776 publication and the end of the nineteenth 
century.
490
 Expatriate John Witherspoon‘s lectures at Princeton influenced James 
Madison, among others. Witherspoon later became a member of the Continental 
congress, where he was a vocal advocate for, and a signer of, the Declaration of 
Independence. In England, Joseph Priestley, primarily known to history as the 
―discoverer‖ of oxygen, delivered an important series of lectures on rhetoric at 
Warrington Academy from 1761 to 1767.  
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In their reconfiguration of rhetoric, the new rhetoricians shift their attention from 
production to reception, from the development of the orator to the psychology of the 
audience, and from speaking to writing. They reject classical theories of invention and 
arrangement. Their lectures serve as a training ground for audiences to audit oratorical 
performances more effectively, particularly those retaining the features that classical 
rhetors evoke. Centralizing and celebrating the empirical privilege of the written word, 
they seek an equivalent precision in oral discourse. Because of these dynamic thinkers 
and the influence of their published lectures, rhetorical historians tend to narrativize the 
period chronologically from indolence to excess to progress, or more specifically, from 
Royal Society attacks in the seventeenth century to the bombast of elocutionists like 
Orator Henley to the recovery of Blair, Campbell, and the Scots. As Patricia Bizzell and 
Bruce Herzberg summarize in their anthology, The Rhetorical Tradition, ―Within a 
hundred years of Sprat‘s strictures, rhetoric‘s estate was considerably improved.‖
491
  
Perhaps recalling Wilbur Samuel Howell, who sees the matter of transition as 
―replacement,‖ Bizzell and Herzberg describe it in terms of recuperation. Nonetheless, 
their reading of the period shares a similar understanding of a narrative in which new 
rhetoricians pursue a necessary transformation from misguided antiquarian tedium or the 
anachronism of a Ciceronian approach, to a rhetoric appropriate for the Enlightenment. 
The orator prompts some of the most crucial shifts in rhetorical theory. As H. 
Lewis Ulman argues, the rhetorical theories that arose as a revision of these ―old‖ 
rhetorics can be viewed as solutions to the problem of language, a set of concerns that he 
traces back to experimentalists and empiricists (such as Locke) imagining corrective 
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 This is a semantic problem that has effects beyond merely 
philosophical and scientific discourse. In this chapter, I look to the efforts of new 
rhetoricians to address the crises that orators pose toward audiences who should be 
informed through reason rather than assaulted by passion. Fearing an overwhelmingly 
affective response, new rhetoricians reject, or in Hugh Blair‘s term ―forget,‖ the orator as 
the central subject of a rhetorical program.  In moving from speaking to writing, new 
rhetoricians cannot completely abandon the orator. In sections that deal primarily with 
oral discourse, its production and its analysis, the orator remains as a kind of negative 
energy that puts these thinkers on the defensive, forcing them to develop strategies to 
contain him.  
The Good Man Speaking Well: Rhetorical Optimism in the Ciceronian Tradition 
When Goldsmith rejects the models of Cicero and Quintilian in The Critical 
Review, he anticipates the critiques of the new rhetoricians. Writing that their rules 
threaten to stifle the orator, he complains: 
Their precepts might have guarded their successors from falling into faults, but at 
the same time they deterred them from rising into beauty . . . But if rules in 
general of this kind are of such inutility, how much more must they lead us astray, 
when we cite the precepts given to the orators of one country to direct the 
pleadings of another; rules drawn from the ancients to direct a modern barrister, 
would make him thoroughly ridiculous; and yet this custom prevailed in Europe 




For Goldsmith, Cicero and Quintilian confuse a ―talent‖ with an ―art‖ by relying on 
prescriptions rather than imitatible models. There is also, as he notes in this passage, a 
problem of translation between cultures and countries. Even if these precepts work, they 
will produce a ridiculous scene of affected and artificial speech. However, as Goldsmith 
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laments, these ―custom[s]‖ prevailed as Roman models dominated rhetorical treatises 
through the medieval period. While Cicero and Quintilian disagree about some minor 
points, they are unified in their view of the civilizing and virtuous potential of the orator. 
This potential is actualized through disciplined rhetorical training that their treatises 
systematically detail and that Goldsmith argues stifles persuasive ability. The Roman 
optimism toward what the well-trained orator can achieve is nearly limitless. This 
optimism led Cicero and Quintilian to see the effects of rhetoric as overwhelmingly 
positive because of the link between rhetorical education and moral development. 
 In De Inventione, Cicero presents a vision of the orator that later treatises would 
endorse and restate: 
At this juncture a man – great and wise I am sure – became aware of the power 
latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind for great achievements if one 
could develop this power and improve it by instruction. Men  were scattered in 
the fields and hidden in sylvan retreats when he assembled and gathered them in 
accordance with a plan; he introduced them to every useful and honourable 
occupation, though they cried out against it at first because of its novelty, and then 
when through reason and eloquence they had listened with greater attention, he 




That transformative vision of that final sentence, in which the orator unites ―reason and 
eloquence‖ to turn savages into ―gentle folk‖ is perhaps the most optimistic of any 
sentiment ever expressed about rhetoric. Its celebration of the curative and humanizing 
potential includes both the natural ability to speak and its eventual disciplinary 
instantiation (―if one could develop this power and improve it by instruction‖). Though 
De Inventione is often read as an early moment in the development of Cicero‘s theory, it 
is still characteristic of his valorization of both a native, natural eloquence and its 
necessary systemization. In De Oratore, he argues that while the mythical ―great and 
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wise‖ man who brought about idyllic order may have possessed an untrained virtuosity, a 
public speaker needs artistic training in order to conform natural eloquence to rules that 
will direct it toward its proper end. He concludes,  
There is to mind no more excellent thing than the power of oratory, to get a hold 
on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations wherever the 
speaker wishes, or divert them for whatever he wishes. In every free nation, and 
most of all in communities which have attained the enjoyment of peace and 





When Cicero praises ―oratory,‖ he admires an eloquence maximized through study, 
rather than an innate genius. Though he occasionally qualifies this optimism by noting its 
misuses, he emphasizes that this is why responsible use should be taught through a firmly 
grounded discipline.  
Quintilian avoids some of the qualifications Cicero makes by arguing even more 
explicitly for the connection between morality and oratory: 
The first and chief difference of opinion on the subject is, that some think it 
possible even for bad men to have the name of orators; while others (to whose 
opinion I attach myself) maintain that the name, and the art of which we are 




For Quintilian, ―orator‖ is not a morally neutral term. In order for one to be an orator, one 
must have a strong moral character. When he discusses the potentially ―pernicious‖ 
application of rhetoric, he acknowledges that while speech itself may be used to 
destructive effect, the ―orator‖ will never employ his art in this way. He writes, ―if 
eloquence be the art of speaking well . . . a true orator must be, above all, a good man.‖ In 
both Cicero and Quintilian, the link between political virtue and eloquence is stable, 
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instilled through training and discipline. One may use persuasive speech to his or her 
personal advantage or as an act of espionage against the state, but that person 
(particularly in Quintilian) is not an orator. Implicit in both writers‘ conception is a near-
assurance that submission to oratorical training instills virtue. The link between character 
and technique is grounded in an idealistic conception of rhetoric. 
As Thomas Conley notes, Cicero‘s influence in England grew as his works were 
made more available through translation. The medieval emphasis on Cicero centered not 
on his politics or rhetoric, but his stoic philosophy of a ―flight from active life.‖
497
 By the 
sixteenth century, Latin works such as De Oratore, Orator, and De Inventione had been 
rediscovered and disseminated broadly enough to have a strong influence on rhetoric in 
the Italian and English Renaissance. In addition, Quintilian‘s Institutes instilled ―the core 
relation between virtus and eloquence.‖
498
 Conley writes, ―these new discoveries 
provided a firm philosophical basis for the celebration of eloquence.‖
499
 In England, the 
early modern rhetoricians embraced this celebration by linking Christian virtue with the 
Ciceronian power of eloquence. 
The inspiration of Cicero and Quintilian is most evident in Thomas Wilson‘s 
popular 1553 treatise The Arte of Rhetorique. Wilson‘s ambitious text is the most 
comprehensive in the sixteenth century, focusing equally on all five canons in his 
adaptation of classical rhetoric for the humanist audience that consisted ―not only of 
schoolboys and perhaps preachers, but students of law as well, young noblemen at the 
Inns of Court who did not have the time or patience to master rhetoric from the Latin 
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 In the first book of The Arte of Rhetorique, Wilson rehearses the 
Ciceronian narrative of savagery to civilization through the empowering virtuosity of the 
orator. Wilson‘s only departure from Cicero is yoking the origin narrative to Christian 
theology and noting God‘s providence as the divine factor that allows the orator to thrive. 
By invoking the biblical concept of a fall from grace, Wilson ably replaces the secular 
origins with a teleology that can be linked to Christian salvation and redemption.
501
 In 
particular, Wilson crafts the orator as an evangelist who brings God‘s word to the rustic 
and fallen savages. Wilson articulates this origin narrative through scattered men living 
―Brutyshlye in open feldes,‖ but brought together by ―these appointed of God [who] 
called theim together by utteraunce of speache, and perswaded with them what was good, 
what was bade, and what was gainefull for mankind.‖ 
502
 Wilson adds, ―Suche force hath 
the tongue, and such is the power of eloquence and reason,‖
503
 and continues to posit 
eloquence as the basis for civilized, Christian society, and the orator as the ordained 
vehicle for such change. In empowering the orator-civilizer, Wilson emphasizes the 
barbaric inadequacies of the ―audience,‖ the receivers of both speech and civilizing 
motive. As Wayne Rebhorn astutely notes, ―the assumed inadequacies of human beings 
render the orator indispensable and make his activities appear unmitigated blessings.‖
504
 
Wilson‘s rhetorical theory is representative of a contemporary optimism toward rhetoric; 
as Brian Vickers explains, ―for Wilson rhetoric and persuasion are the sine qua non of an 
ordered society,‖ a theme that he asserts through an imaginative retelling that ―obviously 
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expresses the Renaissance‘s setting of order against chaos, harmony against discord.‖
505
 
The sixteenth-century rhetorician Henry Peacham, without irony or qualification, states, 
―the emperor of men‘s minds and affections and next to the omnipotent God in the power 
of persuasion by grace and divine assistance.‖
506
 But far from the hypnotic deceiver that 
such an ―emperor‖ might become by abusing such eloquence, Peacham also links 
persuasive power with Christian moral character. 
 By the eighteenth century, this veneration toward classical texts, Cicero‘s and 
Quintilian‘s in particular, remained strong in university settings. One of the most diligent 
expounders of the classical tradition was John Ward, who served as Professor of Rhetoric 
at Gresham College from 1720 to 1759.
507
 The setting is a familiar one for this project, as 
it was also the spiritual and at points physical home of the Royal Society. Gresham was 
also unique for serving as a center of adult education offering public lectures for common 
people with a focus on practical utility in everyday life. Ward was a crucial agent in the 
transition from lectures being presented in Latin to English, thus making them available 
to those without the privilege of a classical education.  
Ward was deeply invested in perpetuating the energizing and humanizing civic 
possibilities of Cicero. The orator must be dedicated to ―persuading men to good and 
virtuous actions, and dissuading them from everything that is ill and vicious; nothing can 
be more commendable in itself, or useful to human societies.‖
508
 Ward was explicitly 
concerned with the practical effects of the study, not merely its antiquarian revival. In his 
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opening lecture, when Ward narrates the ―progress‖ of rhetoric in Rome, he explains how 
philosophers and orators energized and reformed the state. He clearly believes that the 
fruits of rhetorical study can be the same in his contemporaneous climate, in which the 
―Roman youth were so charmed with the eloquence of their harangues, that they could no 
longer be stopped from pursuing the study of oratory.‖
509
 As Kathleen Massey explains, 
Ward‘s lectures are an example of ―education in action,‖
510
 designed for an audience 
unfamiliar with the protocols and formalities of academia and looking to integrate not 
only technical skill but also these principles of action. 
Some more recent critics share the assessment of Goldsmith‘s invective in the 
Critical Review by viewing Ward‘s classical ardor as tedious and derivative, as well as 
inappropriate for the modern student who would hear him. Howell writes that Ward 
operates with the ―defensive patience of an antiquarian‖ in his uncritical survey of the 
ancients.
511
 The critique of Ward fits with Howell‘s depiction of the new rhetoricians as 
pursuing a necessary transformation of antiquarian tedium to modern innovation in their 
development of oral practices and pedagogy appropriate for the age. Thomas Miller sees 
Ward‘s classical veneration as a repressive and inadequate response to a potential social 
mobility and civic engagement that rhetoric should provoke, as well as ―a particularly 
stark example of how antiquarianism sets in when teachers fail to attend to the practical 
needs of their students.‖
512
 For Miller, the adherence to classical models was part of a 
general move within English universities to ―preserv[e] the boundaries of the learned 
culture by confining learning to . . .  the ossified forms of Aristotelianism and 
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 Echoing Goldsmith, these critics see Ward as pursuing rhetoric as the 
subject of a comprehensive historical survey, rather than its application for enlightened 
social and political discourse. From this perspective, Ward misses the enabling civic 
potential of rhetoric that is so evident in Roman and Greek rhetors because of his myopic 
attention to implementing their precepts as a program. In the hands of Ward, Miller 
argues, classical rhetoric became more about understanding the culture in which it 
originated than in applying it to the contemporaneous setting. 
However, while Ward is certainly possessed by a veneration of the classics and a 
near-evangelical desire to reiterate their methods, his estimation of the orator‘s practical 
judgment is more dynamic than his critical reputation. Rather than a stodgy antiquarian, 
Ward can also be seen as reacting to the empirical precision and non-artistic proofs (such 
as hard scientific evidence) that dominated discussions of language, as I have shown in 
my discussion of experimental philosophers and Anglican ideologues. Seeing the 
Ciceronian prescriptions as offering the orator generative prompts to aid in the creation 
and development of persuasive speeches, Ward offers a thorough theory of invention that 
both earlier and later theorists lack. For instance, he refutes the influential sixteenth-
century reforms of Peter Ramus, who separated logic and rhetoric and consigned 
invention and arrangement to dialectic.
514
 Ramus believed that logic should be the 
domain of developing subject matter and giving it an order. Arguing that rhetoric should 
focus only on style and delivery, Ramus challenged the Roman dicta that its study should 
be associated with the moral development of the orator.
 
After Ramus, Bernard Lamy and 
                                                 
513
 Ibid., 74. 
514
 On Ramus, see Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, 124-143. Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and 
Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961). Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method and 
the Decay of Dialogue, from the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason, by Walter J. Ong (Cambridge: 




the Port-Royalists also rejected the Ciceronian topics as generative prompts. In his third 
lecture, ―Of the Division of Oratory,‖ Ward disagrees with this division, arguing instead 
that ―rhetoric not only supplies us with more heads of invention than logic.‖
515
  Logic 
should be centered on ―principles of knowledge,‖ and rhetoric on the broader and more 
practical concern of ―motives to action.‖ Against the reforms of Ramus, Ward expands 
the office of rhetoric back to its roots as an art dedicated to the development of practical 
judgment. The return to classical heuristics is necessary to Ward because he wants to 
encourage his students both to invent and evaluate arguments, rather than rely on the 
standardized methods of logic and science.  
John Lawson, Ward‘s Irish contemporary, was not quite the disciple of classical 
rhetoric as Ward, yet he is even more passionate in his vision for the positive 
transformative powers of the orator. The son of an Irish clergyman, Lawson progressed 
from an impressive career as a student at Trinity College in Dublin to assume the 
Erasmus Smith lectureship at the same institution in 1753.
516
 Lawson‘s public lectures 
were collected two months before his death in 1758 in a volume titled Lectures 
Concerning Oratory. Lawson‘s lectures reflect his deep veneration for classical rhetoric 
and, as Neil E. Claussen and Karl A. Wallace write in the introduction to their edition of 
his Lectures, his approach ―bridged the rigid and attenuating Ramistic dichotomies and 
the innovative rhetorical concepts of Blair, Campbell, and Whatley.‖
517
 The exhaustive 
nature of Ward‘s System contains very few asides or commentaries, intensely (and 
perhaps reductively) focusing on the synthesis of classical sources. Lawson‘s lectures are 
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more colorful and meandering, oscillating between extensive summaries of Aristotle and 
Cicero and poetic passages that commemorate his subject. At points he comes across as 
sermonic in his celebration of the powers of rhetoric, especially in its potential to change 
the contemporary world in which his students lived as it had in the past he so frequently 
eulogizes. Among eighteenth-century theorists, he alone discusses Plato as a rhetorical 
theorist, going so far as to include an imaginative poetic dialogue titled ―The Judgment of 
Plato‖ in which the Athenian chooses lady philosophy over lady poetry. Further, 
Lawson‘s reception of classical theory was more critical than Ward‘s, which is another 
way he serves as a transitional figure from the neoclassicism of the earlier era to the 
revisions of the later thinkers. 
Lawson shares Ward‘s unqualified optimism toward  the revolutionary purpose of 
rhetoric. In his first lecture, his tone aspires almost to the evangelical in his fervor. 
Describing Demosthenes and his incendiary Phillipics, Lawson explains: 
In one place, you see a mighty people dissolved in luxury and indolence, 
effeminate, corrupted, terrible only to those who would reform them; the Orator 
layeth before these their true state; he shews them from without a powerful enemy 
deceiving, and ready to enslave them; traitors selling them within; their allies 
insulted, their territories mangled and alienated, their armies useless, their trade 
destroyed, their fleets baffled and idle; themselves in the meanwhile buried in 
sloth, devoted to shews and spectacles, the contempt of Greece: which affecting 
picture he contrasts with that of their Ancestors, Lovers of their country, patient 
of Labour, intrepid, victorious over the innumerable hosts of the Persian monarch, 
the defenders of liberty and Greece, patriots honoured with immortal fame. Lo! 
This degenerate people are roused, kindled, fired; the Orator‘s Voice recalls the 
spirit of their ancestors; they rush with emulation to arms; they fight and fall, 




The orator creates harmony and order and gives his audience a sense of their own history. 
A revolutionary figure, he is also an educator whose words expose the injustices that may 
be buried beneath ―shews and spectacles.‖ Through the revelatory power of the orator 
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and his dynamic appeals, a nation realizes both what it can be and it is not, reminding 
them of the shared virtues and values to which they can aspire. Lawson tellingly contrasts 
the ―shews and spectacles‖ of a culture founded on luxury with the genuine performance 
of Demosthenes‘ oratory. Passages like this abound throughout Lawson‘s lectures, as his 
stressing the radical power of rhetoric at times overwhelms his instructional precepts. 
Lawson clearly wanted his students to see the parallels between Demosthenes‘ time and 
their own – in which the vigorous thought of noble ancestors had devolved into a culture 
marked by luxury and apathy that Pope mocks in The Rape of the Lock.  The optimism 
toward rhetoric as a force of salvation that instills a fundamental civic order recalls the 
humanist possibilities for the office of orator. The orator at once levels distinctions  and 
calls a nation out of its widespread stupor, opposing ostentation with virtue, moving them 
to action.  
While experimental philosophers and homiletics writers bemoaned excesses of 
floridity and emphasized a speech bereft of ornate features, Lawson celebrates speech 
even in its imperfections. He sees the recent enthusiasm for clarity as an unacceptable 
pithiness that brings with it its own obscurity, and even uses classical precedents such as 
Pliny and Seneca as proof of this failure. The innovation that language allows should not 
be silenced through some kind of censoring method, as often this method leads to dull 
statements prized for their unaffected qualities and little else. He writes, ―However 
intelligible I be, importeth not; for you will not understand unless you listen, and you will 
rarely listen if I be no more than intelligible. The Orator must therefore please and move . 
. . He must, to Perspicuity, add Ornament.‖
519
 Ornament does not obscure, nor does it 
embellish to the point of superficiality, but reflects the array of  inventional apparati that 
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the speaker can potentially employ. In opposition to Locke, whom Lawson refutes 
directly, eloquence is the ―handmaid of truth; those who pervert her craft with sophistry 
and specious argument are not her Sons, but Deserters from her.‖
520
 Describing the value 
of ceremonial rhetoric in its most vivid terms, Lawson declares, ―the Orator, who 
employeth his talent aright, is one of the most useful members of the community, 
infusing principles of religion, humanity, and virtuous industry in all who hear him, 
contributing to preserve peace, justice, and harmony among men.‖
521
 Lawson‘s 
celebration of the powers of the orator might be called naïve; like Ward and the 
humanists, he is bound to a disciplinary conception of rhetoric as a virtuous art that 
produces virtuous individuals. Lawson rehearses the humanistic potential for rhetoric to 
be the ultimate component of civic virtue enacted through public speech.  
Outside of Ward and Lawson, many were calling for improvements in delivery 
and pronunciation. I have already discussed the elocutionist movement in the form of the 
oft-mocked figure of Orator Henley. However, despite such criticisms, elocutionists 
played a significant role in reminding audiences that rhetoric existed as a discipline that 
could be taught and studied, even if they did so by emphasizing only one of the five 
canons. The elocutionists were not alone in calling for a more refined and passionate oral 
character. In a 1710 article in the Tatler, Isaac Bickerstaff challenges the ―clergy of Great 
Britain‖ for their phlegmatic approaches to the pulpit. Advocating against the tone of 
dispassionate oratory that characterized establishment oratory, Bickerstaff instead 
explains that ―the more you are moved yourself, the more you will move others.‖ 
522
 His 
advice for preachers is to make their presence felt more strongly. As an illustrative 
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example, he subtly implies that speakers should consider themselves as audience 
members for their own speeches. The dry, inexpressive quality of contemporary 
preachers would lead the deaf observer to ―think they were reading the contents only of 
some discourse they intended to make, than actually in the body of an oration, even when 
they are upon matters of such a nature as one would believe it were impossible to think of 
without emotion.‖
523
 Regarding the English, Adam Smith later notes, ―Foreigners 
observe that there is no nation in the world which uses so little gesticulation in their 
conversation as the English. A Frenchman, in telling a story that was not of the least 
consequence to him or anyone else, will use a thousand gestures and contortions of his 
face, whereas a well-bred Englishman will tell you one in which his life and fortune are 
concerned, without altering a muscle in his face.‖
524
 These statements attest to the placid 
nature of British expression and, in Bickerstaff‘s appraisal, the need to adopt more 
affective techniques in settings where persuasion is desired. The elocutionists were 
merely one solution to this problem, and their popularity found censure in the same way 
that Goldsmith attempted to debunk the connection between prescription and production. 
 The elocutionists argued that, vocally and physically, the orator should dominate 
the scene; he should be unforgettable. In the influential anonymous early eighteenth-
century elocutionary text, Some Rules for Speaking and Action (1716), the author writes, 
―Every Man indeed should fill the Places where he speaks‖ (22).
525
 This exhortation is 
not merely symbolic. Throughout the Rules, the author explains how one might ―fill‖ the 
oratorical space: not only in the modulation and adjustment of  voice, but in hand 
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gestures, eye raises, and careful motion. The manual trains the orator to become a 
dominant presence, who can control and overpower the audience. For instance, when 
referring to Heaven, ―the eyes must turn up,‖ as the audience will attentively respond to 
such physical action and thus persuasively understand the passion of the point that 
accompanies the gesture.
526
 The education of the orator is based on a rapt audience who 
responds to such techniques because of the innate magnetism that the speaker can create 
through such dynamic posturing. 
 As I will argue in the following sections, new rhetoricians respond to and attempt 
to revise the physical centrality and presence of the orator. They also move away from 
the prioritization of delivery, making what they see as a progressive move from show to 
substance. In The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture, Paul Goring 
notes that the early eighteenth-century writings on public speaking and delivery contain 
―a preoccupation in British culture of this period with the human body as an eloquent 
object, whose eloquence arises from the performance of an inscribed system of gestures 
and expressions.‖
527
 In acting manuals, elocutionary texts, and preaching manuals, the 
physical, pulsating body was central to the persuasive act, its ―capacity for eloquence.‖
528
 
Further, ―efforts to mould bodily eloquence are apparent, with varying degrees of 
explicitness, within an array of eighteenth-century social and cultural arenas.‖ In the 
rhetorical discourse of the early eighteenth century, the orator takes control over physical 
spaces through passionate gestures and a boisterous voice that only enhances his singular 
presence. The figure that the orator assumes, his use of physical gestures and the dramatic 
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contortions of his face, is just as persuasive as the substance of the speech itself. 
However, as Goring explains, for elocutionists the ―body functions as both a sign and 
propagator of virtue‖ as the ―orator should be a dignified and impressive figure with a 
body signifying an elevation above the crowd.‖
529
  
 In the work of Ward, Lawson, and the elocutionists, orators are not only central, 
they are the virtuous and vigorous product of rhetorical training that all theories should be 
configured to produce. In Lawson‘s lectures, the orator starts big and gets bigger – 
amplifying his presence until the audience is transfixed by the performance. If Sprat and 
the Anglican preachers advocated a seemingly artless naturalism, the neoclassicists and 
elocutionists sought to make the orator not only memorable but also an indispensable 
facet of the cultures in which they operated. Without much qualification or hesitation, 
they celebrate the civic potential of orators and integrate this appreciation into a program 
of rhetorical education that will continue to produce and invigorate persuasive speakers. 
This sense of optimism toward the orator is the backdrop to which the new rhetoricians 
respond. 
Sympathy is Persuasion: Adam Smith’s Lectures 
As Goldsmith‘s response to Ward indicates, neoclassical approaches to rhetoric 
quickly became irrelevant in the wake of the new rhetoric. Ward and Lawson would be 
seen as obsolete classicists, teaching rhetoric as a subject of historical interest rather than 
practical application, in their veneration for a theory that did not seem to produce any 
noticeable improvements in eloquent speech. Whatever their immediate influence, they 
were soon forgotten in the wake of the emerging works of Scottish Enlightenment 
rhetors. If Ward and Lawson could be accused of failing to meet the needs of their 
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students, then Adam Smith and Hugh Blair seem dedicated to nothing but giving their 
provincial students the polish and sophistication they  would need to participate in the 
rapidly growing cultural and commercial discourses of Great Britain. As Thomas Conley 
writes, they ―taught students who had serious cultural handicaps disabling them from 
pursuing professional careers or keeping ‗polite company.‘‖
530
 Lori Branch adds that 
Smith‘s engagement with rhetoric shares the impetus of The Wealth of Nations because it 
views appropriate communication as an ―English system of exchange,‖ with Smith 
―trying to analyze it, to navigate it, and to help his Scottish students navigate it.‖
531
 
Clearly, Scots like Smith saw their students as needing the linguistic decorum and 
propriety necessary to be gentlemen, more than they required the ability to ignite the 
deliberative, judicial, and ceremonial settings where rhetoric typically occurred. In 
tempering and correcting the seemingly crude provincial tongue by giving students the 
critical tools they needed to participate in a sophisticated culture, Smith saw the purpose 
of rhetoric as self-improvement rather than mastery of public speaking. 
Smith‘s rhetorical lectures provide an intriguing look into his moral philosophy 
and the place of persuasion within it. They can be seen as an originary moment for 
concepts that Smith would more fully articulate in his published texts regarding the 
communicative systems of exchange at the heart of moral and economic interaction. For 
contemporary scholars, the lectures are difficult because they exist only in the form of 
student notes. Smith gave his lectures at Glasgow University in 1762 and 1763.
532
 By this 
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point, he was an established professor at Glasgow, having taught first Logic and then 
Moral Philosophy from 1752 until 1763. In these subjects, Smith lectured to a ―public‖ 
audience. His lectures on rhetoric were given to a private class who would have attended 
one of Smith‘s public courses as a prerequisite. However, Smith had all his manuscripts 
burned before his death in 1790, among them the original text of his lectures that he 
never published nor wanted published. In 1958, a nearly complete set of notes from the 
lecture were discovered, which later scholars reconstructed. Nonetheless, Smith‘s lectures 
were most formative for two of his brightest students: Robert Watson, who would take 
over for Smith after 1763, and Hugh Blair, whose work carried on the spirit of Smith to 
new audiences all over the world. 
Critics have noted that Smith departs from classical tradition at nearly every turn. 
As Howell astutely notes, ―If Adam Smith drew his rhetorical system from the past, he 
drew it from the past which is always seeking to prepare for the future rather than from 
the past which is always seeking to preserve itself against change.‖
533
 Smith rejects the 
classical system of invention that Ward celebrates and articulates so thoroughly. He sees 
both ancient and modern writings that center on the categorization and description of 
tropes as ―a very silly set of books and not at all instructive.‖
534
  In order for persuasion 
to be most effective, Smith argues, the text must be designed with a focus on propriety 
and perspicuity. In his fifth lecture,  he most explicitly articulates this as a response to the 
tradition of ―figurae sententiarum‖ located in Cicero and Quintilian. These thinkers and 
their contemporary disciples see in figurative speech ―all that is noble, grand and 
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sublime, all that is passionate tender and moving . . .‖ (25). In a passage that more or less 
summarizes his entire approach to rhetoric, Smith refutes the premium placed on tropaic 
language: 
But the case is far otherwise. When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a 
neat, clear, plain, and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is possessed 
of and intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer, is plainly and cleverly 
hit off, then and then only the expression has all the force and beauty that 
language can give it. It matters not the least whether figures of speech are 
introduced or not. (25-26) 
What Smith describes here is an ideal persuasion, and he calls on a familiar term to 
describe what should actual take place: not conviction or approval but sympathy. The 
apparently ostentatious nature of tropes defies rather than encourages a sympathetic 
response. However,  as Smith explains in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, sympathy 
arises not from an abstract passion but from the ―situation which excites it.‖
535
 In the 
Lectures, the ―force and beauty of language‖ are best revealed through what Smith 
describes as a clever plainness. Far from arhetorical, Smith sees plainness as a rhetorical 
choice that will best actualize and provoke a sympathetic response, which is the most 
effective kind of persuasion. At this point, Smith follows Locke‘s suggestion that 
figurative language is ―nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and 
thereby mislead the judgment.‖
536
 However, Smith puts this critique of the trope at the 
heart of his rhetorical theory, constantly restating its exclusion and impropriety. In his 
second lecture, he explains that the overemphasis on figuration that occupies so many 
approaches to rhetoric will ―make ones stile dark and perplex‘d‖ (8). Smith‘s censure of 
figurative language captures a general feeling toward stylistic methods that teachers of 
rhetoric had traditionally advocated. For Smith, artifice discourages sympathy and, 
                                                 
535
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2009), 15 All subsequent references are to this text and will be noted parenthetically. 
536




through it, persuasion. This curiously arhetorical sentiment is central to a pedagogy 
designed to teach linguistic correctness and affective eloquence. In this sense, Smith‘s 
attention to the means by which approbation happens outside of the discourse of classical 
and humanist rhetoric makes him an iconoclast against the backdrop of his neoclassical 
predecessors. 
Sympathy is a crucial term not only in Smith‘s rhetoric, but also to both his 
conception of moral conscience and appropriate social behavior that he outlines in his 
moral philosophy. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith establishes sympathy as the 
emergence of morality, the process in which we become feeling actors through 
benevolent and compassionate response to social behavior. However, as the passage 
above from LRBL indicates, sympathy is also the most significant act of identification 
that leads to meaningful persuasion. In the opening section of TMS, Smith describes 
sympathy as ―our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever‖ (13). There are many 
means through which sympathy can be achieved, perhaps the most effective of which is 
through a response to sorrow. However, sympathy primarily occurs not as a response to a 
premeditated action, such as a calculated speech, but through natural interaction. If we 
suspect that the move to provoke sympathy is artificial or premeditated, we are less likely 
to feel the identification that would otherwise occur. This is why, in speaking of rhetoric, 
Smith explains that the artificiality of tropes can obstruct sympathy. 
Importantly for Smith, the sympathetic response is an interpretive act. While it 
―may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously,‖ Smith insists that 
the observer participates in a complex imaginative act of discernment. In order to judge 




the ―essentially theatrical construction" of this scenario,
537
 and the construction of the 
observer as an audience member also is suggestive of a rhetorical performance. However, 
for sympathy to occur, the observer must break through the monological trappings of 
those settings, in which the speaker dominates or potentially attempts to control the 
listener. The observer only begins as an audience member, but then imaginatively 
assumes the privileged point of understanding the actor. The act of interpretation that 
leads to sympathy is only possible once the observer assumes this imaginative position. 
Smith does not provide much by way of illustration of how this interaction occurs, but 
one passage in particular is illuminating: 
If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which however, upon 
bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect 
upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it 
pusillanimity and weakness. It gives us the spleen, on the other hand, to see 
another too happy or too much elevated, as we call it, with any little piece of good 
fortune. We are disobliged even with this joy; and, because we cannot go along 
with it, call it levity and folly. We are even put out of humour if our companion 
laughs louder or longer at a joke than we think it deserves; that is, that we feel that 
we ourselves could laugh at it. (19-20) 
Smith goes on to describe the overly affected response to a disproportionate degree of 
grief, joy, or humor. If one responds with too great intensity or with a level of 
unacceptable indifference, the observer will feel no sympathy. As Stephen McKenna 
explains, ―highly idiosyncratic and personal sentiments cannot be expected to occasion 
sympathy directly.‖
538
 The opportunity for sympathetic interaction hinges on the 
evaluation and approbation of these moments. Smith repeatedly categorizes these 
reactions in their accordance with ―propriety,‖ a term that had more contemporary 
relevance in rhetorical theory than in moral philosophy. Its significance in the history of 
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rhetorical theory can be traced back to the Sophists. In Against the Sophists, Isocrates 
explains that ―oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, 
propriety of style, and originality of treatment.‖
539
 Isocrates‘ definition of rhetoric 
emphasizes the conditions that the persuasive speaker accepts, rather than the radical 
activity of challenging normative behavior. McKenna insightfully notes that propriety 
bridges the communicative sentiments in TMS with the moral foundations of LRBL.
540
 In 
Smith‘s description of sympathy, propriety proves absolutely central in judging actions 
based upon convention, prior observation, and cultural standards. Otherwise, spectators 
give into prejudices or biases that corrupt their assessment. We have certain expectations 
of how one should respond to fortune, misfortune, or wit – to use the examples of the 
above passage – and whether or not someone meets these.  
Judging the propriety of moral activity is similar to auditing a rhetorical 
performance because both rely on social mores and models of appropriate and polite 
behavior that were becoming more and more central in the development of rhetorical 
theory in the eighteenth century. As Smith explains in TMS, ―In the suitableness or 
unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the 
cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety or impropriety, the decency or 
ungracefulness of the consequent action‖ (22). The sympathetic response is not merely an 
affective reaction, but one that is informed by pre-existing social factors that each 
observer views differently. Though one might find sympathy even through an evaluation 
that might typically be conceived as improper (i.e., both laugh heartily at a clearly 
offensive joke), Smith clearly sees the audience of TMS as having relatively consistent 
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and acceptable notions of ―propriety.‖ That he does not spend much space outlining what 
exactly comprises ―suitableness or unsuitableness‖ is suggestive of his reliance on basic 
moral principles. 
For Smith, the sympathetic response is more persuasive than any response to a 
calculated performance can ever be. At one point, he questions the efficacy and propriety 
of an ―animated eloquence‖ already practiced in France and Italy that is ―just beginning 
to be introduced into England‖ (243). To what Smith refers is unclear, yet he certainly 
could allude to the gyrating enthusiasm of the elocutionists and his inclusion of France 
and Italy insinuates certain excesses that should be avoided in polite culture. In Smith‘s 
evaluation of the rhetorical tradition, ―animated‖ speech is also the problematic product 
of rhetorical theory from Cicero to his disciples Ward and Lawson. The principles of 
plainness and sympathy should replace the overly tropaic models that Smith frames his 
lectures as a reacting against. As he explains in LRBL, the ―animated‖ speech should be 
rejected for the ―neat, clear, plain, and clever manner‖ that encourages sympathy (26). In 
TMS, Smith repeatedly links ideas of sympathy with rhetorical goals such as ―approval‖ 
and  ―approbation.‖ This is most clear in a crucial passage that explains why sympathy 
must precede persuasion: 
To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt 
them is to approve of them. If the same arguments which convince you convince 
me likewise, I necessarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I 
necessarily disapprove of it: neither can I possibly conceive that I should do the 
one without the other. To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of 
others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their 
agreement or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard 
to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others (21). 
 
On one hand, we are more likely to agree with those whose sympathy we already share.  




sympathize. The correspondence relates to Kenneth Burke‘s description of 
―identification‖ as the goal of rhetoric in the sense that ―you can persuade a man only 
insofar as you can talk his language by . . . identifying your ways with his.‖
541
 However, 
Smith also describes the success or failure of the argumentative process itself as 
occurring through sympathetic interaction. The opening tautology, in which approval and 
adoption are interchangeable, is suggestive of the larger point of the passage: to agree is 
to sympathize, and to sympathize is to agree.  
However, though sympathy is largely an internal process, it still relies on social 
customs and normative behavior. The observer applies the standards of propriety to a 
spontaneous act. For instance, Smith explains that sympathy is most aroused by the 
perception of suffering and injustice. However, in the passage I quote above, he notes 
that a disproportionate response to a markedly insignificant affliction discourages 
sympathy and instead projects ―pusillanimity and weakness.‖ True sympathy responds to 
sincere emotion, and any attempt to simulate this sentiment will be deconstructed by the 
astute observer. We respond to emotional actors, who themselves respond artlessly and 
naturally to grief and joy based on shared values and understandings of social conduct. 
Smith describes the emotions that provoke and repel sympathy: 
These must be plain, open, and direct; determined without positiveness, and 
elevated without insolence; not only free from petulance and low scurrility, but 
generous, candid, and full of all proper regards, even for the person who has 
offended us. It must appear, in short, from our whole manner, without our 
labouring affectedly to express it, that passion has not extinguished our humanity. 
(47) 
The opposition is familiar because Smith‘s descriptions retain the confrontations that 
each of my chapters stage: between plainness and elevation, sincerity and ostentation, 
artifice and reality. The pivotal connotation of ―appear‖ shows that ultimately we may be 
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deceived by an emotional response. However, passions that are affected through a 
noticeable ―labour‖ are to be distrusted based on a ―natural sense of propriety.‖ That 
―passion‖ might ―extinguis[h] our humanity‖ is not just a suggestive turn of phrase for 
Smith. Rather, the sympathetic response is one of moderation and control, based on a 
sincerity that comes through rational inquiry and composure. Smith contrasts real, or 
―plain,‖ emotions, and those that are contrived merely to provoke a reaction. 
In his discussion of the social basis of moral conscience, Smith‘s theory of the 
impartial spectator evokes the detachment that I have described in my previous chapters, 
particularly in the figure of the ―modest witness,‖ who defines the protocols of objectivity 
in early experimental discourse. While the spectator is moved, he does little to respond by 
way of action. The main activity of the spectator is the empathy that leads to 
identification. According to Smith, since we are driven by the perceptions of others, we 
should judge our actions as though we are being observed and evaluated. In discussing 
―the principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove our own conduct,‖ 
Smith argues that such assessment can only occur through a disciplined detachment, 
claiming ―[w]e can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any 
judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural 
station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance‖ (128). This distance requires 
imagining the perspective of other observers who would view and evaluate the action, but 
not just any observer: we must imagine the perspective of one who operates without 
passions or motives aggravated by social circumstance or individual desire. Instead, 
Smith writes, ―[w]e endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair 




is a social product, a mirror of social feeling.‖
542
 However, the ideal social observer 
understands the rules of social activity, but does not participate – who stands apart, rather 
than among. In Smith‘s view, social approval drives the agent to appropriate action 
through the imaginative evaluation of a detached observer. 
The basis of the evaluation of the impartial spectator is the sympathy that Smith 
has already described: by acting in such a way that would engender the sympathetic 
response, one engages in what Vivienne Brown calls a ―dialogical scrutiny of oneself.‖
543
 
However, this scrutiny is founded on established social protocols that both the spectator 
and the actor share. Emotions have a social and rhetorical foundation: Smith judges them 
based on the response of the observer – whether or not someone overreacts to grief or 
humor, for instance. Sympathy emerges through shared values that occur through 
observation and approbation. In that sense, sympathy and persuasion have the similar 
goal of identification through those shared values. Sympathy is essential to the possibility 
of persuasion. 
Of course, an even more famous spectator figure in the eighteenth century is 
Joseph Addison and Richard Steele‘s Mr. Spectator, a self-fashioned icon of journalistic 
objectivity and social propriety. Compared with dynamic orator figures, Mr. Spectator 
offers a direct contrast. He is quiet where they are loud, restrained where they are 
animated. In his first essay, he introduces himself to his reader:  
Thus I live in the World, rather as a Spectator of Mankind, than as one of the 
Species; by which means I have made my self a Speculative Statesman, Soldier, 
Merchant, and Artizan, without ever medling with any Practical Part in Life. I am 
very well versed in the Theory of an Husband, or a Father, and can discern the 
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Errors in the Œconomy, Business, and Diversion of others, better than those who 
are engaged in them; as Standers-by discover Blots, which are apt to escape those 
who are in the Game. I never espoused any Party with Violence, and am resolved 
to observe an exact Neutrality between the Whigs and Tories, unless I shall be 
forc'd to declare myself by the Hostilities of either side. In short, I have acted in 





Mr. Spectator‘s authority lies in his relative absence, his non-participation, and his 
intellectual neutrality, despite the raging hostilities that surround him. Fashioning himself 
as an avatar of philosophical detachment, he anticipates the ideal impartiality that Smith 
describes as necessary to make a social judgment. Of course, though Mr. Spectator never 
partakes in the flawed cultural settings he observes, as a ―looker-on‖ he is in a prime 
position to offer commentary. Detachment and pronounced neutrality allow Mr. Spectator 
a pristine ethos because he is uncorrupted by the excesses of the social scenes he only 
observes. Mr. Spectator‘s sanction comes through knowledge attained through impartial 
observation, not active participation. 
 Critiques and satires of the orator center on his presence, his bodily force, and the 
potentially dangerous gyrations of his voice. As I have noted, the elocutionists celebrated 
precisely this force and centrality, offering students the means to attain this enlarged 
presence. Alternately, Mr. Spectator defines himself by his absence, as what Erin Mackie 
calls the ―impersonal arbiter of the ‗higher,‘ more absolute standards of nature, law, 
civilization, and humanity itself.‖
545
  Orators are invasive and confrontational, 
intervening and speaking figures, as opposed to Mr. Spectator, who celebrates the 
archetypal category to which he belongs, ―the Fraternity of Spectators who live in the 
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World without having a thing to do in it.‖
546
 Critics present the orator as a force of 
unwelcome intervention whose rhetorical energy and premeditated tactics signal his 
inherent emptiness. The spectator offers the opposite – defined by a lack of presence and 
voice, his philosophical contemplation is presented not in the form of a call to action, but 
as a wry aside. Mr. Spectator gains authority through the sedate composure that his 
written style suggests. As Hugh Blair notes in one of the three chapters that he dedicates 
to exploring the virtues (and occasional faults) of Addison‘s style in The Spectator, ―to be 
highly pleased with his manner of writing, is the criterion of one‘s having acquired a 
good taste in English stile.‖
547
 The spectator provides a model for ethos in the 
authoritative disinterest that comes across as objectivity. 
In these configurations, the impartial spectator is both an audience member and a 
rhetor. By observing and assessing action, the spectator convinces without speaking or 
writing. Smith establishes the conditions of neutrality that must occur in any observation 
by personifying moral judgment as a spectral figure that departs from the messiness and 
muddled nature of human passions and is elevated to a position of objective judgment. In 
this imaginative gesture, we learn to evaluate both others and ourselves. Charles 
Griswold writes that ―to adopt the standpoint of the impartial spectator is implicitly to 
hold that one‘s judgments ought to persuade others.‖
548
 
Smith‘s lectures on rhetoric, then, can be read not so much as the means of 
achieving persuasion, as attaining and provoking sympathy through linguistic means, 
whether written or oral. This is not Smith‘s sole focus throughout the lectures – to a 
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modern reader, the emphases of the extant lectures reads as an immersive course on the 
subjects of the humanities with a focus on their style and organization. Throughout, 
Smith extols the philosophical and linguistic ideals of a simple style while locating 
figurative excess in the classical tradition. In his second lecture, he explains, 
What are generally called ornaments or flowers in language, as allegoricall, 
metaphoricall and such like expressions are very apt to make ones stile dark and 
perplex‘d. Studying much to vary the expression leads one also frequently into a 
dungeon of metaphorical obscurity. (8) 
Smith does not merely advocate stylistic precision for the purpose of clear 
communication. By studying figurative language, his students risk not only confusing 
audiences but also themselves through an excessive layering of tropes. Ornamental 
language muddies the epistemological picture that projects like Smith‘s lectures aim to 
correct. The pomposity of affectation is here presented as dangerous. Smith has in mind 
his students‘ ability to delude themselves through attention to style more than subject, as 
meaning is lost in a haze of obscurity. The ―dungeon of metaphorical obscurity‖ also 
deters the more important goal of sympathy. 
Since Smith believes that the most compelling and meaningful acts of persuasion 
happen through sympathy, the only language appropriate to engender this effect is that 
uncalculated sentiment produced through what he calls ―just and naturall forms.‖  In the 
second lecture, Smith explains that ―it is very improper for Orators‖ to adopt a ―plain 
simple style‖ when ―their design is to rouse the passions‖ through ―strong and perhaps 
exaggerated passions‖ (7). With this gesture, he admits that the affective tactics of 
rhetoric are necessary within the monologic construction of the public speech. But this 




must acknowledge that such animated gestures and florid stylistic moves still have their 
effects on audiences. Stephen McKenna explains,  
only perspicuous language can communicate the often abstract complexities of 
contextuality with any precision, and only appropriate language  . . . discloses 
sentiment not as mere psychological fact or raw affect, but as a particular kind of 
moral state itself emanating from the causal web of emotion, character, social 
context, and circumstance. Any kind of emotional display, whether linguistic or 
physical, can convey the mere fact that a person is simply having an emotion. But 
only appropriately made speech reliably discloses what otherwise might appear to 
be merely reflexive behavior as a kind of moral action.
549
 
McKenna adds, ―impropriety might be a sign of poorly formed moral character.‖ To 
return to his censure of tropes, Smith fittingly offers his most critical censure of 
hyperbole because it signals an artificial intensification of supposedly natural emotions. 
Significantly, it ―has no beauty itself‖ (31). Hyperbole takes the focus off of the object 
being described and shifts it to the exaggerated language used to describe it. Elsewhere, 
as he notes, figures will be found ―in the lowest and most vulgar conversation‖ (34). 
Since sympathy is actualized through the ―just and naturall,‖ figurative language corrupts 
Smith‘s idealized view of communication through ―pompous sounding expressions.‖ 
In Smith, the efficacy of the sympathetic act to bring about persuasion makes it 
the proper domain of rhetoric. Students should not be schooled in affective devices, but in 
an understanding of sympathy. While the traditional rhetorical scene is characterized by a 
kind of affective violence, Smith eradicates this vehemence from rhetoric of through his 
endorsement of a plain style that resists figuration. Smith substitutes the ideal of the 
orator with that of a sympathetic speaker who finds an emotional language outside of 
rhetorical strategy. 
Hugh Blair: Revising Rhetoric 
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In 1762, Hugh Blair became the first professor of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres at 
the University of Edinburgh, a position he held until his death in 1783.
550
 Blair was a 
renowned teacher, and his success in the classroom is most enhanced and memorialized 
by the continuing influence of the version of Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres 
published in 1783. Blair apparently published his lectures because he was concerned 
about their unauthorized circulation and felt ―threatened with surreptitious 
publications.‖
551
 There were twenty-six abridgements of the Lectures in Great Britain and 
thirty-seven in the United States.
552
 It ―became a staple of instruction for half the 
educated English speaking world.‖
553
 In the Critical Review, an anonymous reviewer 
recommends the lectures as a ―more comprehensive view of what relates to these subjects 
than is to be received from any one book in our language.‖
554
  
Blair‘s work may have been so popular because its accessibility gave readers the 
opportunity to engage with and emulate the sophisticated world that the author describes. 
As Winifred Bryan Horner explains regarding the goals of students who would have 
attended Blair‘s lectures, ―‘good English‘ became a rung on the ladder‖  for a ―large and 
powerful merchant class and those aspiring to better themselves.‖
555
 As Blair explains in 
his first and foundational lectures to his students, 
according as society improves and flourishes, men acquire more influence over 
one another by means of reasoning and discourse; and in proportion as that 
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influence is felt to enlarge, it must follow, as a natural consequence, that they will 
bestow more care upon the methods of expressing their conceptions with 
propriety and eloquence. (I.2) 
 
 Blair sets up the lectures as a move from rudeness to refinement, preparing his audience 
to become more intelligent participants in the world around them. Rather than express 
values of civic eloquence as a vehicle for producing social change, Blair sees rhetoric as 
instilling a social order of which he was an eloquent sermonizer. Even as he seemingly 
provides his students access by allowing them to participate in civil discourse, his 
emphasis on what Thomas Miller calls the ―introspective turn toward belletristic 
sentiment‖ works to encourage personal development more than active civic 
participation.
556
 Even though those two goals are not completely oppositional, Blair‘s 
lectures prioritize an individual improvement that has a private rather than public end. 
That Blair specifically sees rhetoric as the primary forum for discussing decorum, taste, 
and propriety, rather than the production of speeches, reflects the fundamental shift that 
the discipline underwent in the period. 
The accessibility of Blair‘s Lectures was one of its most important selling points. 
The comprehensive and comprehensible qualities of the Lectures gave audiences a 
thorough yet critical survey of classicism. Linda Ferreira Buckley explains that there is 
little original theory in Blair and that he should be viewed as a ―great synthesizer‖ who 
―expressed a safe middle ground.‖
557
 The ―safe‖ nature of the work is intentional, as Blair 
clearly sees the role of rhetoric as important for grooming polite speakers who are 
capable of auditing, rather than producing, persuasive speeches. Barbara Warnick has 
noted that Blair is part of a broad move to reorient the focus of rhetoric from the 
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production of persuasive texts to their reception.
558
 Thomas Miller writes that Blair 
―preach[es] the virtues of self-control, orderly subservience, and liberal tolerance in ways 
that maintained the political status quo.―
559
 Blair hoped that his students would speak 
better, but he has an equal if not greater desire to make them more adequately equipped 
for conversations about the literary and artistic world. The popularity of Blair‘s lectures 
suggests that his particular take on rhetoric was influential in defining the discipline and 
its departure from classical methodology. 
In his first lecture, Blair recognizes that rhetoric has a declining capital that must 
be redeemed through the sober and rational study that his lectures will attempt: 
Indeed, when the arts of speech and writing are mentioned, I am sensible that 
prejudices against them are apt to rise in the minds of many. A sort of art is 
immediately thought of, that is ostentatious and deceitful; the minute and trifling 
study of words alone; the pomp of expression; the studied fallacies of rhetoric; 
ornament substituted in the room of use. We need not wonder, that under such 
imputations, all study of discourse as an art, should have suffered in the opinion 
of men of understanding: and I am far from denying, that rhetoric and criticism 
have been so managed as to tend to the corruption, rather than to the 
improvement, of good taste and true eloquence. But sure it is equally possibly to 
apply the principles of reason and good sense to this art, as to any other that is 
cultivated among men. If the following Lectures have any merit, it will consist in 
an endeavour to substitute the application of these principles in the place of 
artificial and scholastic rhetoric; in an endeavour to explode false ornament, to 
direct attention more towards substance than show, to recommend good sense as 
the foundation of all good composition and simplicity as essential to all true 
ornament. (I.3) 
Blair is clearly on the defensive here. The ―prejudices‖ he finds are broad enough to 
include the philosophical complaints of Sprat, Hobbes, and Locke, and specific to suggest 
the more recent mockery of orators by Pope and Fielding. Blair views himself as 
rehabilitating the study of rhetoric from the both the ―ostentatious and deceitful‖ and the 
―minute and trifling.‖ He frames his work as informed by the very critics who dismissed 
                                                 
558
 Barbara Warnick, The Sixth Canon: Belletristic Rhetorical Theory and Its French Antecedents 
(Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1993). 
559




rhetoric in the first place. It is crucial that Blair pins the contemporary problems on those 
who have pursued rhetoric with a focus on generative prompts or elocution. Similar to 
Smith in rejecting the ―animated eloquence‖ that discouraged sympathy, Blair sees the 
study of rhetoric as having been mismanaged by those who pursue ―artificial and 
scholastic‖ measures. In forecasting the ameliorative intention of the project, Blair 
addresses the ―men of understanding,‖ who might view his attention to rhetoric with 
suspicion. Blair shrewdly does not point out the offenders who have either minimized or 
blown out of proportion the focus of discipline. Instead, he positions himself among the 
critics, rather than apart from them. This stance is operative throughout the lectures. In 
his effort to make ―good sense‖ the foundation on which the new rhetoric is built, he 
accepts only part of the classical tradition. Blair must temper rhetoric of its misuses, 
whether that abuse is in the apparently ostentatious practices of the elocutionists or the 
bland classicism of the neoclassicists. In a later lecture, Blair characterizes the oral 
cultures as overly agonistic and ostentatious. He disdains those ―those public and 
promiscuous societies‖ that have ―an absurd rage for Public Speaking‖ (II.240-41). 
Noting that these ―societies‖ are populated largely by ―multitudes . . . of low stations and 
occupations,‖ Blair condemns these ―seminaries of licentiousness, petulance, faction, and 
folly‖ (II.241).  If mismanaged, the pursuit of rhetoric will encourage such brazen 
practices. Other approaches to rhetorical education (the ―seminaries of licentiousness‖) 
might spawn ―multitudes‖ of orators, but not the method Blair advocates as a reaction to 
such unacceptable oral training. Largely because of these ―multitudes‖ and their 




Since these oral ―beauties‖ are crafted to engage and overwhelm the passions, the 
auditor who is ―dazzled‖ by them gives in to the emotions of the moment while 
overlooking the substance. Blair‘s conceives of taste as a process of consistent refinement 
and comparison, but it is also grows through heightened awareness of the object being 
considered. Trained by the enlightened methods of Blair, the audience member becomes 
a rhetorical critic. The student of Blair‘s lectures will not be given over to the 
―superficial‖ rhetorical performances designed to gain assent through hypnotic style. The 
ideal student will be able to ―distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every 
performance‖ (I.36). 
In his recognition that crude and florid speaking practices are endemic, Blair pits 
mass response against the tasteful reaction that a polite listener should first consider and 
then articulate. Blair notes that the ―public‖ is tempted to respond overzealously to any 
newly released work because ―[t]here are both a great vulgar and a small, apt to be 
catched and dazzled by very superficial beauties‖ (I.39). He later admits, ―The public ear 
is now so much accustomed to a correct and ornamented style, that no writer can, with 
safety, neglect the study of it‖ (I.407). Blair‘s lectures aspire to produce a polite culture 
that will carry on the future of rhetoric in the form that he establishes. In this respect, the 
pedagogical structure of Blair‘s lectures is significant. Before broaching topics of 
reception and history, he establishes firm guidelines of taste and criticism that students 
should follow. Equipped with the disarming mechanisms of taste and criticism, the 
student will be fortified against the improprieties of false ornament. The rest of the 




overwhelming concern for producing seasoned and discerning auditors, who will reject 
the ornate stylings that corrupt polite style. 
In framing the study of rhetoric with a comprehensive discussion of how 
persuasive and literary texts should be analyzed, Blair shows that production and 
reception are closely related. By establishing more accurate methods of assessing spoken 
and written performances, a theory (so to speak) of hearing rather than speaking, he 
situates his work within a familiar system of empirical analysis, one that is ―particularly 
concerned with examining the specific qualities of discourse and their effects.‖
560
 Blair‘s 
redirection might be seen as a shift from the production of affective speech to the analysis 
of how those effects are achieved. However, Blair is less concerned with describing and 
classifying the emotions as he is with considering their propriety. With Smith, Blair 
shares the belief that, while rhetoric has always been associated with emotional proofs, its 
future has to be linked to more rational practices, or to a more thorough theory of 
emotion that can be better described in Smith‘s terms. What comes to matter are not 
orators, but  the audiences who respond to them. 
In keeping with the goals of his new rhetorical program, Blair reevaluates the 
origins of language as they are connected with a system of linguistic and rhetorical 
education. This is deeply connected to his idea that the refinement of the individual is a 
primary (if not the primary) goal of belletristic study. Blair locates the narrative of 
refinement within the genealogy of language itself. Departing from the Ciceronian origin 
story (as well as its later Christianized instantiations in works like Wilson‘s Arte of 
Rhetorique) that civilization is the product of virtuous orators, Blair contends that the 
chaotic nature of early cultures was largely a product of its overly tropaic and symbolic 
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vernacular. In Blair‘s imaginative construction, tropes were crafted out of necessity by 
those who needed a symbolic system of communication before the invention of a codified 
alphabet. Therefore, figures of speech should be seen not as originating from 
sophisticated rhetoricians, but from passionate savages needing an organized language 
with which to express themselves. Because they lacked ―precise expression,‖ the ―early 
Language of men‖ was highly passionate and colorful, but the flourishes were derived 
naturally instead of artistically. Blair writes,  
In the infancy of all societies, men are much under the dominion of imagination 
and passion. They live scattered and dispersed ; they are unacquainted with the 
course of things ; they are, every day, meeting with new and strange objects. Fear 
and surprise, wonder and astonishment, are their most frequent passions. Their 
language will necessarily partake of this character of their minds. They will be 
prone to exaggeration and hyperbole. They will be given to describe every thing 
with the strongest colours, and most vehement expressions; infinitely more than 
men living in the advanced and cultivated periods of society, when their 
imaginations are more chastened, their passions are more tamed, and a wider 
experience has rendered the objects of life more familiar to them. Even the 
manner in which I before showed that the first tribes of men uttered their words, 
would have considerable influence on their style. Wherever strong exclamations, 
tones, and gestures, enter much into conversation, the imagination is always more 
exercised ; a greater effort of fancy and passion is excited. — Consequently, the 
fancy kept awake, and rendered more sprightly by this mode of utterance, 
operates upon style, and enlivens it more. These reasonings are confirmed by 
undoubted facts. The style of all the most early languages, among nations who are 
in the first and rude periods of society, is found, without exception, to be full of 
figures ; hyperbolical and picturesque in a high degree. We have a striking 
instance of this in the American languages, which are known, by the most 
authentic accounts, to be figurative to excess. The Iroquois and Illinois carry on 
their treaties and public transactions with bolder metaphors, and greater pomp and 
style, than we use in our poetical productions. (I.113) 
 
Once again, we see rhetoric as a civilizing tool, providing linguistic order in a 
setting of primitivism. Blair builds on contemporary ethnographic accounts of the 
―Iroquois and Illinois‖ whose ―pomp and style‖ reflect their lack of refinement. In such 




imagination needs to be ―chastened‖ through rational development that comes from 
living in ―more cultivated periods of societys.‖ However, Blair is more vivid in 
emphasizing those cultures as ostentatious rather than merely rude, as they are depicted in 
Cicero and later Thomas Wilson. He imagines the speaking practices of ―first and rude 
periods‖ as an idiom in which rampant symbolism and poetical excess ruled. The 
societies were – to use Blair‘s language – fanciful rather than progressive, relying on 
animated gestures and vivid symbols. Fittingly, the next lecture is titled the ―rise and 
progress of Language and of Writing,‖ suggesting that the move away from figuration is 
part of a general narrative of improvement that led to semantic precision. Further, 
through the development of writing technologies, language ―was brought to its highest 
state of perfection‖ (I. VII.132). In linking figurative language to an uncivilized passion, 
Blair is even more emphatic than Smith in marking it as a signifier of excess. Of 
particular interest is Blair‘s evaluation of primitive description, which is a potent 
departure from the empirical accuracy at which writers of the period aimed. The 
―strongest colors and most vehement expressions‖ overwhelm any inherent substance. 
Also, the savage body is animated in such a way that Blair links with a so-called crude 
society.  
To some degree, Blair celebrates the lively imagination that leads to such 
invented language. Even if, as Neil Rhodes writes, Blair‘s evaluation of the dynamic oral 
character of these invented societies is ―essentially one of loss,‖
561
 he firmly links 
contemporary linguistic problems with the oral practices of an untutored world. For Blair, 
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this striking natural energy should never be emulated except through an aesthetic form, 
such as poetry. His nostalgia for the past does not extend into any practical or 
philosophical instantiation. The message is the same: in the move to ―advanced and 
cultivated states of society,‖ a primarily oral character becomes less and less necessary. 
Blair‘s accompanying valorization of the evolution to writing reflects what Walter Ong 
has described as a ―technologizing of the word‖ as ―print situates words in space more 
relentlessly than writing ever did.‖
 562
 With that technology comes new assumptions 
about the problematic values of the oral and the enhanced virtues of the written. Marshall 
McLuhan has persuasively argued that the transition from oral to written discourse was 
part of a technological shift that had lingering effects on human cognition and 
consciousness.
563
 As the eighteenth century uneasily welcomed an increasingly more 
ubiquitous print culture and the proliferation of new genres that it could more easily 
produce, the emphasis on writing can be seen as linked to this opportunistic need to have 
both new authors and new critics. Yet Blair is quick to acknowledge the ―sense of loss‖ 
that Neil Rhodes argues characterizes his discussion of the virtues and failings of writing 
and speech. As has been noted, in Blair and Smith, rhetorical study became consumed 
more with matters of writing than it ever had before. Part of this transition can be seen in 
the inclusion of ―Belles-Lettres‖ to the title of Blair‘s project, a move he shared with 
Smith. 
The questionable status of the trope is a foundational assumption for Blair‘s 
theory of appropriate linguistic and rhetorical practices. My project so far has seen many 
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attacks on rhetoric that center on the trope as the most problematic feature of practices 
that root their success in intentional ambiguity and enthusiasm. Yet with Blair‘s location 
of the trope in an imagined primitivism, he accounts for the progressive need for its 
eventual removal. He writes, ―When men were furnished with proper and familiar names 
for every object, both sensible and moral, they were not obliged to use so many 
circumlocutions‖ (I.115). If rhetoric is the province of figurative language, Blair sees it as 
the necessary management of those figures. For new rhetoricians like Smith and Blair, 
the centrality of the trope mars the ―artificial and scholastic rhetoric‖ that they are 
dedicated to replacing. 
 Blair‘s consistent association of the elevated energy of tropes with the 
excessiveness of primitive passion anticipates a more specific anxiety toward the 
affective speaker that he will express in later lectures.
564
 The early world was full of 
florid orators, each using figures and symbols in an attempt to outdo the other. Blair‘s 
call for the regulation of figurative language is a part of his rhetorical program of 
mannered civility that reflected the progress of the culture away from such extravagance 
and also the problems of signification. As I have noted, Blair joined Smith in departing 
from the Ciceronian approach that characterized earlier texts. However, while Smith 
sticks largely to theory and potential applications, Blair is much more interested in giving 
his students a discussion in the foundations of eloquence. Amongst Scottish thinkers, this 
makes him unique, yet it should not be seen as an unqualified endorsement of the 
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classical writers whom he surveys. Throughout, he contends that the rhetorical methods 
of the Greeks and Romans were a contemporaneous response to the venues in which they 
would take place.  
 When Blair turns to the classical world, he finds many of the same faults as the 
imagined setting of ―the infancy of all societies.‖ Ancient orators such as Cicero and 
Demosthenes may have been archetypes of dynamic eloquence, yet their methods do not 
hold up under the scrutiny of the modern critical observer. Blair warns against ―an 
injudicious imitation of ancient Orators, who, both in their pronunciation and gesture, and 
in their figures of expression, used a bolder manner than what the greater coolness of 
modern taste will readily suffer‖ (II.57). His analysis of classical rhetoric is not limited to 
his revision of generative principles and the tendency to overemphasize figurative 
language. He also censures and evaluates the veneration for classical orators whom Ward 
and Lawson celebrated unequivocally. As Hume called for the revival of a Demosthenes 
figure who would rouse Britain out of its slumber, Blair critiques the methods such a 
figure would use, anticipating the even more explicit challenge from Joseph Priestley that 
I discuss in my last section. When Blair is forced to evaluate the speaking orator, he 
offers many critical remarks about the classical speakers established as archetypes as 
eloquence. 
 Blair connects the success of ancient orators to their settings, rather than their 
abilities. In Lectures 25 and 26, Blair turns to a ―history of eloquence‖ that focuses 
primarily on those Roman and Greek figures. To attempt to emulate those orators would 
come across as ridiculous before the refined audience that Blair nurtures in his opening 




Blair admits that the mention of Cicero‘s name ―suggests everything that is splendid in 
oratory‖ (II.26). Blair uses Cicero as a model of how one can be both proper and 
passionate, as his arguments are both ―arranged with great propriety‖ and ―always full 
and flowing.‖ Nonetheless, immediately after Blair describes Cicero‘s renowned ability 
to engage the passions, he turns to his defects: 
Ciceronian Eloquence is a pattern so dazzling by its beauties, that, if not 
examined with accuracy and judgment, it is apt to betray the unwary into a faulty 
imitation; and I am of opinion, that it has sometimes produced this effect. In most 
of his Orations, especially those composed in the earlier part of his life, there is 
too much art; even carried the length of ostentation. There is too visible a parade 
of Eloquence. He seems often to aim at obtaining admiration, rather than at 
operating conviction, by what he says. Hence, on some occasions, he is showy 
rather than solid; and diffuse, where he ought to have been pressing. His 
sentences are, at all times, round and sonorous; they cannot be accused of 
monotony, for they possess variety of cadence; but, from too great a study of 
magnificence, he is sometimes deficient in strength. On all occasions, where there 
is the least room for it, he is full of himself. His great actions, and the real services 
which he had performed to his country, apologize for this in part; ancient 
manners, too, imposed fewer restraints from the side of decorum; but, even after 
these allowances made, Cicero's ostentation of himself cannot be wholly palliated; 
and his Orations, indeed all his works, leave on our minds the impression of a 
good man, but withal, of a vain man. (II.27-28) 
 
Blair has many issues with ―Ciceronian Eloquence,‖ but the consistent concern is that 
Cicero‘s unrestrained pomposity is too much of a performance. When Blair calls 
attention to the ―visible . . . parade of Eloquence,‖ he suggests that critical auditors would 
be suspicious of the artifice that Cicero makes no attempt to conceal. With suggestive 
phrasing, Blair writes that Cicero is ―full of himself‖ – his language draws attention to the 
speaker (his ―showy . . . admiration‖) rather than to the subject (the ―solid‖ ―strength‖ 
which would better secure ―conviction‖), as he leaves his audience with recalling the 




Cicero‘s success is due to the features of the pre-modern world in which he lived, of 
more historical than practical interest.  
By contrast, Blair exhorts the decorum of Demosthenes because he is not, like 
Cicero, ―full of himself.‖ His endorsement of Demosthenes fits with the more appropriate 
species of eloquence that the Lectures conveys: a subject-centered rhetoric that resists 
artifice and emphasizes a perspicuous naturalism. Though Demosthenes acts with ―all the 
art of an Orator,‖ and through his Phillipics incites his audience to action, he does so 
because of the substance rather than the style of the argument (II.21). Compared to 
Cicero, who in Blair‘s castigation seems to take a special delight in the obscure trope, 
Demosthenes ―depis[es] the affected and florid manner which the Rhetoricians of that age 
followed‖ (II.20). Blair argues that Demosthenes succeeds because, unlike Cicero, his 
presence gradually diminishes as the argument itself enraptures his hearers. The 
description can be read as direct contrast to the overpowering presence of Cicero.  
He appears to attend much more to things than to words. We forget the orator, and 
think of the business. He warms the business. He warms the mind, and impels the 
action. He has no parade and ostentation . . .  but is like a man full of his subject, 
who, after preparing his audience by a sentence or two for hearing plain truths, 
enters directly on business. (II.21) 
In telling his students that the ideal rhetorical performance is one in which they ―forget 
the orator,‖ Blair stresses the stability of the subject over the problematic speaker who 
might potentially mislead them. In the suggestive phrasing, Blair calls for an orator 
whose presence diminishes as the argument takes effect. As he will explain later, the 
content of Demosthenes‘ orations is so thorough that the orator becomes the neutral 
medium through which it is conveyed.   
To turn Blair‘s analysis of this ideal rhetor into an analysis of his own work, 




within the discourse of rhetorical theory. Blair‘s comments to his students reveal his deep 
investment in rehabilitating the rhetorical tradition from its mismanagement by precisely 
the figure who must be largely expunged. Even when Blair turns to the production and 
reception of rhetoric, he does so with a suspicion and an anxiety toward its effects. 
Especially compared to the speakers in the neoclassical and elocutionary traditions, who 
are defined by their physical presence, this evocative image of the orator whose defining 
quality is his disappearance reflects the move from the primacy of the affective speaker to 
his disposability. 
Like Goldsmith, Blair admits that, despite the improprieties of ancient orators 
such as Cicero,  modern eloquence still has no similar defining characters and is 
―undoubtedly inferior‖ (II.38). Modern  eloquence is too ―humble . . . in its efforts,‖ 
though Blair does not necessarily see this as a dilemma that must be solved. The Greeks 
and Romans were occupied with a ―vehement and passionate [eloquence] by which to 
inflame the minds of their hearers, and hurry their imaginations away: and, suitable to 
this vehemence of thought, was their vehemence of gesture and action‖ (II.41).  
Contemporaneous speakers ―are obliged to be more reserved than the antients, in their 
attempts to elevate the imagination, and warm the passions; and by the influence of 
prevailing taste, their own genius is sobered and chastened.‖ Though he admits that this 
restraint has happened ―perhaps, in too great a degree‖ (II.42), he nonetheless sees that 
the contemporaneous move toward propriety rather than the ―vehement‖ language of 
antiquity is a necessary one.  
In Blair, the celebration of the more accurate and appropriate speech of his 




the earlier lectures. As with his celebration of the vibrancy of the distant past, Blair 
exhibits a slight admiration for oral force only to explain why it must be extinguished.  
He admits that the ―spoken Language has a great superiority over written Language.‖ He 
reflects Smith when he contends that, through speech, ―sympathy . . .  is one of the most 
powerful instruments of persuasion. Our sympathy is always awakened more, by hearing 
the Speaker‖ (I: 136). He concludes a discussion of writing and speaking with the 
conclusion that ―all the great and high efforts of eloquence‖ come through ―spoken, not 
of written, language‖ (I: 136). However in his discussion of writing, Blair emphasizes the 
empirical privilege of writing that speech lacks: 
The advantages of writing above speech are, that writing is both the more 
extensive, and a more permanent method of communication. More extensive, as it 
is not confined within the narrow circle of those who hear our words, but, by 
means of written characters, we can send our thoughts abroad, and propagate 
them through the world; we can lift our voice, so as to speak to the most distant 
regions of the earth. More permanent also; as it prolongs this voice to the most 
distant ages; it gives us the means of recording our sentiments to futurity, and of 
perpetuating the instructive memory of past transactions. It likewise affords this 
advantage to such as read, above such as hear, that, having the written characters 
before their eyes, they can arrest the sense of the writer. They can pause, and 
revolve, and compare, at their leisure, one passage with another: whereas, the 
voice is fugitive and passing; you must catch the words the moment they are 
uttered, or you lose them for ever.  (I: 135) 
 
Despite the advantages of speech, the written word offers both a ―broader‖ 
influence and a privileged clarity. Blair‘s description of the ―permanent method‖ reflects 
what critics in the tradition of Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan would later claim 
regarding the written word, that it implies a finality and a legitimacy that the oral cannot. 
As Ong notes, writing presents ―utterance and thought as uninvolved with all else, 
somehow self-contained, complete.‖
565
 However, when Blair uses the oral metaphor ―of 
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lift[ing] our voice,‖ he applies the affective language of oratory to the seemingly more 
placid domain of writing. Even if the spoken word is primarily the domain of 
―eloquence," Blair considers the enhanced persuasive possibilities of writing to be the 
primary focus of a disciplinary future. In the lectures, this shift can be seen in his 
comprehensive analyses of The Spectator, which (along with an analysis of Swift‘s 
writing) take up five lectures. By contrast, Blair examines only two speeches: Cicero‘s 
Oration for Cluentius and a sermon by Francis Atterbury. Of Cicero‘s speech, Blair is 
predictably critical, even as he explains that he includes it because he feels it is Cicero at 
his most concise. He explains that Atterbury is an appropriate model for pulpit style 
because ―he is most distinguished for elegance and purity of expression‖ (II.127). That 
―purity‖ is most evident in writing, so Atterbury‘s inclusion (the only prolonged example 
of pulpit eloquence) is representative of the ideal of transparency better exemplified in 
the written text that should equally inform the oral performance. If oral performance had 
a place in the emerging rhetorical theories, it had to submit to the more rigid requirements 
that were being imposed on writing. As outlined by Blair, the place that speech would 
have within rhetorical pedagogy was one that centered more on audition and criticism 
than production. Blair presents the examples of Atterbury and Cicero not so much as 
practical models but, as he does with the written pieces he evaluates, as an opportunity to 
show how criticism can be performed on oral scenes.  
In Blair‘s discussion of the relative virtues of speech and writing, he is 
consistently conscious of the uncapturable essence of the spoken word that must be 
contained as well as the unequivocal security of writing that must be pursued even in 




bridges the problems of language in science and philosophy with revised versions of 
rhetorical canons. In creating an audience suspicious of attempts to manipulate language, 
Blair  encourages the ideal speaker who wants to please that critical audience. Also, 
mirroring the rhetorical ideal of Demosthenes, Blair detaches the persuasive identity from 
the persuasive text. Blair admires writing for virtues that Roland Barthes critiques in The 
Death of the Author: ―Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject 
slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the 
body writing."
566
 While Barthes discusses writing as both a creative and a technical act, 
he elsewhere notes that the ―irreversible‖ quality of speech is what makes it at once 
―ephemeral‖ and ―indelible.‖
567
 Nonetheless, the description of the subject ―slip[ping] 
away‖ reflects the division that Blair makes in privileging the content of the speech over 
the speaker him or herself, idealizing the sense of finality and accuracy that opposes and 
improves on the slipperiness of the spoken word. The oral, characterized by its 
uncontrollable instability, escapes that finality with every utterance. 
Blair‘s project can be seen as bringing to the oral word the control that the student 
will have over the written, to give more permanence and stability to the inconsistent and 
unmanageable force of the speech. This is not an unfamiliar move even within classical 
rhetorical theory. Paul Ricouer notes that, in the transition from the apparent lawlessness 
and verbal trickery practiced by the sophists, the work of Aristotle serves as a 
philosophical bridge as it represents ―a domesticated discipline, solidly bound to 
philosophy by the theory of argumentation.‖
568
 By making rhetoric submit to the rules of 
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philosophy, Aristotle ―draw[s] the line between use and abuse.‖
569
 Similarly, Blair 
domesticates what Ricouer calls the ―fugitive‖ oral culture that had become so 
predominant in the earlier part of the century.
570
 Against the specter of disrupting orators, 
Blair‘s rhetoric attempts to stabilize the tensions that rhetoric had traditionally animated. 
In addition to his emphasis on rational analysis and critical reflection over persuasive 
skill, he advocates a language that can be characterized with the same empirical accuracy 
as the written word,  which pushes for agreed-upon polite sentiments rather than radical 
disagreements. Amidst the other transitions from an ―old‖ to a new rhetoric, we can find 
an anxiety toward the force of the orator. In a definitive statement, Blair claims that 
―[t]rue Eloquence is the art of placing truth in the most advantageous light for conviction 
and persuasion‖ (I:317). Eloquence becomes, for Blair, a matter of arrangement, 
organization, and presentation. 
David Hartley, Joseph Priestley, and the Emotions 
For Blair and Smith, rhetorical theory negotiates the power of the orator through a 
combination of analysis and more appropriate conceptions of the oral. The ―new‖ oral 
protocol ―forgets‖ the powerful voice of the classical orator by privileging (in Smith) the 
rhetoric of sympathy and (in Blair) the precise and plain speech that will illuminate the 
subject rather than the speaker. Inherent in these attempts is a critical view of the 
judgment of the auditor and his or her susceptibility to the power of persuasive speech. 
The critical models provided by Blair reflect, in a sophisticated way, the anti-Methodists‘ 
stringent and self-serving belief in training and preparing audiences to see rhetorical 
tactics as a sign of deceptive intention; in the terms of Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca, to recognize ―discourse as a device.‖
571
 Even if oral performance 
would continue to affect hearers, at least those audiences could engage in a program of 
refinement through rhetorical education. This approach reflects the immense continuing  
concern for training or controlling audience reaction through theories of persuasion and 
oral affect.  Blair conceives an audience needing an array of critical models in order to 
give a sophisticated assessment. However, not all eighteenth-century rhetorical theorists 
were as committed to this vision of the limited power of the audience. In his Lectures on 
Oratory and Criticism, Joseph Priestley invokes David Hartley‘s emerging and 
iconoclastic psychology of association to allow for a more enhanced natural faculty 
within the listener that might be found outside of the training that Blair and Smith 
envision as necessary. 
Priestley‘s lectures did not have the influence that Blair and George Campbell 
would have in the nineteenth century, but his theory reflects similar engagements and 
interests. Compared with the classical orthodoxy of Lawson and Ward and the 
revisionism of Smith and Blair, Priestley‘s work offers, if not a middle path, an 
alternative direction. This is most striking when examined through the perspective of a 
psychology of audience, or what might more simply be called a theory of listening and 
reacting. The implications of Priestley‘s theory suggest a reevaluation of the primary 
anxiety that motivates my project. Throughout the last chapters, I have examined writers 
concerned with animated orators who have a hypnotic sway over increasingly malleable 
audiences. Priestley alternates between a vision of the audience that can be more of a 
problem for the orator because of a collective interpretive grasp, and an ability to judge 
between the sincerity of emotions and its manipulative misuse.  
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Priestley‘s intervention in rhetoric is a part of his larger investigation of human 
nature that brought him into contact with emerging innovations in education, science, and 
psychology. While we have seen other philosophers and rhetoricians take an interest in 
science, Priestley is often described as the father of modern chemistry. From 1761 to 
1767, Priestley lectured at Warrington Academy, a dissenting academy often referred to 
as the ―Athens of the North.‖
572
 In An Essay on a Course of Liberal Education for Civic 
and Active Life, Priestley argues that students must be trained more in methodology than 
philology.
573
 He argues that this progressive spirit comes from an inductive 
understanding of England‘s own path to power and stability. By connecting the 
nationalistic drive to  ―wealth, power, and happiness‖ with similar pedagogical aims, 
educators and students alike can share a vision of the skills necessary for producing civic 
virtue and a rich intellectual life.
574
 Priestley‘s involvement in multiple realms of 
intellectual, academic, scientific, and public life led him to approach subjects more 
concerned with their application than in their rote memorization. In the opening pages of 
his Essay . . . on Liberal Education, Priestley laments that the ―defect of our present 
system‖ is that it lacks ―a proper course of studies  . . . for Gentlemen who are designed 
to fill the principal stations of active life.‖
575
 Throughout the Essay, Priestley pushes back 
against an extreme classicism and a selective and reductive focus on an education that 
resembles an apprenticeship in a trade or subject. Thomas Miller contends that Priestley 
and his Warrington associates pushed for ―a progressive individualism that challenged 
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traditional authorities‖ and ―a utilitarianism that valued practical applications over 
abstract speculations.‖
576
 Yet Priestley does argue that such intellectual training enhances 
even those who do not plan to pursue scholarship. He notes the objection ―that a turn for 
speculation unfits men for business,‖
577
 yet argues that this intellectual development 
makes practical application that much more effective. Without the turn to ―speculation‖ 
that comes from training in subjects like belles-lettres, natural philosophy, or 
metaphysics, the singled-minded tradesman will ―find himself miserably bewildered, if 
he have acquired no more knowledge than was sufficient for him while he followed the 
direction of others.‖
578
 Priestley bridges a utilitarian idea of education with his belief that 
intellectual endeavors would advance both a ―progressive individualism‖ and a 
practicality that together prepare students for public life. 
Consistent with other new rhetoricians, Priestley does not advocate for classical 
theory, even if he often turns to its history to make relevant points about persuasion and 
belief. Also, Priestley creates a new argumentative structure that revises the classical six-
part structure. Sharing a suspicion toward classical models of invention, preferring 
instead a Baconian idea of ―recollection,‖ Priestley is consistent with his predecessors in 
his criticism of an elaborate style that he connects to Ciceronianism.
579
 In terms of 
organization, he describes ―analytic‖ methods that draw on Locke and Hutcheson, and 
―synthetic‖ models based on Hume and Hartley (55-71). Priestley even more explicitly 
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than any of his contemporaries challenges the style that he believes Ciceronianism 
encourages: 
It is, likewise, proper that all Englishmen in particular should be informed, that a 
person of liberal education in this country can hardly ever be in such a situation, 
as will not render the imitation of some of the boldest, the most successful, and 
admired stroke of Roman, not to say Grecian eloquence, extremely improper and 
ridiculous. The English pulpit, the English bar, and the English senate, require an 
eloquence more addressed to the reason, and less directly to the passions, than the 
harangues of a Roman pleader, or the speech of a Roman senator. Our hearers 
have generally more good sense and just discernment, at least they are naturally 
more cool and phlegmatic; both which qualities check a propensity to strong 
emotions: and marks of great vehemence must appear absurd in a speaker when 
the audience is unmoved, and sees nothing to occasion such emotion. (113-114) 
 
Contrasting the values of the ―improper and ridiculous‖ appearance of classical 
eloquence with a more reasoned rhetoric, Priestley emphasizes the evolved and refined 
audience, who will be unmoved by the ―great vehemence‖ of such performances. The 
standards of classical oratorical performance might be valuable for those studying the 
Roman and Grecian world, for instance, but they should never be applied to modern 
settings. Imagining classical speakers, Blair and Smith mainly think about propriety and 
the incompatibility of ancient eloquence with polite protocols. However, in this case, 
Priestley argues in terms of efficacy. Why must the vehemence of the ―Roman pleader‖ 
be rejected? Not so much because his rhetorical tactics are so antiquated, but because the 
rational faculties of contemporaneous listeners are so elevated. ―Our hearers,‖ given more 
to ―just discernment,‖ will be suspicious of the performance itself. The emotion of the 
orator will not be duplicated in the audience.  
However, despite his rejection of classical vehemence, Priestley is deeply 
interested in the fate of emotional appeals, and particularly the role the imagination and 




the Scottish new rhetoricians, Priestley participates in the paradigmatic shift from 
production to reception. However, consistent with his interest in David Hartley‘s 
association psychology, Priestley also sees the audience member as more than a passive 
receptacle for the intentions of the rhetor. Priestley recognizes the audience as arbiters 
who must be taken seriously, who have receptive capacities equal to the orator‘s 
persuasive powers. 
In the preface to his published lectures, Priestley explains that that his primary 
reason for making the ―lectures public‖ is to provide an ―illustration of the doctrine of the 
association of ideas, to which there is a constant reference through the whole work‖ (i-ii). 
In a later lecture, he explains specifically what is so valuable about Hartley‘s work: 
Dr. Hartley, proposing a new hypothesis of the principles of the human mind, 
examines very particularly every thing relating to, or dependent upon the mind of 
man, viz. sensations, ideas, muscular motion, the external senses, affections, 
memory, imagination, reasoning, dreams, &c. and endeavours to show that none 
of the phenomena of any of them contradict his hypothesis; that many of them 
admit a peculiarly easy and complete illustration by it; and that the most difficult 
cases are not rendered more difficult, but rather easier by the help of it. And lest 
this hypothesis concerning the principles of the human mind should be suspected 
to bear an unfavourable aspect affect upon a plan of human duty, and human 
expectations, he considers the whole of both systematically; showing, whenever 
he hath opportunity, that the evidences of religion, natural and revealed, with the 
rule of life drawn from it, receive additional light and evidence from it; and, 
lastly, that it hath a happy influence both upon our conduct in this life, and upon 
our expectations after death (61). 
 
Hartley‘s emphasis on the mind‘s ability to piece together and order information leads 
Priestley to an innovative discussion of the role of emotions in processing speech. 
Priestley advocates Hartley‘s hypothesis as a system that can illuminate epistemological 
issues such as knowledge formation and retention. He also sees Hartley‘s work (unlike, 
he explains, Hume‘s) as consistent with natural revelation and biblical truth. Priestley 




fact that he sees his contribution to rhetorical theory in large part as an advertisement for 
Hartley‘s psychological principles shows how much he considered the work as essential 
to a discussion of persuasion. Priestley uses the underpinnings of Hartley‘s neurological 
speculations to show how the auditor is empowered as a decision maker and an 
interpreter of concepts. In several lectures, Priestley shows a specific interest in the role 
the emotions play in this act of interpretation. He is less interested in the speaker‘s 
development of pathos than in how the audience responds to it. He frequently contends 
that the ―sensible‖ auditor is able to decipher true from false emotion, which implies a 
theory of production similar to the ideas of Cicero and Quintilian that eloquence can only 
be achieved by a speaking subject who speaks on a combination of moral and intellectual 
conviction. Yet Priestley argues that the orator who speaks with false emotion will be 
found out by sensible listeners.  
 Hartley‘s complex theory is an early empirical attempt to define neurological 
processes, and thus appeals to Priestley‘s attempt to think in a more elaborate way about 
audiences.  Hartley‘s psychology ―reduces the principles of human nature to their basic 
element – the association of simple ideas.‖
580
 As Ann George explains, Hartley believed 
that ―sensations produce vibrations transmitted through nerves; different kinds of 
sensations produce different vibrations . . . in different areas of the brain.‖
581
 When a 
series of sensations happens, they produce a train of thought that stimulates moral and 
emotional development. Explicit in Hartley is the material essence of thought, rather than 
its intellectual, ephemeral nature. Unlike Locke, for instance, who believed that ideas are  
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formed through a combination of external sensation and internal reflection, Hartley‘s 
epistemology limits  the development of complex ideas to sensation alone.
582
 Assent 
comes not through a passive act of reflection, but through the dynamic process of 
association. 
Hartley‘s theories have significant implications for rhetoric. By making the 
process of association central, Hartley emphasizes the need for rhetors to have a 
grounding of audience psychology and rhetorical technique. Once the audience member 
receives the sensations, he or she undertakes intricate activities of association and 
connection. Hartley recognizes that the most ―visible idea, being more glaring and 
distinct than the rest, performs the office of a symbol to all the rest, suggests them, and 
connects them together.‖
583
 The most ―violent‖ vibrations are most likely to ―recur in the 
imagination,‖ and these govern the remaining process of association. Whatever appears 
most powerful to the imagination will control its development, acting as the central force 
around which all other ideas orbit and are arranged. In other words, passionate response 
results in a kind a rational arrangement.  
Hartley‘s associative principle depends first and foremost on the power of the 
most remarkable impression. All the lesser impressions, vibrations, and ideas are 
organized into a coherent or (in a terminology Hartley shares with Locke) ―complex‖ 
train of thought. This happens through all kinds of sensual interaction, but Hartley 
employs rhetorical terminology when describing aural excitement and its neurological 
and epistemological implications. He writes, 
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Rational assent then to any Proposition may be defined a Readiness to affirm it to 
be true, proceeding from a close association of the ideas suggested by the 
proposition, with the idea, or internal feeling, belonging to the word truth; or of 




In describing association and assent, he argues that each person has a different ―idea,‖ 
―feeling,‖ or ―proposition‖ connected to ―truth.‖ In that case, ―truth‖ is the ordering 
principle, itself built on vibrations, education, and experience. If an argument conforms to 
the listener‘s view of truth, assent will follow, and vice versa. However there is also the 
possibility that the vivid impression of an argument will overwhelm that same innate 
belief to the point where it creates assent. In short, the passion overwhelms whatever 
rational stronghold the individual has created.  
In the terms of eighteenth-century rhetoricians, the associative response is the 
difference between ―conviction‖ and mere ―persuasion.‖ Hartley‘s method describes 
rhetoric at its most powerful – when the sensation of the argument, whether through 
rational or emotional proofs, is enough to change entrenched moral and empirical 
judgments. Through the potential sensual overload of the rhetorical performance, the 
orator has a pivotal power. Most explicitly, Hartley discusses the work of figurative 
language, in his terms anything from a single metaphor to the depth of a fable or allegory, 
as follows: 
And they have this in common to them all, that the Properties, Beauties, 
Perfections, Desires, or Defects and Aversions, which adhere by Association to 
the Simile, Parable, or Emblem of any Kind, are insensibly, as it were, transferred 
upon the Thing represented. Hence the Passions are moved to Good or to Evil, 
Speculation is turned into Practice, and either some important Truth felt and 
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Figurative language has an unusual power in Hartley‘s epistemological paradigm because 
of the way sensation, rather than the Lockean process of recollection, stimulates ideas 
through association. When the ―properties‖ of the metaphor overwhelm the imagination, 
the violent compulsion of association results in the nearly hypnotic force that he 
describes in the above passage. 
Priestley‘s work is informed by this theory of reception that emphasizes the 
―connective formation through chains of sensory association.‖
586
 Because of the 
Hartleian focus of the lectures, Priestley dedicates the bulk of them to the role of the 
audience. He defines oratory as ―the natural faculty of speech improved by art; whereby 
the use of it is perfected, facilitated, and extended; and consequently its value and 
influence greatly increased‖ (1). Priestley does not expend much space talking about how 
speech is ―improved‖ through artificial methods. Instead, he examines the psychological 
motivations behind both the speaker and the audience. Throughout the lectures, Priestley 
mostly focuses on rational appeals, claiming that the ―ultimate end of oratory‖ is ―the 
―informing of the judgment, and influencing the practice‖ (68). Based on that definition, 
Priestley seems primarily focused on rational modes of persuasion, on logos rather than 
pathos. Ann George claims that the Lectures contend that ―argument is most noble when 
it stands apart from pathetic appeal‖ (95). Indeed, Priestley claims that ―the appearance of 
candour and impartiality‖ offers the orator the most persuasive advantage (123). Even as 
Priestley describes the manipulation of ―appearance‖ as advantageous to an orator‘s aims, 
he offers his listener tips to evaluate appearance and discern logos even when the pathetic 
is the primary appeal. 
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 For Priestley, the orator is a performer, a fact that he alternately celebrates and 
critiques. In the passage when he contrasts the composed English rhetor and the ―absurd‖ 
classical rhetor, he pits an ideal rhetoric against dramatic grandiloquence, ultimately 
implying that the latter belongs only on the stage.   His description of ―candour and 
impartiality‖ as ―appearance‖ rather than substance is not merely a suggestive choice of 
words, but rather further evidence of his contention that ultimately even sincerity itself is 
performative. Even if all oratory is essentially a kind of acting, Priestley exhorts that a 
guiding moderation is necessary to make this performance work.  
  As he calls into question the power of the orator, Priestley describes an 
empowered audience who will work collectively to decipher meaning and expose 
rhetorical conceits. In an early section, Priestley describes the difference between a 
―narration‖ and a ―description.‖ He writes, ―The former is sufficient, where it answers a 
writer‘s purpose barely to inform his reader of the reality of the event; the latter is 
necessary, if he be desirous that the reader be interested in it, and affected by it‖ (28). The 
description, he will later state, relies on the figurative language that Hartley found so 
affective. However, 
literary impropriety of figurative expressions is excused only on account their 
being considered as indications of those feelings and sentiments which no words, 
literally interpreted, could describe, they should never be used but when the 
situation of the person who uses them is such as will render those feelings and 
sentiments natural. (78) 
 
In this theorization, the rhetorically enhanced expression does not have the coercive 
power that some of the prior thinkers give it. It also does not suggest, as in Smith, an 
artificiality that reveals an inherent emptiness. Instead, Priestley puts the audience in a 




phenomenon that primarily happens when confronted by a spoken performance. In this 
interaction, the body is crucial, as it can betray the feelings the orator is trying to 
counterfeit. The listener will be able to discern the passionate spectacle, described here in 
the form of the ―figurative expression,‖ from the true feeling the speaker experiences. If 
not, the rhetor will come off as artificial in that use. In other words, tropes can 
appropriately match sentiment with language.  Priestley extends beyond spoken 
performance into written discourse as well. Without that corresponding sentiment to 
match the vehemence of the figure, Priestley writes,   
there will be nothing left to excuse and cover the impropriety of the figure [as] the 
words present nothing but the naked absurdity, and the writer is detected, either in 
pretending to feelings that could have no existence, or in asserting what is 
apparently false and contradictory. (78) 
 
Priestley is unclear as to how exactly the audience will expose this ―naked absurdity,‖ yet 
is clarified when considering his lecture format. Like Blair, he wants to give his students 
critical tools to audit persuasive performances – both spoken and written – with a more 
critical eye and ear toward the tactics being used. Priestley does not dismiss rhetorical 
figures as having a natural ―impropriety,‖ but notes that they detract from substance and 
draw the attention to the ―writer,‖ who ―is detected‖ and exposed. 
To Smith, artifice in general discourages adherence to an argument, yet to 
Priestley, judging the rhetorical style can be a way for an audience to authenticate or 
invalidate the intentions of the speaker. The natural instinct of the auditor is to discern 
true and false emotions. When a speaker uses emotional tactics that he or she does not 
feel, Priestley explains, the speaker exploits the disjunction between artifice and reality: 
―When these things, which have so strong a connection in nature, are not united, the 




and the impostor be deservedly exposed‖ (114). Priestley specifically addresses the use of 
the extemporaneous as a means to enforce assent. In connection with the Methodists 
whom I discussed previously, Priestley‘s contends that the audience will be able to 
―expose‖ a counterfeit passionate performance by seeing ―the imperfect artifice‖ that the 
speaker uses. If it is merely a ―form of address which [is] adapted to gain belief‖ (115), 
the listener should be able to judge the authenticity of the emotions that the speaker 
conveys. Priestley later adds, ―no form of expression can appear natural, unless it 
correspond to the feelings of the person who uses it.‖ The orator who uses emotional 
proofs but not does feel them will be easy prey for the critical audience. 
Though not focused on the production of persuasive discourse, Priestley does 
explain the proper way in which a writer or speaker should use emotion to move the 
listeners. As I note above, artifice that does not correspond to the rhetor‘s emotional state 
will be viewed as ―imperfect‖ and inappropriate. He explains, 
In order to raise a very lively and tender sentiment, it is of advantage to describe 
the circumstances which raise it, in as few words as possible. The less time is lost 
in transition, the nearer is any sentiment brought in contrast with the preceding 
state of mind, and consequently the more sensibly it is perceived. Besides, when 
few words are sufficient to present a moving scene to the mind, it approaches 
nearly to giving a view of the scene itself, without description. The writer 
disappears, and the scene itself is before us: and to apply a general maxim to this 
particular case, if the principal and leading circumstances in any scene be 
expressed, the more negligent a writer seems to be to unfold all the particulars 
connected with them, the more will the reader imagine; and instead of his 
perceiving the effect of every circumstance of the scene separately, they will all 
crowd upon his mind in one complex sensation, and affect him with all their 
powers united. (101) 
 
Similar to Blair‘s describing the ideal act of listening to the speech as ―forget[ting] the 
orator,‖ Priestley sees the writer disappearing as the scene unfolds. Instead of forcing a 




managed to the point where it neither augments nor detracts from the orator‘s presence. 
This corresponds to Blair‘s admonition to avoid a ―too visible parade of Eloquence‖ 
(II.27-28). Yet where Blair sees that parade as evidence of vanity, Priestley speaks more 
to its inefficacy. Here, in dealing with written discourse, he describes the associative 
faculties of the audience creating a more powerful and ―complex sensation‖ than the 
orator ever can. 
For Blair, the scene that Priestley describes, in which the speaker disappears as 
the affective vision grows, is pivotal for persuasion. Priestley argues an even more 
extreme reaction through which the imaginative reader or listener ―enters into, adopts, 
and is actuated by, the sentiments that are presented to his mind‖ (127). To explain 
further, Priestley makes a series of symbolic comparisons to describe the effects on the 
listener who becomes captive to such sentiments. The affective reaction is so powerful 
that he references the out-of-control body in athletic spectacle to describe the persuasive 
moment. 
This takes place so instantaneously and mechanically, that no person whatever 
hath reflection, and presence of mind enough, to be upon his guard against some 
of the most useless and ridiculous effects of it. What person, if he saw another 
upon a precipice and in danger of falling, could help starting back, and throwing 
himself into the same posture as he would do if he himself were going to fall? At 
least he would have a strong propensity to do it. And what is more common than 
to see people playing at bowls, lean their own bodies, and writhe them into every 
possible attitude, according to the course they would have their bowl to take? It is 
true, that all men are not equally affected by this remarkable propensity. The more 
vivid are a man‘s ideas, and the greater is his general sensibility, the more 
entirely, and with the greater facility, doth he adapt himself to the situations he is 
viewing. (127) 
 
Priestley‘s language grows gradually intense, moving from the abstract to the curiously 
specific. Even if one can be ―upon his guard‖ against the power of rhetoric, Priestley calls 




Priestley returns to associative principles in terms of the sophistication of the receptive 
faculties – the degree to which one ―adapt[s]‖ to the scene instead of being overwhelmed 
by it. In this passage involving the person on a ―precipice‖ and the gyrating, writhing 
bodies of those ―playing at bowls,‖ Priestley contrasts contortion and chaos with the 
control that the sensible viewer gives a scene in the last sentence. Upon seeing athletic 
spectacle or impending danger, the watcher can give the scene an order that it does not 
have by continuing refining or ―adapt[ing]‖ oneself to the vivid imagery and pursuing a 
critical detachment by understanding its effects. 
Priestley contrasts such complex and imaginative receptive activity with what he 
calls ―mechanical‖ processes. The refined listener or reader should be able to analyze 
critically a persuasive discourse, making appropriate associations built on a sophisticated 
understanding. However, for listeners who lack this cultivation, the mind acts like a 
mechanism that can be activated by using the rhetorical techniques that Priestley 
describes the refined auditor processing with more scrutiny. When he refers to the 
inappropriateness of Cicero‘s emotive approaches for contemporary audiences, Priestley 
adds, 
An audience indeed, that is wholly illiterate, may have all their passions actuated 
by means of admiration, or astonishment, and mechanical communication; but 
then there are few English audiences composed wholly of persons of so little 
reading and reflection as makes that practicable. And it is hardly possible that a 
person whose reading has lain among English books, or has conversed with 
persons of a liberal education, should not have acquired more delicacy of taste, 
than to be taken with that gross and direct address to the passions, which Cicero 
adopted with applause. The refinement of modern times requires that we speak, 
upon all occasions, with more temper, and use more address in raising the 
passions. (114) 
 
He views classical oratory such as Cicero ―adopted‖ as a kind of fad, given to ostentation 




reducing the techniques advocated by Cicero as aiming at ―mechanical‖ response. 
Modern audiences, refined by English literature and the protocols of polite conversation, 
will not be so easily swayed. In Priestley‘s view, the rustics who respond to emotional 
appeals without inspection are curiously similar to those ancient listeners who responded 
to Cicero with ―applause.‖ However, emotional appeals may be able to bring about this 
mechanical reaction even in the most refined listeners. He writes, ―age, experience, and 
reflection may . . . . have corrected this mechanical propensity; but it will ever retain a 
sensible influence over the generality of mankind; and these are almost the only people 
we have to do with in the business of the passions and imagination.‖ (128-29). Priestley 
sees audiences as becoming increasingly capable of critiquing and correctly processing 
emotional appeals. Despite the polite sensibilities that have been developed through 
―experience,‖ however, even ―these‖ listeners are susceptible to the propensity for the 
affective power of rhetoric has to overrule the reason and consume the passions. There 
will always be the possibility that our enjoyment of affective speech counters the need for 
rational analysis that all eighteenth-century rhetors make so significant a part of their 
ideal rhetorical education. 
Conclusion 
This chapter opened with Oliver Goldsmith lamenting the death of eloquence and 
challenging the state of rhetorical education. Goldsmith died in 1774, before the 
publication of Blair‘s lectures. Even as Blair would distance himself from the 
neoclassicists, Goldsmith might still extend his critique that even these ―new‖ rhetoric 






 He might also, as Thomas Miller has more recently done, 
challenge the increasingly private nature of the new rhetoric, its emphasis on critical 
reception rather than affective performance, and its apparent removal from the scenes of 
civic action. Priestley‘s Lectures are the logical conclusion to the set of concerns that 
Smith sets in motion, in which reception is more essential than production. Rhetoricians 
are, of course, always interested in audiences, but the intense concentration on the 
psychology of the listener characterizes eighteenth-century texts more than in any earlier 
period in the history of rhetorical theory. As any history of the years following the 1783 
publication of Blair‘s Lectures would note, the subsequent years would be marked by 
violent responses, sometimes good and sometimes bad, to vehement rhetoric. In the 
immortal words of Charles Dickens from The Tale of Two Cities, ―it was the epoch of 
belief, it was the epoch of incredulity.‖
588
 As Dickens‘ famous opposition implies, 
revolutions were about listening and responding, and not with the interpretive  repose that 
Blair, Smith, and Priestley imagined. 
As Blair‘s work would enjoy an even greater popularity in the nineteenth century, 
Thomas Conley notes that rhetorical education became ―curiously irrelevant,‖ in the 
emerging contrast between ―the world of polite conversation and learning – the world of 
Blair, in fact – and on the other, the disturbances and repression .  . . in the aftermath of 
the French revolution.‖
589
  Perhaps because of these upheavals, the polite language of 
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sympathy that Blair inherits from Smith became nostalgic. As the incendiary clamors in 
America and France in the eighteenth century grew louder and louder, these texts 
represent language at its most refined and least threatening. Wilbur Samuel Howell calls 
this a ―replacement,‖ but it might better be described as a rehabilitation. Perhaps it was 
the rhetoric an intellectual culture wanted, more than the rhetoric that students needed. 
The next step, beyond the purview of this project, is to see the way eloquence and 
persuasion evolved along with and apart from the production and reception of rhetorical 
theory, both classical and modern. In the long eighteenth century, it is deeply connected 
to the presence of orators and multitudinous efforts to consign them. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 







This project began by showing that critics of rhetoric were actually rhetorical 
theorists. In my final chapter, I argued that rhetorical theorists were also critics. Through 
representations of orators, writers negotiate the relationship between rhetoric and reality, 
seeing the former as a corruptive force on the latter. That connection is not unfamiliar to 
any watcher of the contemporary news media that so often employs the term ―rhetoric‖ as 
shorthand for empty discourse or ―to reveal the way in which they are used to hide or 
rationalize exercises of power.‖
590
 During the 1992 Republican Convention, Ronald 
Reagan told his audience, ―we see all that rhetorical smoke, billowing out from the 
Democrats, well, ladies and gentlemen, I'd follow the example of their nominee. Don't 
inhale.‖
591
 With his typical wit, Reagan connects Bill Clinton‘s much-mocked statement 
that he had smoked but never inhaled marijuana with the deluding potential of rhetoric. 
Reagan draws on a vision of affective power that drives eighteenth-century critics as 
well, along with the new rhetoricians‘ view of critical auditors, who can resist such 
―rhetorical smoke.‖ Most recently, an advertisement from a group called ―Bankrupting 
America‖ used  the slogan, ―Stop the Rhetoric, It‘s Time to Act.‖
592
 Though the object of 
their criticism is government spending, they also attack rhetoric itself. Even Barack 
Obama, when attacked by a Tea Party activist in a 2011 town hall meeting, used rhetoric 
as a metonym: ―Now, in fairness, since I‘ve been called a socialist who wasn‘t born in 
this country, who is destroying America and taking away its freedoms because I passed a 
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health care bill, I‘m all for lowering the rhetoric."
593
 Here, Obama uses the language that 
is so often used not only against him but also as a way of characterizing the discourse of 
the executive branch throughout history. His suggestion that rhetoric is something that 
can be modulated leaves hope for the rehabilitation of the term from the pejorative, yet he 
clearly speaks to a tradition of that negative usage. In the period I have surveyed, we see 
a similar move. Being called an orator was clearly an insult. By cauterizing and 
containing competing voices, by characterizing them as ―orators‖ and then making an 
effort to show everything that is dangerous about that identity, by neutering orators, these 
writers accuse rhetoric of the most devious of motives and the most calamitous of events. 
It is a reduction, but for the thinkers I have described, it is an urgent one. 
Kenneth Burke has written that ―Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel 
after the fall.‖
594
 Following the English civil war, writers linked the cacophonous noise of 
rhetoric with the languages of violent dissent. Yet Burke offers the opposite possibility: 
that rhetoric restores rather than destroys. In Burke‘s Rhetoric of Motives, symbolic uses 
of language lead to an identification that overcomes even the most primary oppositions. 
In Burke, rhetoric bridges the hope of productive conversation through the language of 
consubstantiality.
595
 This vision seems Ciceronian in its optimism, yet it also relies on a 
realism that takes into account the fallibility of language. In that Babel narrative, in which 
voices become dispersed in a cacophony of indecipherable vocabularies, language may 
have led to the fall. But in Burke‘s optimistic vision, rhetoric can restore it. 
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Along the lines of Burke, I see my work as participating in Bryan Garsten‘s 
inspiring project outlined in Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. 
For Garsten, ―saving the possibility of persuasion in democratic politics is an argument 
for protecting the practice of judgment.‖
596
 Outside of politics, we can also look to the 
classroom. Rather than unifying and homogenizing voices into a coherent and authorized 
style, we can celebrate their diversity and appreciate the directions that dialogic 
interaction can go when unrestrained. In Mikhail Bakhtin‘s inspiring words, ―One‘s own 
discourse and one‘s own voice, although born of another or dynamically stimulated by 
another, will sooner or later begin to liberate themselves from the authority of the other‘s 
discourse.‖
597
 The Blairian imperatives such as perspicuity and clarity instead can be 
used to push these voices (and the students who use them) centrifugally toward a more 
polished center because of what they might do if they are not contained. The last thirty 
years of innovations through composition programs are built on a delight, rather than a 
fear, of what happens when those voices are allowed to thrive.
598
 
The civic and social function of oratory that is sublimated through the eighteenth-
century discourse of rhetorical theory can be restored. The vexed conceptions of orators 
led to the declining cultural capital of rhetoric and the ensuing representations of the 
specious and the ridiculous honey-tongued speakers. This conception was a key impulse 
to the shift from the ennobling power of rhetorical education in classical texts to the 
utilitarian and empirical logic of the new rhetoric. In the matrix that dialectic creates – 
between precision and creativity, between centrifugal and centripetal imperatives, 
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between authority and the individual, between speaker and audience – we find the 
tensions that spark animosity toward the orator. Yet there are also the possibilities that 
Cicero conveyed when he celebrated controversy and argument for the dynamic work 
that they can bring about, that rhetoric is and can be a force that unifies, that identifies 
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